Measuring self-knowledge development : construction of a preliminary scoring manual. by Tamashiro, Roy T.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1975
Measuring self-knowledge development :
construction of a preliminary scoring manual.
Roy T. Tamashiro
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tamashiro, Roy T., "Measuring self-knowledge development : construction of a preliminary scoring manual." (1975). Doctoral
Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 3097.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/3097

MEASURING SELF-KHOI-ILEDGE DEVELOPMENT:
CONSTRUCTION OF A PRELIMINARY SCORING MANUAL
A Dissertation Presented
By
Roy T. Tamashiro
Sumitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in parital
Fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION
December 1975
Education
This document is not copyrighted.
The use of any part of this document for
education, research or other "humane" purposes
is encouraged. To facilitate these ends, an
exchange of ideas and energies with the author
or the Self-Knowledge Education Project, Univer-
sity of Massachusetts would be appreciated.
Supported in part by U.S. Office of Education
Project Nos. POE-9536-D
420AH5004
Grant Nos. OEG-0-70-2174
OEG-GOO-75-7166
MEASURING SELF-KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT:
CONSTRUCTION OF A PRELDHNARY SCORING MANUAL
A Dissertation
By
Roy T. Tamashiro
Approved as to style and content by:
Alfred Alschuler, Chairperson of Committee
C^if/
Judith Evans, Member
// ' :
Cl/;.:
Carole Oglesby, Member
Louis Fischer, Acting
School of Education
December 1975
iv
HEASURING SELF-KHOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT: CONSTRUCTION
OF A PRELIMINARY SCORING MANUAL
(Deceniber 1975)
Roy T. Tamashiro
B.A. University of Hawaii
M.Ed., University of Hawaii
Directed by: Dr. Alfred Alschuler
ABSTRACT
This study attempted to create a defensible theoretical and
empirical foundation for humanistic-psychological education. The
present lack of such a foundation has resulted in four major goal
problems, including: (l)The goals are not operationally clear., (2)They
are of questionable educational value., (3)They are not ethically
justifiable., and (4)They • cannot be adequately evaluated or empirically
assessed.
The structural-developmental perspective, represented by the
thinking of J. Piaget, L. Kohlberg, J. Loevinger and others, was used
as the theoretical frame for the proposed foundation. It appeared
that educational goals derived from the structural-developmental
perspective would be operationally clear, empirically assessible, and
educationally and ethically viable.
"Self-knowledge" was Identified as the domain of psychological
education and a working definition for the concept "self-lmowledge" was
constructed. This definition involved three parts: (A) Experiences
(i.e. one’s conscious thoughts, sensations, feelings and actions);
(B) Theories or verbalized conceptualizations of experiences (i.e. oral
Vor written reports of one's own experiences); and (C) Mental operations
(i.e. mental processes that transform experiences into theories).
This study focused only on people's theories or verbalized
conceptualizations of their experiences (Part B) . Specifically, this
study aimed to identify the developmental stages of self-knowledge
theories. Identifying these stages involved both theoretical and empiri-
cal attack. Theoretically, three stages were derived after reviewing the
works of J. Piaget, L. Kohlberg, J. Loevinger (et.al.) and L. Van den Deale.
These stages were named Pre-Operational, Concrete Operational and Formal
Operational self-knowledge theories, following Piagetian titles.
The empirical approach involved finding an instrument that
elicits a sample of a person's self-knowledge theories, collecting
responses using this instrument, and analyzing the responses for
developmental stage characteristics. A new Instrument, "The Experience
Recall Test," was created to obtain samples of people's self-knowledge
theories. The responses of 72 subjects, whose ego development levels
ranged from 1-2 to 1-6, were chosen for analysis. The responses were
examined for semantic characteristics that would potentially differentiate
the responses into developmental stages. These characteristics were
defined and compiled into a "Preliminary Scoring Manual." The character-
istics in the manual were subjected to the Guttman Scaling Technique
to determine which characteristics formed a developmental hierarchy.
Forty-cne characteristics scaled and these 41 were inductively grouped
into four stages. These four stages, named Elemental, Situational,
Patterned, and Transformational, represented the empirically-derived
stages of self-know'ledge theories.
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The four empirically-derived stages were compared with the three
theoretically-derived stages. An overall consistency was found between
the two versions. The discrepancies and inconsistencies found between
the two versions appeared correctable with further work.
The empirical version of the stages was evaluated by several statis-
tical procedures. Percent agreement between two scorers rating responses
independently was low (72%, 69%, 84% and 50%). This implied that the
manual is presently not sufficiently objective. The degree of scalability
among the stages was within standards of acceptability (coefficient
of reproducibility = .97; coefficient of scalability = .84). The stage
scores were also correlated with ego levels and with age. The correla-
tions (+.73 for ego levels; +.47 with age) suggested that the four
stages were consistent with these indicators for structural-development.
The four stages of self-knowledge theories enable psychological
educators to derive their goals systematically. These goals would
probably be operationally clearer and empirically more assessible than
present goals. Goals based on the self-knowledge stages would have a
consistent theoretical foundation; namely the structural-developmental
perspective. This would tend to make the goals educationally justifiable
and ethically defensible. Of course, additional data and further
debate are required for a more definitive clarification of psychological
education goals.
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PREFACE
It was very timely that my personal desire for understanding "true"
self-knowledge paralleled a similar search in the field of humanistic-
psychological education. Psychological educators, whose overall aim was to
increase students* self-knowledge, desperately needed clarification and
definition of their goals; they needed a reliable and valid method of
evaluating their courses, and their goals needed educational and
ethical justification. Personally by understanding how other people
know themselves and their experiences, perhaps I could gain insight
into my o^-m "self".
It was also opportune that my efforts could be coordinated and
linked with the efforts of other individuals on the Self-Knowledge
Education Project, in conducting this study. I wanted to produce a
document that reflected a truly cooperative, rather than individualistic,
venture. Much of the merits of this dissertation is the product of our
joint efforts, rather than mine alone.
In this study we attempted to identify the developmental levels
of how people conceptualize their ovm experiences. .Tihe delineation of
these levels of "self-knowledge" clarifies the major goals of humanistic-
psychological education. Hopefully the knowledge of the stages will
allow educators to make wiser, more appropriate choices for the deliberate
psychological growth of students. The definition of the stages also
makes possible precise evaluation of students* personal, psychological
learnings. But gaining familiarity with the stages of self-knowledge
is not just an academic exercise. It is a way of deepening one s
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understanding and appreciation of human personality and mental processes.
The terra "self-knowledge,” as used in this document, is partially
a misnomer. In ordinary usage, the term refers to the total wealth of
impressions, data, understanding, intuitions, glimpses one has about
oneself or one*s experiences. In this study, we focus only on
people's reported or verbalized statements about their experiences.
We had no access to people's intuitive sensitivities, unverbalized
or autistic, primary knowledge of self.
The Experience Recall Test, presented in this report, was designed
for obtaining a sample of a person's level of self-knowledge. It is
appropriate both for classroom use and for research purposes. The
method of scoring this test is still embryonic and rather complex.
But this complexity may be the virtue of our approach: it seems to
do justice in representing the breadth and multiplicity of people's
actual self-knowledge statements.
We strongly recommend that a person who wishes to use the stages
of self-knowledge, learn the details of the scoring method. It will
probably involve six to 12 weeks of practice to gain some proficiency
in using the manual. There may be other legitimate ways of identifying
the stages, and we certainly encourage experimenting with these other
approaches. In either case, we recommend that scorers work in teams
of two or more, with extensive discussion in resolving discrepancies
in their scoring. Given the present lack of satisfactory interrater
reliability, we believe that objectivity in scoring can be maximized
by scorers working in such teams. All research work and major or
important curriculum applications should depend on the consensus of two
ix
or more raters.
We feel that the Experience Recall test and its accompanying
scoring manual are "humanistic.” We have employed a sound and rigorous
methodology while remaining faithful to the values and assumptions of
humanistic education. This is contrasted with many previous workers
who have sacrified one or the other. For example, completing the
Experience Recall Test is generally a valuable experience for subjects.
Some respondents have found the test enjoyable or "fun," some have
found it a clarifying exercise for greater self-understanding ("I
never thought about this experience carefully before."); and still
others have found it therapeutic ("The question about the future made
me realize that I could really change the way I am."). At the same
time, the test can be administered in a standardized manner (in either
oral or written format), and it can be administered so that the factors
biasing people's responses are minimized or controlled.
The scoring manual does not confine and demean human subjects
into pigeon-hole labeling and judging. Each stage of self-knowledge
is assumed to serve a healthy and positive function for individuals.
There is value in operating at each of the stages and no stage is
considered to be "better" or "superior" to others. A stage score thus
gives insight into, and appreciation of the qualities, functions and
nuances of a person's self-knowledge. In this way, the scoring method
is dignifying and respectful of individuals.
There is beauty in the Experience Recall Test, even when it is not
used to identify self-knowledge stages. A sensitive person may read
responses to the test and be moved by the kaleidoscopic richness,
variety and depth of people’s conscious experiences. Responses to the
test are sometimes humorous, sometimes dramatic or tragic, or sometimes
very ordinary—invariably, though, they reflect unique qualities and
distinctive "styles” of the persons behind those responses.
In working V7ith our subjects' responses to the recall test, I
personally have been touched, entertained, awed, bored, angered, confused
and thrilled by their experience descriptions. But above all, I have
learned a great deal from working with their personally meaningful
memories. Thus, I wish to acknowledge the contribution of our respondents
first. I extend appreciation for their cooperation and eagerness in
sharing a part of their lives with us.
Central to every aspect of this study were the other individuals on
the Self-Knowledge Education Project, who also served as members of
this dissertation committee: A1 Alschuler, Jerry Weinstein, and
Judy Evans. The close co-operation and mutual supportiveness with which
we worked make it difficult to clearly differentiate each person's
role. A1 was especially valuable in encouraging and insisting on a
high-caliber of auality and excellence in all phases of both the research
process and my writing. Jerry's special contribution was his alertness
and persistence in keeping the human "self", especially the emotions,
from getting lost in the psychometric research jungle. I am grateful
for his counsel at numerous points throughout the dissertation process
—
he was very helpful in preserving my sanity through the journey.
Judy was truly unselfish and generous in giving her time, energy and
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knowledge during the entire research, process. I cherish her ability
for turning the obstacles, difficulties and nitty-gritties of this
research into painless and often joy-filled tasks.
As the "outside" coiniDittee member, Carole Oglesby provided a
fresh, unglazed perspective on our work. Her insights and criticisms
enabled us to recognize the blind-spots and gaps in our work.
George Foreman gave us the initial clue that eventually led to
developing the present scoring manual. His critique of this disserta-
tion as the dean’s representative was also valuable.
Also essential in this study was the participation of several
talented and energetic individuals. Giles Hopkins built much of the
philosophical and historical framework for the concept of self-knowledge.
Kate McClain searched developmental theories for the characteristics
that eventually provided the basis for the theoretically-derived stages
(Chapter IV) . Ann Jones trained and supervised raters of the ego
development test, which we used alongside the Experience Recall Test.
Jude Berman and Maxine Markson contributed immensely to the momentous
task of constructing the scoring manual and of scoring the Experience
Recall Test protocols. All of these persons also contributed their time
in administering the recall test to several hundred subjects.
Several people played key roles as liasons making available the
cooperation of various test groups and respondents. These liasons
included: Frank Bellizi, Virginia Evans, Sharon Flashraan, Paul Henry,
John Howell, Ann Jones, Carole Oglesby, Carly Tartakov, and Andrew V^Vieiahan.
Our office staff assumed tremendous responsibility for record
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keeping and organization, transcribing protocols and typing manuscripts.
Most of this responsibility was centered around Ginny Mondschein.
Assisting Girny throughout the course of this research were Bernice
Stratton
,Arlene Kanno, Susan Olsen, and Donna GaT'rron.
I am grateful to good friends who were immensely patient and
supportive of me during the course of this dissertation. My roommates,
Peter Hardin, David Goodman and Joel Goodman graciously accepted
both the torturous struggles and the ecstatic breakthoughs I encountered
doing this dissertation. The people at One Kennedy Drive including
Dennis Gray, Cathy Garnett, Joy Hardin, Jan Levine and Kathy Phillips
provided emotional refuge when I needed it and energy and encouragement
at other times. A support group which included Joy Hardin, and through
the years, Kate McClain, Kathy Atkinson and Elaine Ostroff, provided
editorial support and critique of my writing. Barbara Mangarell^
provided a physical challenge of playing tennis at 6:00 a.m. that
enabled me to structure and discipline myself into a consistent
writing schedule.
Joy deserves special acknoxjledgements in addition to her contributions
mentioned above. I am grateful for her love and kindness, and for her
assistance and partnership in teaching, research, siting, and play. I
cherish her friendship and collegueship
.
Finally, I thank Ruth Levinson and Helen Nowlis for their belief and
confidence in our work. Through their advocacy of our interests, this
research has been supported during the last three years by grant* G007507166
from the U.S. Office of Drug Education.
ROY T. TAJIASHIRO
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
What should be the goals of psychological education? This may be
the most important question facing educators whose concern is
students' inner, psychological world. Since they deal directly with
people's values, emotions, beliefs, and otTier areas of personal
experience, these educators are potentially very influential. They
may be able to deliberately stimulate development toward the ideals
of human functioning; for example, to teach people to be "fully
integrated, healthy, and capable." Virtually all psychological
educators endorse these Ideals. But, they disagree about what those
Ideals and goals mean in practice. They have conflicting notions
about the operational definitions of these goals. They lack adequate
means for evaluating courses directed toward these goals. And, they
have difficulty justifying the educational and ethical value of
psychological education. Thus, it is hard to know if psychological
education goals and courses are truly worthwhile, if they serve no
benefit, or if they are actually harmful.
This study tries to address these goal problems in psychological
education. Of course, any solution, in the last analysis, will be
limited by one's perspective and expertise. But the investigators
in this study believe that solutions should be sought because
psychological educators have an obligation to insure that their goals
and courses are just and desirable. To teach without rational,
justifiable goals magnifies the potential for violating a person's
2rights, for making unwise decisions and for engaging in unwarranted
actions. We believe that psychological educators should have a
systematic foundation for their goals to reduce the potentiality
for these unjust and undesirable consequences. Moreover, a
strong theoretical and empirical foundation for goals would enable
educators to make intelligent decisions and to implement effective and
worthwhile curricula.
In this study, we make the case that the major current problems
and difficulties in psychological education result from the lack of a
comprehensive theoretical and empirical foundation. We propose that
the structural-developmental perspective offers a framework that can
fill the need for that lacking theoretical foundation in psychological
education. On this premise, we proceed to define the domain of
psychological education in terms of the structural-developmental perspective
and to seek empirical data that support or clarify the theoretical
definitions. This empirical search is conducted by creating a test
instrument that elicits data relevant to the theoretical definitions,
by collecting people's actual responses to the test and by constructing
a method for scoring these responses. This dissertation is a documentation
of these steps in the search for a sound theoretical and empirical
foundation for the goals of psychological education. We begin by
surveying the major unanswered questions or problems in the field
of psychological education.
Goal Problems in Psychological Education
In this section, we contend that the lack of an adequate theoretical
3and empirical foundation in psychological education has resulted in
some difficult and unanswerable questions; and that these difficulties
and problems are solvable if such a theoretical and empirical foundation
is developed for psychological education.
By "theoretical and empirical foundation" we mean a systematic
perspective or position that involves the following characteristics:
(1) It makes a coherent and philosophically defensible statement
about the nature of mental processes, their functioning and how
learning occurs.
(2) It represents a consistent value position. That is, all
aspects of the position are defensible in terms of a consistent
educational and political or social value base. This value base
should itself be morally justifiable.
(3) Its concepts can be defined operationally. This means that
the concepts involved in the perspective are definable in terms of
actions (or behaviors) without ambiguity or confusion.
(4) Its concepts are empirically verifiable. The concepts
involved in the perspective can be clarified, corrected or otherwise
evaluated by the various methods of empirical research.
Currently there is no comprehensive theoretical and empirical
foundation in psychological education. The courses and programs are
generally developed by ingenious, but individualistic educators whose
philosophies, goals and orientations rarely coincide. Consequently,
it is not surprising that there are some serious goal problems that
plague psychological education. These problems include the following:
41. Psychological education goals are operationally
confusing and misleading.
2. Psychological education goals are of questionable
educational value.
3. Psychological education goals are ethically
unjustifiable.
4. Psychological education goals cannot be adequately
evaluated or empirically assessed.
Each of these problems are now explained in detail.
1. Psychological education goals are operationally confusing
. A
growing awareness of the importance of directly promoting psychological
growth for students has stimulated a proliferation of humanistic and
psychological education courses. The goals of these courses are
almost as numerous as the courses themselves. Typical goals Include:
"becoming more open," "increasing creativity," "improving one's memory,"
"gaining greater awareness of oneself," "developing spontaneity or
authenticity," or "clarifying one's values." Despite this wide
array and diversity of goals, the goals themselves are ill-defined.
The vagueness of the goals becomes evident when one attempts to
specify a goal with observable behaviors. Practically any bit of
behavior could be interpreted either as a positive expression of one
goal or as the failure to realize another related goal. For example,
let us suppose a person strolls past an ice-cream parlor, and is
tempted to buy a sundae, but decides not to buy it. This behavior
could be Interpreted favorably as an example of "practicing self-discipline,"
a typical goal in psychological education. The same behavior may be
5explained in the negative light of another goal as the "lack of
spontaneity." There is no foundation or criteria to appeal to to
resolve the differences of interpretation. Labeling a behavior in
positive or negative goal terms seems completely relative, "since one
person's 'integrity' is another person's 'stubbornness,' one person's
'honesty in expressing your true feelings' is another person's
'insensitivity to the feelings of others' (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972, p. 479)."
Typical psychological education goals are also misleading,
because the behavioral expression of the goal may be appropriate in one
situation, but not in another, i.e. the goals are sltuationally-determined.
This problem can be illustrated with one such goal, "to Increase
spontaneity." Whereas spontaneity may be valuable in composing
a piece of original music, it is probably dysfunctional and dangerous
in lariding an aircraft at O'Hare Airport without communicating with the
control tower. The situationally-determined quality of most current
psychological education goals cannot be clarified because there are
no systematic rationales or theories supporting the goals.
The unmanageable number of psychological education goals also
contributes to their confusion. On one hand, the numerous and
diverse goals all seem to point to one superordinate goal: to
help people increase and improve ways of knowing and understanding
themselves and their experiences, i.e. increasing self-knowledge.
Practically every program and goal claims to ultimately promote
full humanness (Alschuler 1973). But, there is virtually no common
understanding of what specifically constitutes self-knowledge or
full humanness. These are mere platitudes, further confusing the
6attempt to define the goals clearly.
Vague and misleading goals have several undesirable practical
consequences. First, nebulous goals cannot be translated into meaningful
curriculum objectives. Educators cannot reliably derive action plans
or behavioral objectives from vague goals. Second, with psychological
education goals unspecified, curricular sequencing becomes difficult.
There is no method for deciding which goals should precede or
follow other goals; which competencies are prerequisites for another
competency. Consequently, the coordination of psychological learnings
is impossible—educators cannot decide whether a goal is appropriate
for six-year olds or for 16-year olds. Third, vague and misleading
goals mean that educators cannot evaluate their programs, and hence
are unable to obtain useful feedback to Improve their effectiveness.
They cannot learn from their mistakes, nor benefit from research
findings when the goals are too vague to evaluate. In general,
vague and misleading goals have led to difficulties in the implementation
of psychological education programs. And, these practical problems need
not exist if a systematic foundation adequately clarifies and defines
the goals.
2. The educational value of the goals is questionable . Without
a consistent foundation for their goals, psychological educators
have been unable to resolve several issues regarding the educational
value of their goals and programs . One unresolved issue is whether
the goals can he considered educational if no behavioral differences
result from teaching toward a goal. Most psychological education goals.
7such as "self-disclosure," "body awareness," or "improving self-esteem,"
focus on Internal states and feelings rather than observable skills
or behaviors. These internal states are usually unrelated to specific
behaviors (Wylie, 1961). Of what worth is a goal which makes no
behavioral difference? Psychological educators might maintain that
inner feelings and experiences are what is most relevant to students,
and to ignore students' concerns is alienating and discourages learning
(Fantini & Weinstein, 1968; Paths, Hermin & Simon, 1966). Granting
that, the questions still remain: "What is really learned in a psycho-
logical education course?" "Are there any behaviors to show the learnings?"
Another issue is whether psychological goals achieved in a course
or program are retained. Many empirical studies of workshops, training
session and encounter groups report negative results on long-term
effects (Back, 1972; Lieberman, Yalom & Miles, 1973; Campbell 6
Dunnette, 1968). Moreover, some psychological goals (e.g. on dimensions
such as introversion-extroversion, and passive-active) have been shovm
to be linked to hereditary temperraental traits, that no amount of
education is likely to change (Ausubel & Sullivan, 1970; Kohlberg,
LaCrosse & Ricks, 1971). Thus, for many psychological education goals,
behavior changes either cannot be effected or they cannot be retained.
When learnings are so unretalnable , it is questionable whether the
goals have any genuine educational value.
Leaving the several issues involving the educational value of the
goals unresolved has political implications. Since it is easy to
overlook the valuable aspects of psychological education programs when
these unresolved issues are foremost; legislatures, parents and educators
8may remain doubtful and unconvinced that a course is any "good" or
that it is worth supporting with time, money and other resources
(Alschuler & Weinstein, 1973). Worthwhile programs may be abandoned
simply because their less than adequate foundations could not address
these issues,
3, The goals are ethically unjustifiable
. Another difficulty of
psychological education goals is that they are often entangled in
ethical webs. The manner in which psychological education courses
come into being illustrates these lacunae. Courses are often designed
to promote the existing aims of education, especially psycho-social
aims (Alschuler, 1969). Some of these courses are inspired by research
results, such as deCharms’ (1969; Shea & Jackson
^
1970) "origin"
training program. This program used the Coleman report (1966)
(which found a significant correlation between students* attitude toward
their own fate and how much they learned in school) as its rationale.
Other courses appeal to predominant cultural norms or traditional values
as their starting point. Achievement motivation training, for example,
claims to encourage basic values such as independence, acceptance of
personal responsibility and entrepreneural role responsibility (Alschuler,
1973). But appealing to either empirical facts or cultural traditions
is ethically naive. Deriving educational goals from facts confuses
what is, with what is desirable. Facts may inform us about the way
things are, but they do not tell us the way things should be. We may
still ask, "of what value is this fact?" (Kohlberg, 1971).
Appealing to cultural traditions is also ethically questionable.
Within this country alone there are thousands of cultural groups—the
Catholic Church, the Daughters of American Revolution, the Ku Klux Klan,
9Ford Motor Company, the Black Muslims, the National Football League,
the U.S. Air Force—^which have conflicting or incompatible traditions.
Which cultural tradition should be the basis for goals, and why? One
may take a cultural relativist position and accord the different values
of each group equal validity for members of that culture. But there is
still no method for resolving differences when conflicts arise between
the different cultures. In a diverse society, any goal derived from
norms or traditions probably violates the traditions or norms of some
parents, some sectors of the community or some teachers. This leaves
educators unable to decide what should be the goals of psychological
education.
In an attempt to avoid this dilemma, some psychological education
goals focus on the processes which help students reach goals they
choose. It is argued that emphasizing the processes minimizes
imposing values on students and is non-indoctrlnary . Thus, students
in these courses are taught how to clarify values, not which values
to hold (Rath, Harmin and Simon, 1966). They are taught hov; to work
through self-chosen undesirable patterns, rather than being censured
for them (Weinstein, 1971). Despite this shift in focus, the further
question, "Why are process goals good? Under what criteria?" still
is unanswered. Also, the question of justice remains when, in these
courses, everyone (including the teacher) may express one's own views
only as a perspective and not the right answer. Conflicts of values
or goals cannot be resolved, because there are no principles or
criteria of right. Without these principles, respect for human life
and discrimination by sex or race are equally right; a murderer and a
10
saint have equal claim to freedom. The wisdom of teaching toward
this non-principled morality (i.e. amorality) is highly questionable.
In summary, the goals in psychological education seem to be based on
several, often inconsistent and indefensible ethical positions. There
is no theoretical foundation that one can appeal to for resolving the
conflicting value positions of the various goals in psychological
education.
4. Psychological education goals cannot be adequately evaluated . Still
another consequence of an Inadequate theoretical and empirical foundation
for psychological goals is that the goals cannot be evaluated.
Many goals, in the first place, do not have accompanying validated
tools of measurements. Generally, psychological educators teach toward
their invented goals or concepts without carefully designing a test
or evaluation method for their goals or concepts. Thus, numerous well-
sounding goals, such as "self-reliance," "deliberateness," "openness,"
or "creativity" have no accompanying evaluative tools that can assess
whether students have learned these traits.
Where instruments do exist, their items are composed randomly
and arbitrarily because the constructs they evaluate have inadequate
theoretical clarity. For example, practically all Instruments that
claim to evaluate self-esteem or self-concept (Butler and Haigh, 1954;
Schwartz and Tangri, 1965; Pervin and Lilly, 1967; Rosenberg, 1953; Secord
and Jourard,1953; Coopersmith, 1967; Gough and Hellbrun, 1965) may be
characterized in this way. In these tests, there is no clear relation-
ship between the test items and the concept the test purports to
measure (Wylie, 1961). Thus, there is also no clear relationship
between the test items and the goal that was derived from the concept.
11
Ultimately, one does not know whether the test measures the goal being
tested.
In outlining the current goal issues in psychological education we
have suggested that an inadequate theoretical and empirical foundation
for those goals has led to practical difficulties, educational and
ethical value questions, and problems in evaluating the goals. We
now propose that the structural-developmental perspective offers a
viable systematic foundation to address the problems of psychological
education. This claim will be outlined after we sketch some key
elements of the structural-developmental perspective.
The Structural-Developmental Perspective
The structural-developmental perspective is a philosophical and
psychological system which emerges from several sources, including the
dialectics of Hegel and the modern pragmatism of John Dewey (1938).
The major exponents of this perspective include Jean Piaget (Flavell,
1963), James Mark Baldwin (1906; 1908; 1911), Lawrence Kohlberg (1964,
1972), 0. J. Harvey, David Hunt and Harold Schroder (1961); and Jane
Loevlnger (1966, 1970). The reader is referred to these sources for a
more complete description of the structural-developmental perspective.
Here, we shall attempt to summarize the essence of this perspective
by briefly describing some of its main features.
The core of the structural-developmental perspective is its view
of mental growth and development. Most other psychological theories
assume that mental development is either determined primarily by
hereditary, biologically given factors or determined primarily by
environmental and social influences. The first sees the mind as
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organic, like a plant or animal which matures according to an ^ priori
plan. The other sees the mind as essentially mechanistic, like a
passive machine upon which data from the environment is transmitted and
impressed (Langer, 1969). The structural-developmental perspective
avoids this irreconcilable debate by using a different metaphor to
illustrate mental processes. It views mental development as a
dialectical progression of ideas in a conversation or discussion. In
this perspective, individuals develop as they redefine and reorganize
ideas » These redefinitions and reorganizations occur as the ideas
are acted out in experiences and are confronted with opposing ideas in
discourse and argument (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972).
Central to understanding the nature and dynamics of mental
processes as viewed by the structural-developmentallsts
,
is the
concept of structure . Structure has several properties. First, there
is a unitary thought-organization or wholeness which characterizes
structure. This means that behind any thought that a person expresses
there is a logical consistency, an integration and an organized system
of relationships. For all persons at a given level of mental develop-
ment these characteristic thought-organizations would have the same
qualities. But the qualities would differ at another level of
development
.
Second, structures are characterized by several kinds of mental
activities which are called transformations. Transformations are the
abilities of the mind to take elements given in an experience and
change them in various ways. For example, given two elements, the mind
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might combine them, reverse them, assign sequentiality to them,
assign causality to them, or make hypothetico-deductive considerations
with them. At a given level of development, some kinds of mental
processes or transformations would be possible, while other trans-
formations would not be possible.
A third property of structure is that it is self-regulating. This
means that a structure is able to maintain a balance or equilibrium,
preserve its own properties, and follow coherent principles of operation.
It does so as if the mind were governed by rules for the processing
of information and for the connecting of events.
Thus, a structure "is a systematic whole of self-regulating
transformations (Piaget, 1970, p. 44)." It is an organized thought-
pattern which undergoes transformations in its transactions with the
environment. It maintains equilibrium and stability by functioning in
a self-regulating manner.
Developmental growth is defined as a movement from one of these
mental structures to another. These changes are not inevitable
maturational changes. Experiences are crucial for structural-development
to occur. However, "learning" in the usual sense of acquiring knowledge
of the environment through training, instruction or practicing, does not
necessarily constitute structural development either. Rather, structural
development Involves changes in the overall, general patterns of
thinking about the self and the world. By definition, these structural
changes occur in a sequence of stages . which have the following
characteristics
:
1. There are distinct, qualitative changes in a
personas modes of thinking, or modes of solving
a problem from one stage to another.
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2. These different raodes of thinking form an
invariant sequence
,
order or succession in
individual development. No stage can be
skipped; and while cultural factors may
speed up, slow down, or stop development,
they do not change the sequence.
3. Each of these different and sequential modes
forms a "structural whole ." A given stage
response on a task does not just represent a
specific response determined by knowledge and
familiarity with that task or tasks similar
to it; rather it represents an underlying
thought-organization.
4. Stages are hierarchical integrations which
form an order of Increasingly differentiated
and integrated structures to serve a common
function. Each stage is more complex than
the previous one and prepares for the suc-
ceeding one; every stage builds on, incor-
porates and transmutes the previous stages.
(From Tanner and Inhelder, 1956; 1960)
Unlike many views of development, the concept of structural stage
development is theoretically Independent of chronological age (Kohlberg,
1969; Loevinger, 1966). Structures and stage sequence are defined
without reference to age-specific or culture-specific problems such as
entry into kindergarten, adolescence, or marriage.
In summary, some essential features which typify the structural-
developmental perspective are: (1) its view of mental development
as the dialectical encounter of an inquiring human mind with Itself
and environmental experiences; (2) its concept of structure as a
systematic whole of self-regulating transformations; and (3) its
sequence of stages which are qualitatively distinct, invariant in
succession, structurally wh61e and hierarchically ordered.
In understanding these characteristics, there is a tendency to
confuse principles and facts . It should be noted that the features of
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the structural-developmental perspective represent principles and
criteria which underlie the theories. Whether a particular developmental
theory in fact meets these criteria is a question open to empirical
research. For example, according to the structural-developmental
perspective, the sequence of stages do not vary from culture to culture.
This does not necessarily mean that the sequence of stages in a specific
theory, say Kohlberg*s sequence of moral reasoning, is actually
culturally universal. Although he aims to develop a culturally
universal theory, Kohlberg can claim that his sequence of moral
reasoning stages is truly universal only after empirically verifying
the stages in all past and present cultures. Until then, his
theoretical stage sequence is open to revision. In the same manner,
Loevinger*s and Piaget’s developmental sequences are culturally
universal to the extent each has been tested in different cultures.
Simply stated, stage sequence is culturally universal by definition
and principle; stage sequences of actual theories are approximately
universal (to the degree they have been empirically researched).
We shall turn now to reviewing how this structural-developmental
perspective offers a viable framework for addressing the goal problems
of psychological education.
A Potential Fo\mdation for Psychological Education Goals
Advocates of the structural-developmental perspective claim that
an educational ideology derived from it would have a systematic
philosophical and psychological foundation supportable by empirical
research (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972; Sprlnthall, 1973; Stewart, 1972).
We have reviewed how the goal problems of psychological education
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result primarily from the lack of this kind of systematic foundation.
Here we outline how the structural-developmental perspective contains
the necessary characteristics that make it a potentially fruitful
theoretical and empirical foundation for psychological education.
First, the structural-developmental perspective is rooted in a
philosophically coherent ideology, termed "progressivism, " associated
mainly with Dewey (1938) and developed as part of the pragmatic
-
functional-genetic philosophies of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. From this philosophic base stems a defensible
learning theory, viz., the dialectical-interactional notion of mental
processes, elaborated most recently by Dewey and Piaget (See previous
section). This dialectical-interactional perspective seems to be a
more useful assumption about learning for educators than either the
maturational-organic perspective or the mechanistic, data-acqulsltlon
perspective. In the maturational-organic view, the role of educators
in a person's learning is minimal because individuals learn mostly
by maturation, regardless of educational intervention. In the mechanistic,
data-acqulsltion view, the function of education is also minimal. This
is because, in that view, significant learning can occur in any
environment; thus, educational settings (and the role of educators) are
no more significant than other "non-educatlonal" environments. In the
dialectical-Interactional view, educators can provide important oppor-
tunities for learning, which are not available either in the natural,
maturational process or in data from external environments. The role
of the educator in this view is to structure selective, stimulating
problems that challenge learners according to their developmental levels.
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The learning that occurs involve increasingly adequate reorganizations
in the individuals* TPental operations. Thus, it seems that educators*
roles in the learning process is clearer, broader and more significant
in the dialectical-interactional view, than in the other two perspectives.
Second, the structural-developmental perspective represents a
consistent value position. Ethically, the structural-developmental
perspective rests on the value postulates of ethical liberalism,
identified mainly with J. S. Mill, Tufts, Dewey and Kant. This ethical
position rejects cultural or traditional standards and also rejects
value-relativism. Instead it recognizes ethical universals, which
are formulated and justified philosophically, not simply by appealing
to facts, to the status quo, or to empirical evidence. These ethical
universals can define and clarify the educational, ethical and politico-
social value of educational goals. For example, let us suppose that
''individual liberty" was defined as an ethically universal principle.
For the structural-developmentalist,
...the principle of respect for liberty is itself defined
as a moral aim of education. Not only are the rights of
the child to be respected by the teacher, but the child's
development is to be stimulated so that he may come to
respect and defend his own rights and the rights of others....
Consistent application of ethical principles to education means
that education should stimulate the development of ethical
principles in students
.
(Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972, pp. ^73-474)
If the structural-developmental perspective is applied to psychological
education, the ethical and educational value of the goals in psychological
education courses could also be defined and clarified by making the
goals consistent with these ethically universal principles. This would
mean also that psychological education goals would not be defined
according to culture—specif ic standards nor would they be value—relative.
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Third, the concepts involved in the structural-developmental
perspective can be operationally defined. As discussed above (see
previous section), the central concepts of structure and sequence of
stages have explicit definitions. These definitions serve as clear
criteria for identifying what phenomena are related to structures or
stages. And, once these phenomena (relating to structures or stages)
are Identified, the definitions can be used for translating structural
and stage characteristics into curriculum objectives. For example,
a developmental objective based on the definition of structure must
stimulate behavior change which is irreversible, general over a field
of responses and relevant t^ the sequential-hierarchical stages.
Irreversible behavior changes implies that learnings would not be
extinguishable nor situationally-determined. Given the explicit
operaticnalizable definitions, the concepts in the structural-developmental
perspective make possible relatively clear and unambiguous translation
of those concepts into educational practice.
Finally, theories, concepts and goals derived from the structural-
developmental perspective are empirically verifiable. Since each
concept or educational goal in theories based on the structural-
developmental perspective would have theoretical and operational
meanings independent of test items (Kohlberg and DeVries, 1971; Pinard
and Laurendeau, 1964), test items need not be composed randomly or
arbitrarily. The concept or goal can guide the composition and selection
of test items. Hence tests can truly evaluate the concepts they purport
to assess. Moreover, the test items can, in turn, clarify and correct
the concept or goal they measure (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955; Loevinger, 1957)
.
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Another educational use of developmental tests is that they can assess
the superordinate ends of education. This is because goals based on
general and fundamental concepts such as structures and stages would
also be fundamental and basic (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972). In short,
developmental tests are potentially useful in choosing specific
objectives and also in clarifying fundamental and superordinate goals
of psychological education.
In general, compared to present goals in psychological education,
the goals derived from the structural-developmental perspective are
potentially more defensible and coherent in its philosophical base
including its position on how people learn and develop, and in its
educational and ethical value position. Given a structural -developmental
framework, psychological education goals and concepts can become more
definable operationally, i.e. they can become clearer in terms of
actual practice and Implementation, And the structural—developmental
perspective could provide a method for adequately evaluating the goals
in psychological education. If approached with the systematic theoretical
and empirical foundation of the structural-developmental perspective,
it appears that the present goal problems plaguing psychological
education can be solved.
Plan Of This Study
Having reviewed the persistent problems of goals in psychological
education and how they might be untangled by approaching them from the
structural—developmentalist perspective, what were our steps in this
untangling process?
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The first step was to stake out the content domain of psychological
education, to which the structural-developmental perspective would be
applied. This domain was tentatively labeled, self-knowledge
development. The meaning of "self-knowledge development" needed to
be sufficiently clarified. This step is reported in Chapter II.
This study focused on the aspect of self-knowledge as defined in
Chapter II, namely on people's theories or verbalized conceptualizations
of their experiences. We hypothesized a set of stage characteristics
from existing structural-developmental theories, including Piaget,
Kohlberg, Loevinger and Van den Deale. Then an Instrument that elicited
people's verbal reports of experiences (the Experience Recall test)
was created. We used that Instrument to collect a sample of people's
self-knowledge theories and used these collected responses to construct
a scoring method for identifying the developmental stages of self-
knowledge. These steps comprise the major focus of this dissertation
and are outlined in detail in Chapter III.
Chapter IV summarizes the hypothesized stage characteristics
derived from other developmental theories. These characteristics were
used as a guide in the early phases of constructing the socring manual.
Chapter V describes the four stages and their characteristics,
which are derived by having analyzed the responses to the Experience Recall
test.
We assessed the reliability of the scoring methodology and the
construct validity of the four empirically-derived stages. The results
of these evaluations are reported in Chapter VI.
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In the final chapter, the entire study is reviewed and critiqued.
This is done by comparing the theoretically-derived stages to the
empirically-derived stages, and by evaluating the technical specifications
of the Experience Recall test and its scoring manual. The final
chapter also contains recommendations for future studies and a
conclus ion.
CHAPTER II
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THE CONCEPT OF SELF KNOWLEDGE
Before applying the structural-developmental perspective to the
goal problems of psychological education, the content domain of these
goals needed to be sufficiently clarified. In the present chapter, this
domain is delineated and defined. This is done by first abstracting
what is the common concern among current goals and courses in psycho-
logical education. Then the common element, namely, self-knowledge,
will be defined to serve as a working construct for the present study.
Common Ground Of Psychological Education Goals
It may seem futile to attempt a summary of the commonality among
ill-defined goals (described in Chapter I). However, it is legitimate
to ask, "What makes these diverse goals all part of psychological
education rather than part of another field? Is there any thread that
unifies all of these courses?"
One way of answering these questions is to group the goals according
to their broader underlying intentions or aims. Using this approach,
Alschuler (1973) found practically all existing courses and goals falling
into four categories. The categories are not mutually exclusive, but they
do help to organize the goals. He suggests that "the first broad goal
of psychological education is to promote the existing aims of education,
especially the often neglected psycho-social goals (Alschuler, 1973,
p. 205)." Included in this category are various courses which aim to
improve memory (Roth, 1952; Furst, 1960), to increase creativity
(Masslalas and Zevln, 1967; Gordon, 1961; deMille, 1967), or to develop
one's mastery of the environment according to standards of excellence
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(McClelland, 1965; Parsons, 1959). "Confluent" courses, integrating
experiential and affective methods in the teaching of traditional
academic topics (e.g.. Brown, 1971), are also Included in this group.
"The second basic goal of psychological education is to teach
students effective and pleasurable processes to reach the goals they
choose (Alschuler, 1973, p. 207)." Instead of focusing on specific
outcomes such as increasing creative behaviors, these courses aim for
students' understanding the methods and procedures that enable them
to make their own decisions about those outcomes. Courses such as
"values clarification" (Raths, Harmin and Simon, 1971; Simon, Howe and
Kirshenbaum, 1972), "microcounseling"^ (Ivey, 1971), and "education of
the self"^ (Fantlnl and Weinstein, 1970; Weinstein, 1971) are typical
examples of this group.
"The third goal of psychological education is to teach positive
mental health" (Alschuler, 1973, p. 209). Although mental health has
a variety of meanings ranging from a healthy body to spiritual fulfill-
ment, all of the courses in this category are concerned with "positive"
human qualities rather than with pathologies or with adjustment.
Alschuler gives some examples:
One group of practitioners claims that the royal
road to mental health is the body. You should stop
betraying your body (Lowen, 1967), relax (Jacobson,
1962), awaken and relax your senses (Gunther, 1968,
1. "Microcounseling" teaches methods and techniques ("how-to's") for
attending and listening to others. Instead of telling students when to
behave this way.
2. "Education of the self" teaches processes for students to work
through self-selected "dissonant" patterns.
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1970), find inner beauty and outer youth (Enelow,
1969), breathe properly (Proskauer, 1968), control
your brain waves (Tart, 1969), have peak
experiences in the nude (Bindrim, 1968) and
ultimately achieve the sine qua non of mental
health, a quivering, vibrating, pulsating,
mind-boggling orgasm (Reich, 1942; Lowen, 1965).
At the other end of the continuum, there are those
who describe positive mental health as the psycho-
logical equivalent of spiritual fulfillment:
Individuation (Jung, 1959), Psycho-synthesis
(Assagloli, 1965), Self-Actualization (naslow,
1968).... In between the body and the spirit there
is a large group of practitioners with theories
and followers who espouse healthy Interpersonal
communication: how to fight fair with those you
love (Bach and Wyden, 1970)
,
how to communicate
effectively with your children (Gordon, 1970), with
your family as a whole (Satlr, 1967)....
(Alschuler, 1973, pp. 209-210).
"The fourth major goal of psychological education is to promote
normal development CAlschulerJ973, p. 211)." Courses in this category
include those which facilitate learning in stages of Plagetian
cognitive abilities^ (Smeldslund, 1961; Sigel, Roeper and Hooper, 1966;
Gruen, 1965; Beilen, Kagan and Rabinowitz, 1966), develop reasoning
about moral problems (Kohlberg, 1963, 1964, 1968) or stimulate ego
development^ (van den Deale, 1970; Sprinthall and Mosher, 1970).
In brief, by grouping courses and goals according to their under-
lying aim, they can be classified into one or more of four categories:
(1) those courses promoting the existing psycho-social aims of education;
3. These abilities Involve reasoning in several areas of physical
reality including number, class, membership, length, mass and volume
(Flavell, 1963).
4. "Ego development" stages parallel the stages of Piaget's cognitive
development, but is more Inclusive. Aspects of ego development include
impulse control, interpersonal style, conscious preoccupation and
cognitive complexity (Loevlnger, al.
.
1970).
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(2) those teaching students effective processes to reach goals they
choose; (3) those teaching positive mental health; and (4) those
promoting normal psychological development.
When the goals and courses are sorted into these four categories,
some common concerns in all psychological education courses become
apparent. One of these commonalities is that the courses all seem to
recognize and directly address the experiences of learners. Whether
the goal is to control your destiny or to be able to monitor your
brain waves, the focus is on understanding personal data. This is
contrasted with the focus in other courses on learning facts or concepts
that are often unrelated or only distantly relevant to oneself. Given
a choice between emphasizing public, factual knowledge versus personal,
experiential knowledge, psychological education courses would all select
the latter. Another similar unifying element underlying the four
categories is the phenomenological perspective. Specifically, the
subjective aspect of the learners is important in the goals in all four
categories. The students' perceptions, interpretations, values,
meanings or choices are central to every goal in psychological education.
By collectively considering these unifying concerns (viz., the
emphasis on the experiential, on personal knowledge, and on the
subjective), one could identify the essential content domain of psycho-
logical education. Taken together, these common elements seem to point
directly to the notion, "self-knowledge." "Self-knowledge" could be
tentatively defined as the ways of knowing and imderstandlng one's
experiences. By this broad definition, "self-knowledge" accurately
represents the domain of psychological education because the courses
and goals are all concerned with this subjective, experiential, personal
self-knowledge.
* * *
This preliminary conclusion that self-knowledge is the unifying
concern among psychological education courses seems to be confirmed by
the actual methods and procedures used in the courses. When the
activities or procedures used in the courses are examined, the "rhetoric"
of the stated goals becomes operationally specified. For example,
...Outward Bound courses attempt to promote "self-
reliance" (Katz and Kolb, 1968). Most of the
course exercises ask students to engage in physically
difficult tasks like scaling a cliff or swimming
50 yards underwater in one breath. Outward Bound
courses usually end with a solo survival experience
in the wilderness in which the trainee lives off
the land. Procedurally
,
"self-reliance" is defined
as mastering these challenging physical tasks
(Alschuler, 1969, p. 9).
Similarly, by focusing on course procedures, it is possible to
summarize the actual concerns of those courses, and then to see whether
the term "self-knowledge" includes these concerns. Alschuler (1969)
has identified four types of typical or common procedures.
First, most courses contain procedures to develop
a constructive dialogue with one's own fantasy life.
A second set of extremely common procedures involves
nonverbal exercises, such as silent improvisations,
free expression dance movements, meditation, the
exaggeration of spontaneous body movements, and a wide
variety of games.
A third set of typical procedures focuses on developing
and exploring Individual's emotional responses to the
world.
A fourth characteristic set of procedures emphasizes
the Importance of living fully and intensely "here
and now" (Alschuler, 1969, pp. 9-11).
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This summary of procedures, like the categories of goal statements,
point In the direction of self-knowledge. The emphasis again Is on
experiential, personal knowledge. In constrast to external, public
knowledge. The procedures also suggest that this experiential focus
specifically Involves a person's emotions, fantasy, communication
patterns and actions. These focal characteristics further elaborate
our broad definition of self-knowledge. We derived the following
definition by Incorporating these characteristics: Self-knowledge Is
understanding the Immediate experience of one's own emotions, fantasy,
communication patterns and actions.
Thus, we arrived at the notion of self-knowledge by abstracting
typical characteristics of goals and courses In humanistic education.
Although the concept of self-knowledge seems to adequately summarize
the content domain of psychological education, the concept needed to
be defined more exactly for purposes of the present study. To do this,
we constructed a working definition of self-knowledge, which Is detailed
In the next section.
Working Definition Of Self-Knowledge^
Ideally, a working definition of "self-knowledge" should be
derived froB> reviewing and summarizing its previous conceptualizations
in philosophy, psychology and psychiatry. But it would require a
Herculean effort and prodigious scholarship to review relevant theories
of self-knowledge over the 2,000 years of Western History and the 4,000
5. Parts of this section are adapted from Self-Knowledge Education
Working Paper 113, "Towards a Theory of Self-Knowledge Development,"
unpublished paper. University of Massachusetts, January 1974.
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years In the East. The investigators in this study surveyed some of
these theories.^ Along with this survey, a set of practical criteria
guided the formulation of the working definition, so that it would be
relevant to our aim of addressing the goal problems in psychological
education (see Chapter I). These criteria are:
(1) The definition should be consistent with the content
domain of psychological education. The definition should include and/or
emphasize the various concerns, goals and procedures of the courses,
such as those described in the previous section.
(2) The definition should be consistent with, and research-
able from the structural-developmental perspective, because this study
approaches the goal problems of psychological education from that
perspective. This means that the definition should assume that the
human mind develops through transactions in experiences, rather than
as predetermined by nature or by the environment. Also, the definition
should be consistent with the concepts of "structure" and "sequence of
stages" (described in Chapter I), which are central to the structural-
developmental perspective.
(3) The definition should contain a behavioral or otherwise
observable component, so that (a) from this definition, an instrument
and scoring method for the self-knowledge construct can be developed
and empirically evaluated, and (b) educators can eventually use this
definition for deriving and implementing psychological curricula.
6. This review is documented in Giles Hopkins', "From Descartes to
Developmental Theory: A consideration of the definitional evolution of
'self-knowledge'," Self-Knowledge Edueatlen Working Paper #5, unpublished
paper. University of Massachiisetts, 1974.
29
To meet these criteria, a three-part definition of self-knowledge
was constructed. "Self-knolwedge" was construed as Including, (a) a
person's direct experiences, (b) verbalized conceptualizations or
theories that the person makes about these experiences, and (c) the
mental operations enabling the person to transform the direct experi-
ences into the verbalizations of those experiences (See Fig. 2-1)
.
FIGURE 2-1 SCHEMATIC MODEL: WORKING
DEFINITION OF SELF-raOWLEDGE
A. Experiences
(Definition A)
C. Mental Operations
(Definition C)
B. Theories or Verbal-
ized Conceptuali-
zations of Experi-
ences (Definition B)
One's conscious
thoughts, sensa-
tions, feelings
and actions.
Processes of the mind
that transform experi-
ences into theories.
Oral or written descrip-
tions of experiences,
hypotheses about experi-
ences and assignment of
value to experiences.
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These three parts of self-knowledge are conceptually distinct, but
are closely interrelated. This interrelationship can be illustrated by
an example. Imagine a man and a neighbor watching a collegiate football
game on television. The man is constantly experiencing a multitude of
phenomena : the visual images of the game on TV; the furniture in the
room; his neighbor; the smell of someone preparing a barbecue across the
street; the stream of thoughts and emotions he has about the game, his
neighbor and himself; and so on. All of these experiences constitute
the man's direct experience, which is the first part (A, above) of the
construct, self-knowledge. Part two (b, above) is illustrated by the
man saying to his neighbor, "You know, Pete, every time I watch a football
game, I get very frustrated wishing I were out playing instead of watching.
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This statement is an example of a verbalized conceptualization about
his experiences. Any statement about one's experiences such as this
one, make up part two of the self-knowledge construct.
The third part of the self-knowledge construct (C, above) is less
obvious in the man-watchlng-TV example. This part of the concept
involves the intermediary mental actions or "operations" that selected,
then transformed the man's experiential data and enabled him to make the
verbal description about himself. We car infer from the way he expressed
himself that he can make generalizations over time (e.g., "every time
I watch..."). He can also name emotional states (e.g., he says, "I get
frustrated") and he can make comparisons (e.g., "I wish I were out
playing instead of watching."). These three mental capacities—i.e.,
the ability (1) to generalize over time, (2) to name emotional states
and (3) to make comparisons—are examples of what enables this man to
describe his experiences in the way that he did. Mental capacities
or operations such as these constitute the third part (C, above) of
the self-knowledge construct.
Our example has shown how the three parts of the self-knowledge
construct—the experiential data, the explanations or hypotheses, and
the mental operations—fora an inter-connected whole, i.e., the concept
of self-knowledge. Each of the three parts are described in further
detail in the next sections.
1, Experiences .
Definition A: Experiences consist of a person's own conscious
sensations, feelings, thoughts and actions.
Experience in this sense is anything In a person's immediate or
present awareness. These experiences are private : No one else has
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direct immeldate access to an Individual's experienced sensations, feelings,
thoughts or actions.
Experience is everything in one's conscious awareness, including
that consciousness itself. This definition thus includes William James'
notion of "pure ego" (1890), because "pure ego" is the consciousness,
subject or knower of all awareness. Although this "contentless"
awareness (i.e., what is "behind" a person's perceptions) is part of
Definition A, this pure ego is not distinguished from the contents of
consciousness by this definition. Both are included and often indis-
tinguishable in experience.
According to Definition A, anything one is conscious of (or aware
of) makes up experience. No distinction is made between the awareness
of "self" and the awareness of external phenomena like events in the
political, physical or biological world. This distinction between
"self" and other ("non-self") is not given a priori in experience.
The person conceptually differentiates "self" from "non-self" at some
point in his/her ontogenetic development. In other words, a person
must mentally construct the boundary between "I" and "the world." The
individual may or may not be conscious of the "self"-"non-self" dis-
tinction. When one conscious of the boundary, this awareness obviously
is included in conscious experiences, i.e.. Definition A. For a person
who has not differentiated various aspects of self from non-self,^
7. This Includes infante who have not yet mentally constructed the
differentiation between self and non-self. A person who ontogenetically
has made this differentiation can also have conscious experiences where
self is Indistinguishable from non-self. This occurs in some altered
states of consciousness, for example in certain forms of mystical,
meditative or drug experiences.
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this distinction is not part of that person's experience. In essence,
only what one is conscious of (i.e., aware of) constitutes experiences,
according to Definition A.
Definition A does not include a collective or personal unconscious.
Surely, unconscious motivations, or forgotten or suppressed past
experiences are significant factors in understanding personality. But
Individuals can only construct theories of their experiences with data
available to them; and unavailable, unconscious material is not useful
to the person as long as it remains out of consciousness.
Experiences, defined as a person's conscious awarenesses, implies
that these experiences need not be verbalized. Definition A includes
all non-verbalized conscious thoughts. A distinction is made between
verbalized statements and non-verbalized thought: When the experience
is described or expressed by words in written or oral behavior, the
descriptions themselves are not included in Definition A. These
explanations are reserved for Definition B. However, any and all
experiences conscious to the person, which they do not verbalize, are
the domain of Definition A.
In summary, "experience" Includes all the sensations, feelings,
thoughts and actions in a person's conscious awareness. These
experiences are the person's raw data about which one constructs
explanations and theories for understanding and knowing oneself.
Before describing the other two parts of our self-knowledge
construct, an epistemological concern about defining "self-knowledge"
should be addressed. The notion, "self-knowledge," is paradoxically
circular. In terms of personal experiences and knowledge, the "self"
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is both (a) that which is experienced, perceived and known; but at the
same time is (b) that which does the experiencing, perceiving and knowing.
"Self" can be either the object of knowing (i.e., what is known) or
the subject of knowing (i.e., the knower)
.
This dicotomy has inspired
some philosophers (e.g., Jaspers, 1963) to argue that self-knowledge is
not possible at all, because the "I" that knows is always different in
nature than the "I" that is known. The self, as soon as it is known,
loses its subjectivity, i.e., its essence as the "I".
This dilemma was recognized in constructing this working definition.
Definition A allows for the raw experiencing of both kinds of self (i.e.,
as subject and as object). In one's sheer experience, the knowing self
and knowledge of self are often indistinguishable. The distinction
between these two selves is not dismissed, however. The self-as-the
object of knowledge (i.e., the "I"-as-it-ls-known) is treated by
Definition B, and the nature of the self as the subject of knowledge,
(i.e., the "I"-as-knower) is the focus of Definition C.
2. Theories or verbalized conceptualizations of experiences .
Definition B: Verbalized conceptualizations of experiences
consist of oral or written statements which are:
(1) descriptions or characterizations of one's
experiences (as defined by Definition A); or (2)
hypotheses or explanations about those experiences;
or (3) assignments of value, significance or
importance to those experiences. Together these
three parts make up a theory about one's experiences.
Definition B states that any verbal statement about one's
experiences is considered a verbalized conceptualization of experiences.
Anything one says or writes about one's own experiences (as defined by
Definition A) is considered a verbal report of experience and Included
in this definition.
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Only verbalized statements are Included in Definition B. This
means that other types of non-verbal behaviors, such as gestural,
unsymbolized vocal, and graphic expressions are excluded from these
definitions. While these non-lingulstic behaviors may give Important
clues to an individual's knowledge about self, we choose to focus on
verbal behavior only. This decision was made for practical reasons.
In principle, knowledge of self is more than verbal descriptions, but
in practice, no behavioral task (verbal or non-verbal test) can
guarantee a response of exactly what a person knows about self. Since
current psychometric methods are most applicable to symbolized verbal
behavior, this study defines the behavioral expression of self-knowledge
only as verbalized statements.
We postulate that these verbalized conceptualizations of experiences
serve a similar function that scientific theories serve for natural
phenomena. Just as scientific theories enable one to understand, predict
and control phenomena, verbalized conceputallzations of experiences
enable one to understand, anticipate and be intentional about one's
experiences. Anticipation and intentionality are the psychological
equivalents to prediction and control in natural phenomena (Ivey, 1969;
Ivey and Rollen, 1972), Hence, Definition B may be called theories
about experiences.
Scientific theories generally contain three essential parts: (1)
the data, or descriptions of the phenomena to be explained, (2) the
hypotheses or explanations of the relationships among the variables
involved in the phenomena and (3) the statements describing the
significance of several variables in the theory. For the purposes of this
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study, it seemed potentially useful to differentiate theories of
experiences (i.e., the verbalized conceptualizations) into three parts
that parallelled the three parts of scientific theories. Thus, we
postulated that there are three parts or dimensions to theories about
one's experiences: (1) statements that describe or characterize one’s
experiences, (2) statements that explain or hypothesize about the
experiences, and (3) statements that assign or attribute value,
significance or meaning to the experience.
The first dimension, i.e., the statements that describe or
characterize one's experiences, involves the reporting of one's
experiences as data. Any of various aspects of experiences are included
in this dimension. For example, one may describe one's experiences in
terms of: (1) one's body or its parts, (2) one's actions or behavior,
(3) one's abilities or skills, (4) one's personality traits, (5) one's
role in a social group, (6) one's possessions, (7) one's beliefs, values
or other thought patterns or, (8) one's emotional responses. These or
other aspects of experience, when reported, comprise the first dimension
of theories of experiences, namely how experiences are described.
Statements that explain or hypothesize about one's experiences
are the second dimension of people's theories of their experiences.
These explanations are the ways in which various aspects of the
experience are related to each other. For example, between two given
aspects of the experience, there may be no relationship, there may be a
correlational relationship, or there may be a causal relationship.
How these and other relationships among the various aspects of experience
are reported comprise the second dimension of theories of experiences.
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The third dimension of experience theories is the nature of the
reported value, meaning or significance assigned to one's experiences.
This includes statements about the ways in which an experience (or
aspects of an experience) is important or significant to a person.
Often this includes attributing an emotional valence, positive or
negative, to one’s experience or aspects of one's experiences. This
dimension may also include statements about one's significant learnings
or meanings created from the events or Incidents one experiences.
In sum. Definition B includes any statement, oral or written about
one's experiences. These statements may be one of three types—
descriptions or characterisations of the experiential data; explanations
relating various aspects of the experience; or the assignment of value,
significance or Importance to one's experiences. These types of verbal-
ized conceptualizations are the major dimensions that make up one's theory
about one's experiences.
As part of the working definition of self-knowledge. Definition B
plays a significant role. It represents the behavioral manifestation
of the dialogue between mental processes and experiences. The
verbalized conceptualizations or theories about experiences are the
only aspect of the working definition which can be observed non-
subjectlvely. That is, these verbal reports are the only part of one's
experiences accessible to persons other than oneself. This observable
or behavioral aspect had been a major criterion in constructing the
working definition.
3- Mental operations
.
Definition C: Operations are the mental processes that enable
a person to transform experiences (Definition A)
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into theories or verbalized conceptualizations
of those experiences (Definition B)
.
Mental operations are the essential processes of the mind that
individuals use for making sense of their experiences. Every
structural-developmental theory postulates mental operations as one
of the critical properties of structure. As described earlier
(Chapter I), structures are characterized by mental activities—abilities
of the mind to take elements in experience and change them in various
ways. These abilities to combine two elements, to assign causality,
to analyze elements hypothetico-deductlvely, among others, are examples
of mental operations (according to Definition C)
.
Operations transform conscious experience into verbalized
statements and theories, much as a computer program organizes raw
input data into print-outs. In the same way as a computer program
is composed of many specific, systematically interrelated operations,
mental operations are similarly interrelated in the structures.
Structures are organized assemblies of operations. Another oversimpli-
fied analogy Illustrates the relationship between operations and
structures. The motor of a car (its structure) is composed of a
number of Interconnected, functioning mechanisms (its operations).
It is this assembly of interrelated mechanisms, the structural whole,
that enables the car to transport people and goods around the block or
across the continent. Mental operations, like the engine's mechanisms,
make up the "structural" motor that enables a person to transform
conscious experiences into self-knowledge theories.
As part of the mental structures, the operations are also related
to the structural-developmentallsts' concept of stage sequence . At a
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given stage of development, certain mental operations are possible and
available. At the next stage, certain new operations become available
—
making more complex thinking possible.
According to Definition C, operations are mental processes . These
processes include both cognitive and affective mental activities.
Cognitive operations are thought processes that are characteristically
intellectual, logical or rational; Including the mental processes of
differentiation and integration.
The emotional or affective mental activities are also included in
our definition of mental operations. Affect is the ability of the mind
to "assign value" and "distribute energy" to one's experiences (Piaget,
1967). Loevinger (1966, 1970) describes these affective processes as
an individual’s mode of impulse control or character development, or a
person's underlying core disposition-state. These current theoretical
positions seem to suggest the existence of "affective operations," but
characteristics of affective processes are not well-defined because
structural-developmental theorists have, to date, focused primarily on
cognitive, rather than affective, operations.
Although both cognition and affect are important aspects of
mental operations, a compulsive distinction between the two is probably
not useful. Affective processes are closely related to and often
indistinguishable from cognitive processes. Loevinger and Piaget
emphasize this point:
A current theoretical dispute among some psychologists
Interested in ego development and related subjects concerns
the relative importance of cognitive and affective factors
in that development. This issue appears to be a relic of
outworn categories of thought, for integration of observations
into a coherent frame of reference is, obviously, cognitive.
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while anxiety is, obviously, affective. But the failure to
attain a meaningful and cognitive Integration is precisely
what generates anxiety.
(Loevinger, et.al.
. 1970, p.8)
All behavior presupposes instruments and a technique:
movements and intelligence. But all behavior also Implies
motives and final values (goals): the sentiments. Thus,
affectivity and Intelligence are indlssociable and
constitute two complementary aspects of all human behavior.
(Piaget, 1967, n.l5)
Thus, the intent of Definition C is to r jognJ.ze the importance of
•both affective and cognitive types of operations in a person's
transforming conscious experiences into theories about experiences.
Another property of operations (and the structures of which they
are a part) is that they are not observable in the same way that overt
lehavlor is jbservabli. Operations are mental processes or internal
mechanisms: they function "inside the mind," and we cannot "watch"
operations in action. Only the products or results of mental operations
are observable. Verbal behaviors (i.e., the theories or verbalized concep-
tualizations of experience) are the manifest products of mental operations
Thus, given a verbal report or other behavior, it may be possible to
infer (hypothesize) the mental operations necessary to deliver that
explanation. But this behavior, verbal or otherwise, is not the
equivalent of, nor part of mental operations.
We postulated that mental operations are organized into structures,
or a systematic whole of self-regulating operations. We adopted the
structural-developmental position that these structures, or patterns of
mental operations, undergo developmental growth in a fixed sequence of
stages. This sequence of stages is characterized by distinct qualita-
tive changes in a person's mode of thinking from one stage to another.
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The stages form a culturally invariant sequence, and they are
hierarchical integrations, wherein each stage builds on, incorporates
and transmutes the previous stage (see Chapter I).
In brief, we have described mental operations in the following
ways: (1) Operations are mental processes that enable a person to
transform conscious experience into theories or verbalized
conceptualizations of experiences. (2) Opc rti.‘ons a^e interrelated
into organized wholes called structure? which have the same properties
that other structural-developmental theorists attribute to them;
(3) Operations include both affective and cognitive activities; and
(4) Operations are not observable in verbal or other overt behaviors,
ilth'^ugh their existence may be inferred from behaviors.
Adequacy And Limitations Of The Working Definition
Let us return to our starting point, the concept of self-knowledge.
The working definition of self-knowledge presented here was constructed
in the context of the goal problems in psychological education,. By
staking out a territory that includes conscious experiences, lncludln"g
personal thoughts and emotions (in Definition A), we have corralled
what is probably the central concern in psychological education courses.
Definition A recognizes the significance of personal experiences, in its
infinitely diverse, though privately subjective form.
But these experiences do not occur in isolation. They Interact
4
with mental processes (l.e., the mental operations), and the experiences
become tranformed into theories about experiences. The concept of
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mental operations is consistent with the structural-developmental
perspective. In this view, a person’s mental development is not
determined by environmental forces alone, nor by simple maturation; but
rather by continual transactions between mental operations and
conscious experiences. A person's theory about their experiences is
possible through the transactions between experiences end available mental
operations
.
Individual's theories about their iixperlences represent the
behavioral manifestations or observable aspect of the interaction
between conscious experiences and mental operations. This observable
aspect of self-knowledge ma'^es an empirical study of the self-
knowledge concept possible.
In essence, the working definition seems to meet criteria we had
set for formulating a definition of self-knowledge for this study.
(1) The definition echoes the central concern in psychological
education—the emphasis on knowing personal, subjective experiences.
(2) The working definition is compatible with key structural-developmental
concepts of stage, structure and how human minds grow and develop.
(3) By postulating theories or verbalized conceptualizations of
experience, the definition specifies the behavioral or observable
component necessary for an empirical study of the self-knowledge
construct.
The Intention of this study was not to identify mental operations
per se
.
Mental operations are not open to direct empirical observation.
Mor was the focus of this study on the content of conscious experiences,
since experiences are ultimately private and also unaccessible to
A2
observation. Rather the aim of this study was to identify the
characteristics of theories or verbalized conceptualizations of
experience, which reflected developmental stages. That is, we wanted
to identify the stage characteristics of people's theories about their
experiences.
The working definition was a guide in this study: It focused our
efforts primarily on the aspect of self-k- 1 ;ge involving people's
theories or verbalized conceptualizations of experiences. In
attempting to define the stages of people's theories about their
experiences, this study represents a first step in specifying the
mJ'e.stones in the development of self-knowledge, which in turn represents
.. cep toward inswerlng the question, "What should be the goals of
psychological education?"
Several Issues concerning this working definition remain unresolved
in this study because of current methodological limitations. These
limitations include the following:
1. There is no one-to-one correspondence between verbal
behaviors (i.e., the verbalized conceptualizations of experience)
and mental operations. Although the correspondence can be derived
inferrentlally and shown to be statistically significant, the relation-
ship is, at best, a probabllstlc one.
2. Some mrelated or non-developmental variables cannot be
distinguished from characteristics of the stages we identify. For
example, verbal fluency and linguistic competence cannot be separated
from some characteristics of mental operations, because empirically we
rely only on verbalized statements. Likewise, characteristics
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related to socio-economic levels, cultural contexts, educational levels,
and other non-developmental variables may confound characteristics
of the stages.
3. Ho psychological test can guarantee to reveal mental opera-
tions or the stage of development of a subject. Objective tests Impose
the experimenter's perspective on the subject. Projective tests
do not Insure that the subject will reve i’ relevant to the
investigator. Also, there is no method for determining when subjects
have consciously or unconsciously concealed their actual developmental
stage characteristics.
4. In principle, one can speak of stages of development, but
in actuality, a person usually displays behaviors of more than one
stage. At present, there are various psychometric methods of assigning
a stage score for a person. But there is no final or definitive court
of appeal for deriving a stage score from behaviors corresponding to a
range of stages.
These (and other) methodological limitations are left for future
studies to tackle. For purposes to this study, the working definition
of self-knowledge appeared useful and it enabled us to proceed toward
identifying stage characteristics of people's theories about their
experiences.
CHAPTER 111
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STRATEGIES FOR IDENTIFYING
STAGES OF VERBAL
DESCRIPTIONS OF EXPERIENCES
Viewing self-knowledge from the crow's nest of the structural-
developmental perspective, how can we identify discrete stages and
their developmental sequence? The aim of this study was to discover what
characteristics in people's verbalized conceptualizations of experiences
(i.e. self-knowledge theories) reflect a di ' ' 'pmental stage sequence.
This chapter describes the strategies used t" define these developmental
changes
.
In general, the task of identifying stages required both
theoretical and empirical clarification, with extensive dialogue
between the two. It seemed Impossible to empirically arrive at
stages of experience descriptions without a theoretical framework that
guided such observation. The role of a theoretical frame had been
previously recognized by Cronbach and Meehl (1955) and Loevlnger (1957).
They emphasized beginning with a strong theoretical or philosophical
foundation that guides the observation of behaviors. Observations are
conducted using this theoretical frame, and the observations in turn,
are used to correct and refine the theory. This dialogue—theory-to-
observation and observation-to-theory—results in increasingly accurate
and adequate conclusions.
This study proceeded along thisi^general- path. We began by formula-
ting a theoretical sta'ge sequence. This formulation guided the
development of an instrument, the selections of the sample, and the
collection and analysis of the data. Subsequently, the data from these
steps clarified and revised the theory. In the remainder of this
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chapter, the details of tftiese steps will be outlined.
Deriving A Theoretical Frame
Initially the theoretical frame for this study Involved two
aspects: (a) a working definition of the self-knowledge construct;
and (b) potential stage characteristics of verbal explanations. The
formulation of the working definition has h. outlined in Chapter II.
A theoretical frame of stage characterl<= Ics was constructed by
deducing from four structural-developmental theories; Piaget's
theory of cognitive development, Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning
development (Kohlberg and Turlel, 1971,1973), Loevinger, et. al. *8 ego
development theory (1970), and Van den Daele's theory of ego-ideal
development (1968) . These theories conceptually represent four aspects
of structural development. Although their content is distinct from
the self-knowledge construct, the underlying framework Is the same.
Kohlberg and Mayer explain the relationship among the four developmental
theories we draw from.
According to cognitive-developmental theory there Is
always a cognitive component to development, even in social,
moral and aesthetic areas. Development, however is
broader than cognitive-logical development. One central
area Is moral development, as defined by Invariant stages
of moral reasoning (Kohlberg and Turlel, 1971,1973) ... .These
stages have a cognitive component; attainment of a given
Piaget cognitive stage is a necessary, though not
sufficient, condition for the parallel moral stage.
....there is a still broader unity, called ego development,
of which both cognitive and moral development are a part
(Loevinger, Wessler and Redmore, 1970). Particularly In
the earlier childhood years, it is difficult to distinguish
moral development from ego development. Cognitive development,
in the Plagetian sense, is ^so related, to ego development,
since both concern the child's core beliefs about the
physical and social world. (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972, p. 491)
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It is possible to overlay each theory upon the others according
to the sitnilarity of the stages. Table 3-1 outlines this overlaying
1
procedure.
Having aligned the four selected theories, we deduced hypothetical
stage characteristics relevant to Piaget's three basic stages. These
characteristics formed preliminary composite descriptions of potential
self-knowledge stages (see Chapter IV). i 'age rnarcteristics
provided enough detail to guide the ea: xy phases of instrument
development and data analysis. Eventually, after analysing
the collected data and deriving stage characteristics empirically
(outlined in Chapter V)
,
the theoretically derived stages could be
rected, expanded and refined (discussed in Chapter VII).
1. Specifically, the cognitive (Piaget' a )stage is a prerequisite for,
i.e. a necessary, but not sufficient condition for its parallel moral
stage (Kohlberg's) . For example, a person at the Interpersonal
Concordance Orientation Moral stage must have attained Concrete
Operational cognitive thinking; but a person at Concrete Operational thought
may not reason from an Interpersonal Concordance Orientation in the
social-ethical domain.
Van den Daele's ego-ideal stages are similarly related to Piaget's
stages. A given Piagetian stage is a necessary, but not sufficient
condition for achieving the parallel ego-ideal stage.
Loevinger's ego development stages are an even broader unity.
Parallel moral, cognitive and ego-ideal stages are all part of, hence
prerequisites for, a given ego development stage. "All children at
a given ego stage ’must have attained the parallel cognitive (and moral
reasoning) stage but not all children at a cognitive stage will have
organized their self-concept and social experience at the corresponding
ego state" (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972, p.491)
The specific relationship between Van den Deale's ego-ideal
stages and Kohlberg's moral reasoning stages appear to be equal
in scope, but mutually exclusive. That is, neither seem to be a
prerequisite for the other.
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TABLE 3-1: COMPARISON OF STAGE SEQUENCES OF FOUR
STRUCTURAL-DEVELOPMENTAL THEORIES
Piaget: Cognitive
S tages
Kohlberg: Stages of
Moral Reasoning
Van den Deale: Ego-
Ideal Stages
Loevinger: Ego
Stages
Pre-operatlonal
thinking
1 . Punishment-
obedience
orientation
1 . Undifferentiated
incorporation of
powerful or
glamorous figures
1-2: Impulsive
Concrete opera-
tional thinking
2 . Instrumental
relativist
orientation
2. Naive identifi-
cation with
parental role
Delta: Self-
protective
3 . Interpersonal
concordance
orientation
3. Social conformity
to expectations
(t evaluation by
others
1-3:
Conformist
Formal operation-
al thinking
4. Law & order/
conscientious
orientation
4. Self-affirmation
through internal-
ized values and
beliefs
1-4:
Conscientious
S. Social contract/
legalistic
orientation
5. Integrated world
view through
reflective con-
sideration of
personal or human
situation
1-5:
Autonomous
6. Universal ethical
principles orien-
tation
1-6:
Integrated
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In summary, three stages characterizing verbal descriptions of
experiences were hypothesized by drawing from four selected structural-
developmental theories. The characteristics of these three theoretically
derived stages are outlined in Chapter IV. These stage characteristics,
along with the working definition of self-knowledge, comprised the
first portion of the theory-observation dialogue. The next portions
involved developing an instrument, seleci
.g sample, analyzing
data collected from that sample and arriving at stage characterizations
from this empirical analysis. The strategies for each of these
empirical steps are detailed in the following sections.
Instrument Development
In accordance with the working definition (Chapter II)
,
verbal
descriptions of experiences were chosen as the area for analysis.
Given that, we needed an appropriate instrument for collecting
protocols of such verbal descriptions. Specifically, we wanted
the instrument to yield three kinds of Information relevant to the
self-knowledge construct.
(1) We were interested in identifying characteristics of how people
described their own experiences. What data about their experiences do
individuals at each developmental stage have access to? The Instrument
needed to elicit a sample of the data base to which individuals have
access.
(2) We were interested in how pedple explain their own experiences
at each stage. That is, how do they construct hypotheses about and
draw conclusions from their experiences? The instrument needed to
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engage people In the process of arriving at these hypotheses and conclu-
sions, by having them conceive and describe the antecedents and consequ-
ences of their experiences. From the various ways in which these
antecedent and consequence explanations are made, we believed we
could Identify a developmental sequence of how (i.e, the process of)
people explained their experiences.
(3) Finally, we were interested in the ways in which persons
assigned value, significance or importance to their experiences. The
instrument needed to elicit descriptions of what individuals themselves
saw as the valuable or significant aspects of their experiences.
In short, our aim was to collect people's (1) descriptions of their
own experiences, (2) explanations of their experiences, and (3) their
assignment of significance, value or importance to their experiences.
In order to provide us with these kinds of data, subjects needed to
engage in a task which allowed them to recall and report their
experiences, and also to construct hypotheses about those experiences.
Initially, we reviewed existing standardized personality tests to
determine whether any one of them would suffice for our purposes.
The typical multiple-choice objective measures were examined and rejected.
Self-concept tests can be used to Illustrate our reasoning. The
usual approaches to self-concept depend only on degree of self-approval
or some other polar dimension or continuum. The fallacy of this approach
is that persons at different developmental stages use different
criteria and dimensions for self-approval and disapproval (Wylie, 1961;
Loevinger, et.al., 1970). For example, Loevinger , found
"at low levels (1-2 and Delta) both a shallow self-approval and bitter
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self-rejection, at middle levels (1-3 and 1—3/4) predominantly self-
satisfied remarks, while high at levels there are characteristic tempered
self-criticisms (Loevinger, Wessler and Redmore, 1970, II, p. 275)
V
Similarly other single dimension scales such as semantic differentials,
Likert—type scales (Likert, 1932) and checklists would not suffice,
because they all measure where people lie on individual dimensions,
rather than identifying a sequence of qualJ Native developmental changes.
Also it did not seem possible to elicit qualitative stage differences
by other existing non-projectlve techniques. The inherent difficulty
of multiple—choice and forced choice tasks used to measure multi-
dimensional constructs can be illustrated by Shostrom's Personal
Orientation Inventory (1968). The POI is a self-report instrument
that attempts to assess values, attitudes and behaviors relevant to
Maslow's concept of the self-actualizing person. Maslow's concept
and the self-knowledge construct are similar in that both view
development in a hierarchical stage sequence. But the qualitative
stage differences are lost when the test measures the degree or intensity
of attitudes on one dimension rather than eliciting the type of dimension
people choose to use to evaluate themselves.
In each item, the subject is asked to choose between
two opposing statements. .. .This often provides the subject
with a mre clearly delineated choice then he would otherwise
have.... It is a bit more disturbing to find that so many
statements are ejq)ressed in an absolute, categorical
form. The testee is frequently confronted with a demand
to choose between two extremes, neither of which comes close
to describing his attitudes or life situation. (Caan, 1972, p. 293)
Finally, existing non-projectlve instruments do not elicit the
process of how persons arrive at explanations of their experiences.
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These Instruments yield data on the product, hut not the process
of a person's thinking. Hence, we decided that non-projective techniques
were inappropriate for our aims, and that a projective format should
be used for the data-collecting instrument. In principle, the subjects'
responses in projective tests are manifestations of how they process
data. And since our aim was to identify characteristics of verbal
descriptions that reflect this processing, the projective format seemed
more appropriate than non-projective techniques.
In reviewing existing projective techniques, it appeared that
none were constructed to elicit descriptions of personal experiences.
Visual projective techniques, such as the Rorchach Inkblot Test (Rorschach,
19A2) and the Thematic Apperception Teat (Atkinson, 1958; Henry, 1956)
,
depend on subjects' responses to a given visual stimulus. But,
describing a picture, cartoon, or Inkblot seemed distinctly unlike
describing one's own experiences; i.e. one's emotions, thoughts and
behaviors. These visual projective techniques were considered
inappropriate, because they did not get at content relevant to this
study, namely descriptions of personal experiences and their implications.
The other common projective format, the verbal projective techniques,
was more sensitive to descriptions of experiences. However, they
provided incomplete and Insufficient data for our purposes. Existing
verbal techniques rely on the person's mental association to a word,
an Incomplete sentence or a story fragment. These mental associations
are usually tangential to what subjects consider as their own
experiences. Also, these techniques did not Involve subjects in
constructing explanations or hypotheses of their experiences.
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Consequently, we decided against using existing verbal projective
techniques in their published form.
In essence, these decisions meant deriving a new projective
instrument which would be more appropriate for our aims. To develop
this new instrument, we first identified the desirable properties which
would characterize this instrument. These properties included:
(1) The instrument should elicit data relevant to the working
definition and the theoretical frame of stage characteristics.
Specifically the test should allow subjects to provide detailed
descriptions of their experiences. It should engage them in constructing
hypotheses about their experiences by having them describe the antece-
dents and consequences of their experiences. The instrument
should also reveal the subjects' assignment of significance or importance
to the experiences.
(2) Since the Instrument would eventually be used by educators at
all levels, the test should be appropriate to a broad age range of
subjects.
(3) The instrument and its administration should be as objective
as possible, and the factors which bias subjects' responses should
be minimized.
(4) The instrument should be feasible in terms of available
skills, time and financial resources.
(5) The instrument and the testing procedure should meet ethical
standards. The hinnan rights and "personal Integrity" of the
subjects should be respected by the test and the testing process.
S3
These properties were used as guidelines iu creating several
prototype "self-knowledge" tests. Each of these prototypes were
2
reviewed with practice subjects. After numerous revisions and pre-
3
liminary testing with practice subjects, the Experience Recall Test
(hereafter, ER) was the instrument that seemed to best match the
above list of desirable characteristics.
The ER test involves subjects in recalling and describing an
"unforgetable" experience. The instructions direct the respondents to
close their eyes, relax, and scan their lifetime for memorable
experiences. Subjects are then asked to select one of these experiences
to think about or recount in detail. After they have "relived"
the memorable event, they are asked to open their eyes and respond
orally, or in writing, to the following questions:
(a) Describe as fully as you can, and in as much detail, the
experience you remembered. (Please include what led up to this experience,
what your thoughts and feelings were and what the results of this
experience were.)
(b) How was the experience important or special to you then?
(c) How is the experience important or special to you now?
(d) From the experience you just remembered, please describe some
things you know about yourself now.
2. A review of this search for an appropriate instrument appears in
Self-Knowledge Project Working Paper #7, "Developing Self-Knowledge
Elicitors," Unpublished paper. University of Massachusetts, 1974.
3. The current oral and written forms of the ER are found in Appendix A.
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(e) How could knowing this about yourself be useful to you?
Specifically, how can it help you get what you want or avoid what you
don't want?
(f) Do you have any comments about what it was like answering
these questions?
We evolved the ER by incorporating desirable characteristics from
various existing instruments and invented prototypes. The format
of directly asking subjects to describe an experience was borrowed
from Flanagan's "critical incident" technique (1954) and other similar
methods (e.g. Carlson, 1971). The idea of "scanning one's memories"
can be traced to Jackins (196b), Scheff (1972), and common humanistic
education methods Involving "fantasy."
We screened through the criteria of desirable properties, and the ER
seemed to satisfactorily meet the specifications. It appeared: (1) to
elicit data relevant to the working definition and theoretical frame;
(2) appropriate for subjects, ages six through late adulthood; (3)
controllable for the major factors biasing subjects' responses; (4)
feasible in terms of skills, time and financial resources; and (5)
ethically sound.
How did the ER satisfy these criteria?
1
.
Relevance to working definition and theoretical frame . Following
the working definition (see Chapter II), the focus of this study was
Individual's descriptions of their experiences. The ER directly asks
subjects to report this in Question A. Most respondents gave detailed
descriptions— the cues and suggestions in the instructions seemed to
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help them recall and describe their selected experiences in detail.
It was by analyzing these experience descriptions that we eventually
strived at characteristics differentiating the various stages.
The assignment of significance, value or importance to experience
wasalso part of the working definition. This is reflected in the ER
in several ways. First, in selecting an experience to remember in
detail, subjects are asked to choose "one that is somehow important
to you." As such, we may assume that there is some "value" or
significance inherent in the "important" experience they describe.
More directly, two questions in the ER ask subjects to state how
the experience was slgnif icari*- to them. Question B asks how the event
was important to them at the time they experienced it, and Question
C asks how the event is Important now. By analyzing responses to questions
B and C, we hoped to begin defining the role of affect and the assignment
of value in development.
We were also interested in people's explanations of their experiences.
That is, how do they construct hypotheses and come to conclusions about
their experiences? Does the type of hypotheses (which a person can
make) change developmentally? The ER seemed to actively engage respondents
in constructing hypotheses about their experiences. The sequence of
questions inductively leads them to stating these hypotheses in
Question D and the application of these hypotheses in Question E.
By examining responses to Questions D and E, we can find the ways in
which experiences are explained; i.e. how the antecedents and consequences
of experiences are conceived. Responses to Question A in the ER also
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contained clues to developmental stage differences in subjects'
descriptions of antecedent and consequent conditions of their experiences.
In summary, the ER seemed to elicit data that were relevant to
the working definition and the theoretical frame of stage character-
istics. It engaged subjects in describing the experience in detail,
constructing a hypothesis about that experience, and stating how the
experience was significant or important to cnem. Thus, the ER was an
instrument which seemed to adequately meet our content specifications.
We will now describe how the ER met the practical and ethical
specifications.
2. Appropriateness to a broad age range
. The criterion of appro-
priateness is the extent to which the respondent group can meet the
demands imposed by the Instrument. Persons age six through adult were
selected as the respondent group, because we intended the instrument
to eventually be used by educators at all these levels.
One demand imposed by any verbal Instrument is that the subjects
have command of the vocabulary and grammar of the language. We
assumed that the subjects were capable of understanding instructions
given in standard American English. The instructions and questions
in the ER were carefully examined and revised from several perspectives
to minimize ambiguity in the language and to eliminate jargon that has
meaning limited to technical, culture-specific or regional contexts.
From numerous trials and revisions it appeared that anyone over age
six who understands standard English could follow the set of instructions
in the ER. But it was noted that some words used in the instructions for
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children were Inappropriate for adults, and conversely, some words
that had clear meaning for adults were distracting to children.
After many refinements to make the instructions uniform and equivalent
for adults and children, we decided on two separate, but equivalent forms
of the ER: one for subjects younger than 12 years old, and the other
4
for older subjects.
Further reason for using two forms emerged when we considered the
demand upon subjects to read and write. Although there was no
method to control for verbal fluency, the possible discrepency between
speaking ability and writing ability was considered. Probably elementary
school children are less capable of expressing themselves in writing,
than they are in speaking. Thus, the children's form of the ER
involved subjects responding by speaking into a tape recorder, rather
than writing. Also, adult subjects not fluent in written expression
had the option of responding orally using a tape recorder. For all
other respondents the written form seemed manageable and acceptable.
It was thus assumed that one of the response formats, either oral
or written, would be appropriate for all respondents.
Inasmuch as judging the appropriateness of the instrument is
subjective, it appeared to us that the verbal demands of the ER (including
4. Equivalence between the two forms was determined informally with
practice subjects. The practice subjects each responded to both forms
and their protocols were compared (between forms) and judged essentially
equivalent." Formal reliability studies to establish equivalence between
the two forms have yet to be conducted.
5. The equivalence between the oral-response format and the written-
response format was established informally with practice subjects and
with repondent groups in early phases of data-collection.
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ability to understand standard American English, and to respond orally or
in writing) could be met by all respondents over six years old who know
6
English.
Turning to the content demands, it appeared that some subjects might
not be able to respond to some of the suggestions in the instructions. For
example, a person may not remember exactly "what the place looked like" or
"what other people did and said" in their recalled experience. But it did
not seem significant if these suggestions were not answered, because they
were Intended as cues to assist respondents in re-living their selected
experience. The question demanding the subjects' actual response is
open-ended; it asks that the subject describe the experience "as fully as
you can, and in as much detail." If some suggestions in the instructions
were not helpful, the respondents generally focused on and described other
aspects of the recalled experience relevant to their own frame of reference.
Thus, whether or not the respondent can answer the specific suggestions
in the instructions, these cues seemed appropriate in that they stimulated
subjects to think about their experiences, without binding or restricting
them to answering these questions.
In general, it appeared that the ER, after many revisions, met the
criterion of appropriateness, in that all respondents could meet the verbal
and content demands of this Instrument.
3. Response bias and objectivity . In any test situation there are
6. Note that subjects need the ability to understand the instructions
in standard English, but they need not respond in standard English. They
may respond in one or another dialect of English, or even in another
language. If this occurs, this is a problem in analyzing the data, but
it does not affect the subjects' ability to respond fully to the instrument.
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factors that may Impede subjects from giving unbiased responses.
The criterion of objectivity involves the extent to which these factors
have been minimized or controlled.
In the ER, two major sources of bias, the interviewer bias and the
bias Involving the instructions, were considered. In the face-to-face
interviewing of the ER, the interviewer^s behavior, appearance,
temperment, sex, age, race or other characteristic -ould affect the
lnterviewee*s responses. The following steps were taken to minimize
these potential interviewer influences: (1) Training sessions for all
interviewers were conducted so that they could administer the ER's
in uniform manner. The Interviewers were trained to monitor their
own behaviors (such as postirres and voice inflections) that could affect
the subjects' emotional responses in the test experience. (2) An
important aspect of the ER Instructions is that the subjects close
their eyes to scan their memories. This reduces distractions for the
subjects and thus enables them to more easily focus on their experiences.
With the subjects' eyes closed, there are no visual stimuli or cues
from the interviewer, hence the subjects' visual Impressions of the
interviewer as a source of bias is probably reduced. (3) Finally,
interviewers were assigned to subjects randomly and the same team of
interviewers administered the ERs to virtually all respondent groups.
The effects of this procedure was that a random Interviewer bias-effect
on respondents is distributed throughout the total sample, hence
partially controlled.
Another potential source of bias in the ER was the instructions.
Does the lengthy set of instructions affect objectivity? The following
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measures were taken to maximize objectivity in the ER instructions:
(1) The statements, questions and suggestions in the instructions were
reviewed many times over for consistency with the specifications of the
working definition. The current ER instructions appear to refer only to
the behaviors we want to observe (i.e. verbal descriptions of experiences,
the significance of these experiences and the construction of hypotheses
about these experiences). (2) Suggestions that appeared to influence the
7
respondents' selection of an experience were deleted. No examples of
types of experiences to recall are given to the subjects. (3) The
instructions were "standardized" to the extent that Interviewers did not
deviate from the instructions while administering the ER.
In sum, we have traversed several impedemefits against objectivity
in the ER format. The major biasing factors Involving the Interviewer
and the instructions, which affect subject responses, were minimized
or controlled where possible. Other factors biasing subjects* responses
including history bias (external events beyond the control of the
researcher affecting the performance of respondents) , maturation bias
(irrelevant internal processes of the subjects affecting their responses)
,
and instrumentation bias (changes in the ER forms over test groups)
were left uncontrolled in this study.
4. Feasibility. The criterion of feasibility Involved three aspects:
skills, time and money. Skills refer to the abilities necessary to
7. Currently, the only criteria for selecting an experience are: (1)
"that the experience is somehow important," or significant to the subject;
and (2) the experience is "one that you could think about now,"
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administer the instrument and analyze the collected data. The ER
Involved some special interviewer skills that interviewers could be
(and were) trained for. These skills were learned by our interviewers
(graduate students) in two or three hoijrs. Most classroom teachers should
be able to learn the procedure for administering the ER in the same amount
of time. Compared to months of training required to administer other
projective tests (e.g. TAT, Rorschach and WAIb) or tc learn Piaget's
"method clinique" the ER is very practical and has potential for
widespread use in classrooms. The time required to administer the
ER appeared practical—approximately 45 minutes for either oral or
written form.
Learning how to score the ER protocols using the current manual
(Appendix B) takes considerably longer than learning to administer it.
Probably several months would be necessary to understand all the details
and nuances of the manual in its present form. The time Involved
should decrease with future revisions and clarification of the manual.
A trained scorer can rate an average protocol within twenty minutes.
Finally, the financial outlay required in administering the ER
and preparing the protocols for analysis seemed reasonable. In short,
the ER was practical and feasible as a data-collecting instrument.
5. Ethical standards . This criterion involves the extent to which the
testing procedure and demands of the instrument respect the human rights
and "personal integrity" of the respondents. We did not want to
exploit respondents; put differently, we wanted the test experience to
be inherently valuable or meaningful to the respondents themselves.
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The following procedures were followed to carry out these
intentions: (1) All potential respondents were informed about the purpose
of the study, the nature of their task, and how their responses would
be used. They were given this information several days prior to the
interview. Parents of children-respondents were also Informed. All
questions or concerns of respondents (or their parents) were addressed
before the ER was administered. (2) The FR was completely voluntary for
all subjects. Parental consent for minors was also obtained. (3) The
names of subjects were kept in confidence within the project staff.
Protocols were identified by assigned code numbers and not by names, and
each respondent was assured this confidentiality. (4) Requests for
feedback about results were honored.
A more complex ethical issue is whether it is justifiable to arouse
deep emotions, stir memories and force perceptions in a psychological
test. Are there any risks in surfacing unforgetable memories that
could result in self-destructive or socially destructive consequences?
Although there is no guarantee of eliminating these risks, there are some
safeguards in the ER and its use to minimize them. These include the
following: (1) The subjects were informed beforehand of possible
8
distressful memories and given a method to cope with them. (2) Many
psychologists believe that repression operates to keep memories that are
too stressful from being consciously recalled. This means that
aspects of an experience one is not prepared to cope with probably
8. For example the interviewer could say, "Some people remember very ,
Important and emotional events; and they might shake or feel like crying.
This is perfectly normal. If this happens to you, it's o.k. ; you need not
worry about it. I encourage you to talk about your experiences with your
friends afterwards."
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will remain imconscious. This appears to be a built in safeguard
within every person. (3) Persons recalling "painful" experiences are
not left stranded with their distress. Questions B through E play a
significant role for helping people deal with these types of memories.
The questions enable subjects to assign a coherent meaning to the
experience recalled. This coherence involves "making sense" (i.e. in
Gestalt terminology, "completion") of the experience by crystallizing
or clarifying the sources of the distress (this is done by answering
questions B and C). The subject is encouraged to gain some understanding
of the emotions and give present and future direction to them (by
answering questions D and F) to the new coherence or meaning. Thus, there
is a therapeutic and/or educational quality to the sequence of questions
in the ER. lliis seems especially valuable to a person recalling a
distressful experience. (4) Finally, after each Interview there is a
"de-briefing" period in which the interviewer addresses any remaining
concerns or questions.
In general, the ER and the way it has been administered seemed
non-explotative of subjects, in that it acknowledges their rights as
human beings in the interview situation. Also, the procedures and
questions of the ER minimized the dangers and maximized the educational
9
value of the experience.
9. These ethical and "humanitarian" considerations were major focal
points in the development of the instrument. For more detailed descrip-
tions of' these issues, see Self-Knowledge Project Working Paper //7A
"The Unforgetable Experience Recall Test," by Roy Tamashlro, unpublished
paper. University of Massachusetts, 1974; and also. Working Paper //9,
"The Development of Affective Dispositions in Loevinger's Theory;
Challenge for S.K. Theory," by Roy Tamashiro, Unpublished paper. University
of Massachusetts, 1974.
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It seemed that the ER was inherently valuable or meaningful
for many if not most of the respondents. Examples of comments about
the ER interviews include: "It was fun," "enjoyable," "I learned a
lot about myself by thinking back and reviewing my life," and "The
question about the future made me realize that I could really Improve
myself."
Data Collection Procedures end Sample Selection
After the ER was developed as the measuring instrument, the data
collection procedures and sample selection strategy needed to be
specified so that protocols from the target populations could be collected.
The general procedures for gathering data were determined in
conjunction with the planned data-analysis. Also, the data-gathering
procedures and the accompanying rationales of previous developmental
theorists (namely, Kohlberg, Loevinger and Van den Deale) were
10
reviewed and considered in making these decisions.
The first procedural issue Involved the use of an instrument
(the ER, in this case) to measure developmental differences. The
passage of time, or more specifically, the sequential order in which
characteristics appear in a person's growth, is a critical variable
in the study of development. Currently the method most suited for
collecting data to assess the order and changes of these emerging
characteristics is the longitudinal approach. With this method.
10. This review is docinnented in Self-Knowledge Project Working
Paper #6, "Sampling and Data Analysis Methods," by Judith L. Evans,
Unpublished paper. University of Massachusetts, 1974.
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(which consists of measuring the same individuals at different intervals
over a period of time) continuity can be plotted "without having to
worry about differential sampling among age groups" (Buhler, et . al.
.
1973, p. 864). Also, "longitudinal investigations are mandatory if
we are to ascertain the permanence—or lack of permanence—of various
response tendencies" (Kagan, 1964, p.l). And, the patterns and
increments of growth can be ascertained with more certainty than with
other methods (e.g. the cross-sectional).
In spite of these valualjle assets in the longitudinal approach, an
alternative method— the cross-sectional approach—was employed in this
study. In this approach, a rjmposite picture of development is con-
r.tructed by simultaneously measuring groups of individuals from different
age (stage) populations and comparing them on specific variables. ,TTie
major advantage of this technique was the saving of time; by this approach
we did not need to wait for a period of years for subjects to progress
to the next stage and then retest them. Although the continuity of
development as it occurs in an individual is lost by the cross-sectional
method, this method seemed adequate as a first step in collecting the
ER protocols for the purposes of identifying developmental stages. The
method would be useful in locating the needs for future longitudinal
research.
The second major decision concerning data-collectlon was to obtain
a series of successive samplings from different populations, rather than
to sample one target population. This decision was a function of the
experimental status of the ER test. By the successive sampling technique
the instructions, questions and format of the ER were reviewed and
66
improved after the test had been administered to each group. Simul-
taneously, each group provided data to be analyzed to derive the scoring
manual.
The Invited samples were initially selected according to availa-
bility, and diversity on two demographic characteristics, age (or grade
in school) and occupation (or membership in selected specialty groups).
No other criterion for achieving representativeness was used in selecting
the invited sample.
Within the invited samples, specific samples needed to be selected
for administration of the ER. Except for students, the groups were
small enough such that a liaison could invite all members of a group
that the liaison knew. In schools, one or two classrooms at each grade
level were arbitrarily selected by principals , teachers and/ or the
project staff. Parents of students in the selected classrooms were
sent letters requesting permission for students to participate in this
study. Ten to 15 students in each grade were randomly selected from
among those students with parental permission. Thus, a pool of subjects
selected for testing was composed of 10 to 15 students at each grade
level and all volunteering members in the other groups.
After the ER had been satisfactorily developed using practice
subjects, it was administered to the selected populations. The first
invited sample was a university women's gymnastics team. An oral form
(Form 0/3-74) was administered to eight women on the team, ages 19 to 22.
They also completed the Washington University Sentence Completion Test
for ego development (Loevinger, , 1970).
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After testing the gymnasts, revisions were made in the ER instructions,
and the first written form (Form W/4-74) was developed. This written
form was administered to the second and third invited samples. In the
second sample, 11 student drug counselors ages 15 to 27, were tested.
The third sample included seven women ages 18 to 21, on a university
softball team. Also, this revised form was used in testing five assorted
adults (written form), ages 23 to 44, 11 welfare recipients (oral form)
ages 18 to 76, and nine students ages IP to 33, in an Introductory
humanistic education class ("Education of the Self") (written form).
The children's forms of the ER, one oral (Form 9/5-74) and one
written (Form W/5-74) ,were created for testing in the school populations.
The oral form was administered to 15 fourth graders in an elementary
school in a university community, to 29 second graders in an urban
(Springfield, Massachusetts) integrated public school, and 14 second
graders in another public school in Springfield. The written form was
used to test seven seventh graders and 25 tenth graders in Springfield,
and 18 students, ages 16 to 19, in a high school in Easthampton,
Massachusetts.
The questions in the ER were revised after protocols were collected
from all of the above mentioned groups. The second and third questions
on the early forms asked hew the subjects saw themselves as "the same as
or "different from" the way they were when the recalled event occurred.
The fourth and fifth questions asked how they thought they would "stay
the same" and "change" in the future. These four questions (the second,
third, fourth and fifth) on the early forms were changed to five new
questions on the current forms (W/9-74 and 0/9-74). The new questions
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ask how the event was Important or special to the subject when it (the
event) was experienced and currently. They also ask subjects to make
generalizations about what they know about themselves from the experience
recalled, and how this knowledge could be useful to them. The first
question in the current forms, asking subjects to describe in detail
the experience they selected, remained basically the same as in the
earlier forms.
With the revised questions, the new iorm of the ER (Form W/9-74)
was administered to two additional groups. Both were graduate level
seminars in psychological education. Twenty-two students, ages 23 to 52,
in a course titled "Education as Feminist Consciousness Raising"
comprised the first group; and 22 students, ages 23 to 47, in a seminar
titled "Autology" comprised the other group.
Having 203 protocols available, the next step was to select a
manageable number of protocols for analysis and construction of a
scoring manual. For the purpose of this study, it seemed that the
most important sampling variable was "range of developmental levels."
That is, since the aim of this study was to identify the developmental
differences in verbal descriptions of experiences, it was crucial that
the collected protocols were representative of persons at all levels of
development. But the developmental level of a person is usually unknown
before testing. Chronological age is a crude measure, but it is highly
unreliable especially beyond age 12 (Kessen, 1960; Loevinger, 1966).
Thus, to determine the developmental levels of subjects, a test for ego
development^^ (the Washington University Sentence Completion Test:
11. "Ego development" was a construct known to be related to the area of
Interest in this study, namely verbal descriptions of experiences.
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Loevinger, et
. , 1970) was administered to the respondents. This
meant that subjects took two tests: the ego development test and the ER
(in either the oral or written form)
.
Some of the groups tested, however, were not administered the ego
development test. These groups included the drug counselors, the softball
team, and the students in the Springfield schools. Ego level scores
were derived for subjects in these groups by reading their ER protocols
and assigning an ego-level score using the same criteria for scoring
the Sentence Completion test. These scores were "compromised" between
two raters. However, the error introduced by using the Sentence
Completion scoring method on the ER protocols (which the method was
not intended for) was left uncontrolled.
Those subjects who did complete the ego development test were
assigned an ego-level score according to their scores on the test. (the
Sentence Completion). The manual for scoring the Sentence Completion
test was followed closely: This involved at least two raters scoring
each protocol independently and "compromising" differences in their
ratings.
The actual data-producing sample was identified after the ego
development tests were scored. A total of 72 ER protocols were selected
for analysis from the several samples on the basis of their ego
development scores (I-levels) . Ten of these protocols were from subjects
who scored "1-2" on the ego test. Ten were from subjects scoring
"Delta;" ten from those scoring "Delta/3;" ten from those scoring "1-3"
and so forth for each of the other levels of ego development (including.
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"1-3/4," "1-4," "1-4/5," "1-5," and "1-6").^^ We deliberately included
protocols representative of several test groups at any given I-level
grouping. For example, tbe ER protocols in the 1-3 group included
subjects from the softball team(l), the Springfield public schools(4),
the welfare group(4) and the Easthampton high school group(l). Table 3-2
lists the number of protocols selected from each sample group for
construction of the Preliminary Scoring Manual. Table 3-3 lists the
number of protocols selected from each cample group for each ego-level
grouping.
Besides including protocols from several test groups in each level,
there was no other attempt to achieve representativeness on other
variables. The reason for this was that the critical variable was
developmental range (achieved by selecting according to ego levels)
.
Representativeness according to demographic or other characteristics
was secondary and could be eventually achieved in subsequent studies.
Thus, this selection procedure yielded 72 protocols from the
various sample groups. Using these protocols, we attempted several
methods of content analysis to arrive at an Initial method of scoring
the ERs. The strategies used in analyzing the ER protocols and deriving
a scoring method will now be discussed.
12. Although there are nine ego levels, there are only 72 (rather than
90) protocols in our sample. This is explained by the fact that very few
persons in any population score at the highest levels (1—5 and 1-6)
.
Because of this paucity, we treated 1—5 and 1-6 as one level for our
purposes. Other protocols were discarded because of Incomplete responses.
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TABLE 3-2: LIST OF SAMPLE GROUPS TESTED,
CHARACTERISTICS AND NUMBER
SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS
Group Number
Tested
Age
Range
Ego Level
Range
Ntnnber in Data-
Producing Sample
Gymnastics Team 8 19-22 Delta/3-I-5 6
Drug Counselors 11 15-27 Delta-I-5 5
Softball Team 7 18-21 Delta-I-4 6
Assorted Adults 5 23-44 I-4-I-6 2
Welfare Recipients 11 18-76 I-2-I-4/5 11
"Education of the Self" class 9 18-33 I-3-I-4/5 3
Elementary School: University
Community-Grade A
15 8-9H I-2-Delta/3 6
Springfield Public Schools:
(a) Second Graders (1)
(b) Second Graders (2)
(c) Seventh Graders
(d) Tenth Graders
29
14
7
25
7-8
7-8
12-13
15-18
1-2
1-2
Delta
I-2-I-4
1
1
1
15
Easthampton High School 18 16-19 I-3-I-3/4 3
"Education as Feminist
Consciousness Raising
Class
22 23-52 I-3/4-I-5 10
"Autology" Seminar 22 23-47 I-3/4-I-6 2
72
TABLE 3-3: NUMBEE OE PROTOCOLS SELECTED FROM EACH
SAMPLE GROUP ACCORDING TO EGO-LEVELS
Group 1-2 Delta Delta/3 1-3 1-3/4 1-4 1-4/5 1-5, 1-6
Gymnastics Team - - 1 - - 2 2 1
Drug Counselors - 1 - - 1 2 - 1
Softball Team - 2 2 1 1 - - -
Assorted Adults - - - - - - 1 1
Welfare Recipients 2 - 3 3 1 1 1 -
Elementary School: University
Community—Grade 4
4 1 1 - - - - -
Springfield Public Schools 4 4 2 4 2 2 - -
Easthampton High School - - - 1 2 - - -
"Education as Feminist
Consciousness Raising"
Class
1 2 4 3
"Autology" Seminar - - - - - - 1 1
Data Analysis Strategy
Given the responses to the ER test, a procedure was needed to categorize
the data, such that characteristic developmental differences in these data
could be discerned. Several traditional approaches to analyzing data in
open-ended tests did not seem appropriate. These approaches included the
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tabulation method and the polar continuum method. They were not
designed to pick out qualitatively different characteristics that, in
this study, would distinguish the several developmental stages. The
polar continuum approach is sensitive only to differences that can be
spread across a one-dimensional scale; i.e., it is sensitive to
differences in quantity or degree, but not qualitative differences. The
tabulation method also yields only quantitative sums, differences and
ratios of particular characteristics, and not the qualitative differences
between the characteristics.
Some developmental studies, notably Kohlberg's and Loevlnger's,
experimented with various approaches to analyze their data for qualitatively
different characteristics. But lacking a previously developed model for
"qualitative" content analysis, the direction and evolution of their
scoring methods resulted largely from numerous trial-and-error attempts.
In the present study, aspects of the methodology and/or the insights of
these developmental studies shed some light on the problem of scoring
the ER protocols. But trial-and-error dictated the direction of our
efforts to a greater degree.
13. The tabulation approach Involves counting instances of the relevant
characteristics observed in the subjects' responses. For example, the
Rorschach scoring consists of counting and summing the number of total
responses ("R")
,
responses based on form ("F") and responses based on
color ("C") (Rorschach, 1942).
The other approach is to postulate a polar continuum and estimate
a position on that continuum for each response. For example, an attltudinal
continuum may involve degrees of satisfaction from extremely positive (+5)
to neutral (0) to extremely negative (-5). The score of a response is
a judgment of whether the response falls on this +5 to -5 scale. The Miner
Sentence Completion Test (Miner, 1964) and the Rotter Incomplete Sentence
Blank (Rotter and Rafferty, 1950) use this second approach.
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The earliest attempts to score the ER protocols clarified the level
of analysis. Should we analyze strictly what the respondent said ,
counting specific words or phrases verbatim (with nothing inferred or
assumed)? Or should we score responses at the latent level, in which
the meaning of the responses or the underlying dynamics motivating the
person is described? It was not feasible to categorize responses by
counting words or phrases: Every protocol described a different
experience, hence in principle, if in actuality, the content of every
response is unique. When the content is treated as unique, it is not
possible to scale protocols in a developmental sequence.
Latent approaches were unsatisfactory for two main reasons:^^
(1) Latent approaches relied too heavily on the subjective interpretation
of the scorer (In other words, no clear objective criteria for scoring
could be defined using these approaches); and (2) the unconscious
material (drives, motives, needs, etc.) that is scored by latent level
analysis was outside the focus of this study. (See Working Definition,
Chapter II). It seemed that the scoring method should reflect the
study’s aim of identifying differences in descriptions of conscious
experiences by also scoring on the conscious rather than unconscious level.
14. On the latent level of analysis, three approaches were attempted. The
first might be characterized as a "subjective literary" approach. In this
approach, a judge would read through the protocols in each ego stage grouping
and try to describe over-all distinguishing characteristics of the protocols
in that group (much in the manner of an English composition teacher). For
example, 1—2 protocols appeared to describe experiences by signing or
"naming" them; Delta/3 protocols described experiences as "traumatic" or
"shocking;" 1—3 experiences were "melodramatic" and "soap operatic; and 1-4
experiences were "kaleidoscopic." The second latent level approach was to
abstract from the protocols what seemed to be the underlying (i.e. unconscious,
orientation, goal or intention (i.e., "what the person was trying to get ) of
the person, A third approach was to Interpret and classify the protocols
according to the various "needs" as specified by Maslow's (1943) hierarchy.
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Thus, it became apparent that the level of analysis we sought was
neither the verbatim word or phrase count, nor the latent (unconscious)
level. Rather, we sought analysis on the level of the subjects'
conscious meanings. On this level, the aim was to analyze and group
the responses into categories which the subjects themselves would
recognize as their own meanings. Of course some inference would be
involved. Short of re-interviewing the subject, we can only guess what
a person meant by any given response. But the guideline was to infer
on the level of common discourse, not on the level of unconscious or
psychoanalytic meanings.
The trial attempts to score the ER protocols also raised the
question, what is the unit of content that should be scored in the
protocols?^^ Should the total response be scored as one unit, or
should a response be broken down into the words, phrases, sentences, or
paragraphs, that make it up? The usually lengthy responses especially
to Question A were too cumbersome to score as a total unit; but breaking
down the responses into smaller units resulted in losing some of the
person's meanings. This issue was resolved by compromise, and we decided
to score the responses basically in sentence units. Each sentence-unit
was identified as in conventional English grammar, i,e., the unit of
(written) thought Included a complete subject and predicate, usually
15. The trial approaches include those described in Note 14 above. In
addition, another trial approach was to classify responses according to
the hypothesized- stage characteristics of verbal descriptions (See Chapter
IV '). Still another approach was to Identify examples of verbatim
responses from the protocols that could distinguish one developmental
level from another; i.e., the "exemplar" manual approach. None of these
approaches were fruitful.
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visually distinguishable from each other by terminating punctuation
marks (period, question mark, or exclamation point)
.
(See General Rules
for Scoring in Preliminary Symbol Scoring Manual; Appendix B.)
A more difficult problem in scoring the ER protocols was evolving
a method of categorizing a given response (i.e., classifying a sentence-
unit) . We chose to develop a schematic symbol approach to scoring the
16
sentence-units. This approach involved loci'sing on the organization
or structure of the sentence-unit, rather than the superficial content
of the statement. The specific content was represented by a symbol that
denoted a category; and each symbol (or category) represented similar
specific content. For example, references to "I" or "self" was denoted
by a circle ( O, S.l in the manual); references to overt actions by an
arrow (“>, S.5); and references to other persons, singular or plural,
by a square (O, S.2). The symbols which represented the various parts
of a sentence were diagrammed in a schematic configuration which
reflected the organization 'in the statement. One way that the above
three symbols could be diagrammed is;0—)D. This configuration denotes
any statement having the form, "I acted on another person," Hence all
of the following sentences were diagrammed by that configuration: (a) "I
kicked the nurse..." (b) "I had a baby." (c) "I saw a cute negro girl."
(d) I did visit them."
The assumption behind the schematic symbol approach was that each
symbol was a hypothesized developmental characteristic. Starting with
16. This schematic symbol approach is similar to that used by Kenneth
Isaacs in his study assessing developmental levels of interpersonal
relatability (1956)
.
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about twenty symbols, each representing a hypothesized developmental
characteristic, we attempted to diagram the sentence-units in the 72 ER
protocols selected by ego-levels. We began with ER protocols of subjects
with lower ego levels (which contained simpler statements)
,
and moved to
protocols of subjects with higher ego-levels (which contained more
complex statements) • A new symbol was created whenever a characteristic
of a sentence-unit could not be represented by a previously-defined
symbol. A team of four raters diagrammed the sentence-units in the
protocols, discussed their choices of symbols and diagrams, and decided
when new symbols were necessary.
The decision made for scoring each sentence-unit (in responses to
Ouestion A) in all 72 protocols were recorded on scoring worksheets (Fig. 3-1).
coring worksheet consists of a sentence-unit typed at the top of the
sheet. Below it was space to record the. diagram which the scorers
decided on for that sentence-unit. Then all the individual symbols
which were considered in diagramming the sentence-unit were listed.
A "yes" was indicated for each of the symbols considered which were
actually used in the diagram and "no" was recorded for those symbols
considered but not used. Each of these "yes"-and-"no" decisions were
then recorded separately on file cards. The card listed the symbol
considered, the part of the sentence in question, and the scoring
decision (yes or no). (See Fig. 3-2)
These symbol-decision cards were filed according to the symbol code
numbers (S.l, S.2, S.3, etc.). In short, (1) all of the sentence-units
were diagrammed by the scorers; (2) their decisions were recorded on
scoring worksheets and (3) these decisions were transferred to cards
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FIGURE 3-1: SAMPLE SCORING WORKSHEETS
1, Last June, right, me and my sister.
0411011 (4)
we went to a concert.
v/j ( o-a)-^A
NO S.4 me and my sister, we
YES S.4B me and my sister, we
YES S.3 concert
0210713 (6)
3. In remembering back this seems to be the experience where
I discovered my "self" for the first time ever.
v/,
YES G . 2 In remembering back , this seems to be the
experience
.
YES S.6 discovered
YES S.l 22, "self"
NO S.36 for the first time ever
NO S.12 for the first time ever
YES S.47 for the first time ever
and filed. After we scored the 72 protocols and recorded the decisions
by this procedure, we defined each of the symbols.
There were several steps Involved in defining a symbol. First, the
scorers named the criteria they employed in deciding whether to use a
particular symbol in scoring a sentence-unit. Then, each card filed
under the symbol (the Symbol—Decision Card) was examined against these
criteria. There were numerous discrepancies between the scorers' criteria
and the examples on the cards. (This was because the scorers' criteria
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FIGURE 3-2: EXAMPLES OF SYMBOL DECISION CARDS
S.42
(Symbol
code No.)
(On white card, indicating "yes") 0210713 (6)
(protocol ID
No. & I-level)
Up to that time, I had had a poor concept of myself
although it had been improving slightly through the
previous few years.
Explanation: previous years is coded 'i2
S.9C (On green card, indicating "No") 0210401 (4/5)
I felt as if we were the only poeple in the world.
Explanation: felt as if is not coded S.9C
underwent .aaiiy revisions or changes in the process of scoring the 72
protocols.) These discrepancies were resolved either (1) by changing
the scoring of an example on the card to a different symbol, or (2) by
revising the scorers* criteria so that the discrepant example was
incorporated by the revision. As these decisions were made to refine
the symbol-criteria or to change the scoring of particular responses
the definition of the symbols were gradually clarified. Some existing
symbols needed to be sub-divided into separate symbols, while some
symbols were dropped because their criteria were duplicated by another
symbol. The result of this definition procedure was the compilation of
the Preliminary Symbol Scoring Manual (Appendix B)
.
The Preliminary Scoring Manual was used to re—score the 72 subjects
responses to Question A of the ER. The scorers closely followed the
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criteria, definitions and examples in the manual to diagram Che sentence-
units. When the manual itself did not provide enough guidelines for
scoring a particular sentence-unit, the scorers referred to the Symbol
Decision Cards, which were no6 filed according to current symbol
definitions
,
After sentence-units in a protocol were diagrammed, another person
verified the scoring. This verification was done by attempting to
re-create the structure or organization rl the original sentence by
reading the scored diagrams alone. The extent to which the substance
of the original sentence could be re-created indicated the appropriate*
ness or correctness of the symbols selected to score the sentence-unit.
When a diagram did not convey the organization of the original sentence,
or if it did not conform to specifications in the Preliminary Scoring
Manual, he diagram was revised.
When the re-scoring and verification steps were completed, the
frequency of each symbol used in scoring a protocol was tabulated.
This frequency count was taken individually for each of the 72 protocols
scored. These tabulations were then translated into binary units of
"presence*’ versus "absence" of each symbol. If a symbol was used at
least once in the scoring of a protocol, this was counted as a "presence,"
And, if a symbol was not used in scoring a protocol, it was coimted as
"absence," These units of presence and absence for each symbol was then
subjected to the Cornell Technique for Scaling (Guttman, 1944, 1947),
This technique enabled us to ascertain whether the set of symbols formed
a hierarchical sequence. Forty—one symbols from the manual did scale
in this hierarchy and 12 did not (See Chapter VI),
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From this hierarchical sequence of symbols, we postulated four
stages of verbal descriptions of experience. These stages were: the
Elemental stage, the Situational stage, the Patterned stage, and the
Transformational stage. The descriptions of these stages are presented
in Chapter V.
The organization and interpretation of the sequence of symbols
into the four stages suggested further revisions of the scoring manual.
For example, the pattern of occurrences tf some symbols on the Guttman
scale suggested that these symbols be combined into one S5nabol, Other
patterns on the scale suggested that particular symbols should be
re-defined and further re-worked so that it differentiated stages more
clearly. These revisions are discussed in Chapter VI, but the scope
of this study does net include the description of the actual revisions
made on he Preliminary Symbol Scoring Manual.
The Preliminary Manual was evaluated in three other ways: the
degree of agreement between raters using the Preliminary Manual was
evaluated. And, the assigned stage scores on the ER protocols were
compared with the individuals' ego level and with their chronological
age. These evaluation procedures, their results and the implications of
these results are discussed in Chapter VI.
Other desirable methods for evaluating the Preliminary Manual,
such as cross-validation, tests of validity (e.g., predictive validity),
and tests of internal consistency, were outside the scope of this
study (See Chapter VII).
* * *
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In sum, the data analysis began with numerous trial-and-error
attempts to identify qualitatively different characteristics that
differentiated developmental stages among the ER protocols. Eventually
we decided to score the responses in units of sentences, on the level
of the respondents’ conscious meanings. A system of schematic symbols
was devised to do this, and the Preliminary Scoring Manual was
constructed on the basis of these symbols. The Guttman scaling
technique was applied to arrange the occv.rer^es of these symbols' in a
hierarchical sequence. This hierarchical sequence was interpreted and
organized into four stages. Finally the Preliminary Manual was evaluated
by assessing the degree of agreement between raters using the manual,
and by computing the correlation of respondent's ages and ego levels
jith the four self-knowledge stages.
Aftei completing these empirical procedures, the resulting
Preliminary Symbol Manual and the derived stages were compared to the
initial hypothesized stage characteristics of verbal descriptions of
experiences. This comparison clarified and corrected the hypothesized
stage characteristics. This is reported in Chapter VII. At this point,
we had come full-circle in the dialogue between theory and observation.
The dialogue began with a theoretical frame in which stage characteristics
of verbal descriptions of experiences were hypothesized from four
selected developmental theories. Then the observation half of the dialogue
involved developing an Instrument (the Experience Recall Test)
,
selecting
and testing respondents using the ER, and devising a scoring method for the
ER protocols. These empirical steps illuminated the theoretical frame from
which we began and to which we now return. The next chapter describes the
original theoretically derived stage characteristics of self-knowledge theories.
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CHAPTER IV
THEORETICALLY-DERIVED STAGES OF
SELF-KNOWLEDGE THEORIES^
Before embarking on an empirical search for the stages of self-
knowledge theories, we attempted to derive a composite description of
these stages from existing structural-developmental theories. Four
theories were used. These theories included Piaget *s theory of cognitive
development, Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning development (1964;
Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971; 1973), Loe'^'inger et . al . * s theory of ego
development (1970) and Van den Deale's theory of ego-ideal development
(1968).
The four theories were aligned with each other for their theoretical
equivalency (this procedure is described in Chapter III). Assuming this
general similarity among the theories (see Table 3-1), we deduced
characteristics that formed a stage sequence of self-knowledge theories.
This chapter outlines the theoretically-derived characteristics of these
stages.
In this preliminary composite description of the stages, character-
istics derived from three of the theories (namely, Kohlberg's; Loevinger,
et
. 's; and Van den Deale's) were subsumed under the Plagetian cogni-
tive-developmental framework.^ Characteristics from the various theories
1. The material in this chapter is adopted from Self-Knowledge Education
Project Working Paper #3, "Toward a Theory of Self-Knowledge Development,"
unpublished paper. University of Massachusetts, 1973.
2. It is debatable whether Piaget's theory of cognitive development is
"more general" than the other three. For example, the concept of ego
development contains numerous dimensions other than cognitive ones. However,
the Plagetian stages seem to be prerequisites for the equivalent (parallel)
.
stages in the other theories (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972; Loevinger, 1966)
and thus, we used the Plagetian stages as a general framework for deriving
characteristics of stages.
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were identified whenever they were relevant to the question, "How do
people differentiate and integrate antecedents, responses and
consequences of their experiences at the pre-operational stage, early
and late concrete operational stage and early and late formal operational
stage?" The characteristics are outlined here according to each of
these stages.
Pre-Operationa T
Pre-operational thinking is limited to single, concrete, obvious
immediate instances or aspects of reality. "The pre-operational child
is confined to the surface of the phenomena. He (or she) tries to think
about assimilating only those superficial features which clamor loudest
for his (or her) attention. . . . One form which concreteness assumes
is what Piaget calls realism . Things are what they appear to be in
immediate, egocentric perception; and the Insubstantial phenomena (dreams,
names, thoughts, moral obligations, etc.) are substantiated as quasi-
tangible entities (Flavell, 1963, p. 157, 159)." Similarly, "affects
are seen primarily as felt bodily states or impulses rather than as
differentiated inner feelings or as generalized psychological states
(Loevinger, et . al. , 1970, p. 58)."
For the pre-operational child good and bad are naive, global
dichotomizatlons of the physical consequences on the child. "(He or she)
tends to dichotomize the world into good or bad, mean or nice, and
clean or dirty .... People are seen as sources of supply, she demands
things from them, and good often, if not always ,means good to me
(Loevinger, al
. ,
1970, pp, 56-57)," In responding to a Kohlberg-
type moral dilemma story, the pre- concrete operational child defines
S5
"good or bad according to reward or punishment rather than according to
adult rules or commands." An act becomes good or bad only after it is
rewarded or punished. Goodness or badness is not Independent of the
immediate, experienced consequences.
Because pre-operational children are bound to single, concrete,
immediate experiences they are unable to hold original premises or
situations in mind as the situation changes. Thus they do not appreciate
lawful transformations nor are they able to reverse the sequence of
events in their minds to get an internal image of the original state
after that state has changed externally. Pre-operational thought only
"can focus impressionistically and sporadically on this or that
momentary static condition but cannot adequately link a whole set of
successive conditions into an integrated totality by taking account of the
transformations which unify them and render them logically coherent. . . .
They are unable to keep their premises unaltered during a reasoning sequence.
Their thought is irreversible in the sense that the permanent possibility
of returning . . . to an unchanged initial premise ... is denied them
(Flavell, 1963, pp. 157, 159),"
What integration there is occurs as a juxtaposition of a specific
Instance. Although these three elements are differentiated, they are
not causally related by the child. "And" and "because" are used to mean
"and." There are no true (self-knowledge) hypotheses at this stage
because: (a) there is no inference that the unique Juxtaposition of events
recurs beyond this instance; and (b) because antecedents, responses,
and consequences are not causally related. There may be habitual
patterns of antecedent, responses and consequences obvious to an adult
but the habit is not recognized by the pre-concrete operational child.
When describing their experiences (feelings, actions, sensations,
thoughts), the situation in which these experiences occur and the
consequences, the pre-operational characteristics should be evident
in the following aspects of a child's report:
1. Descriptions of antecedents, responses and consequences
are limited to a specific, singular instance. They are
not described as in terms of mort general sets
—
"My brother hit me, and I cried, and my mother
came" (ver^s)"When my brother hits me, I cry
and my mother comes."
2. Descriptions of antecedents, responses and consequences are
in terms of obvious, superficial aspects of reality. Even
dreams, names, thoughts, and feelings are substantiated as
quasi-tangible entities assumed to be visible to others.
"I am a girl. I have long hair."
(question) "Can I always see it when your feelings
are hurt?"
(answer) "Yes."
3. Descriptions of antecedents, responses and consequences are
global, simplistic or dichotomous (e.g., good-—bad, happy
—
sad, nice—mean, fun— hurts, clean—dirty).
4. Good and bad are determined by, and after the response of
other people, usually adults, and the pleasure-pain effects
on the person.
5. The child can link or juxtapose an antecedent, response and
consequence. "And," "because" and "then" are used to mean
"and," The child is unable to specify causally related
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classes of antecedents, responses or consequences. For
instance, the child is unable to cite additional examples
if asked, "are there other things that make you mad?"
or "At other times are there things you do when you get
mad?" Ttoswering these questions requires moving beyond
the immediate instance to a class or set of functionally
equivalent instances.
Concrete Operai-.xons
If we take a group of objects, bunch them closer together and ask
a child if there now are more, less or the same amount, the pre-operational
child will say, "less." The concrete operational child will say, "the
same." If we ask for the concrete operational child* s reasons, he or
she will say either that nothing has been added or that the group can
be spread out again. According to Piaget the difference lies in a
child's conceiving of a concretely experienced action now as one among
a number of systematically Interrelated compensatory actions. A child
can see that:
1. Two successive actions can be combined into one:
2. The action-schema already at work in Intuitive
thought becomes reversible;
3. The same point can be reached by two different
paths without being altered;
4. A return to the starting-point finds the starting-
point unchanged;
5. When the same action is repeated, it either adds
nothing to itself or else is a new action with a
cumulative effect. In these we recognize transitive
comblnatlvity, reversibility, associativity and
identity;, with either logical tautology or
numerical Iteration. (Piaget, 1960, p. 141, 142)
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Because the child now views an action such as bunching a group of objects,
as one action in an increasingly complex, tightly integrated system of
compensatory actions (1-5 above), the child is no longer fooled by
exclusive attention to the one action. The essence of concrete operations
is described by Lunzer (1965):
. . . what develops at about the age of six or
seven is the ability to examine two judgments
simultaneously and arrive at an appropriate
conclusion .... An invariant "operational"
concept represents a synthesis ^ - tv. o compen-
satory judgments .... The .lew (concrete
operational) concepts do not entail loss of
awareness of such prepotent features (an area
covered by a group of objects). But they do
imply that such awareness is balanced by a
simultaneous awareness of other features and,
above all, by an awareness of the lawful
character of compensation (pp. 19, 20, 22).
Concrete operations, according to Piaget, presuppose structures or
total systems of operations of which they are a part.
In order to pose a class and cognize it as
a true logical class rather than as a momentary,
perceptual configuration or collection of elements,
one must have the generalized ability to pose
other classes, to add various classes together
to form supra-ordlnate classes, to subtract one
class from another, and soon. In short, the
single at-the-moment actualized operation of posing
one class could not occur without a whole prior
system of at-the-moment potential class operations
(Flavell, 1963, pp. 166, 167).
Piaget describes nine such structures In logical-mathematical terms,
called "groupings." His empirical research shows that a child can
perform a variety of concrete operations that pre-suppose these
structures, e.g. adding, subtracting, multiplying, dividing. These
operations allow a child to conserve number, weight and volume In spite
of Irrelevant perceptual changes. According to Piaget the essential
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operations of concrete reasoning are those of classification and
seriation (Inhelder and Piaget, 1964) and their effect is to allow the
child to establish precise relations between directly experienced
objects.
Our research does not attempt to prove the existence of these
structures, or to identify new structures or to verify the existence of
new or previously identified operations. Instead, we are investigating
how these operations, with their implied structures* are manifested
when children attempt to make sense out of their experiences (feelings,
actions, thoughts, and sensations) in relation to the events that
occasion them.
To summarize, concrete operational reasoning involves the
awareness of the lawful character of compensation between two simultaneous
aspects of a directly experienced situation. These lawful compensations
are: (1) Transitive comblnatlvity (two successive actions can be
combined into one); (2) associativity (the same point can be reached
through two routes ) ;(3) tautological identity (when the same action is
repeated, it neither adds anything to itself nor takes anything away
from itself); (4) numerical iteration (when the same action is repeated
there is a cumulative effect); and (5) reversibility (a return to the
starting point finds nothing changed). These five lawful compensations
are characteristics of concrete operational structures which allow the
child to perform two essential concrete operations, logical classification
and seriation, as well as several other operations Involving these
fimdamental operations, e.g. adding, subtracting, multiplying eind
dividing
.
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In all of these operations, it is important to remember that they
occur in immediate, direct, concrete experience. The child at this
stage does not apply these operations to unexperienced, possible events.
Concrete operations are tied to and limited by what the child
experiences or can manipulate in the here-and-now
.
We hypothesize that concrete operational reasoning will be
reflected in several ways when children describe stimuli, responses and
consequences and their relationships.
1. The child is able to classify (or cite) two or more
concrete instances as members of the same set of
antecedents, responses, or consequences. These two
or more instances are seen as functionally
equivalent in leading to the same response or
consequence.
I feel hurt (response) when my brother told
me I couldn't make a wooden airplane, and when
kids on the playground wouldn't let me play
baseball with them. . .
Later in concrete operational reasoning two or more
sets of experienced antecedents or responses are cited
as functionally equivalent in leading to the same
response or consequence.
I get high (response) when I exercise, smoke
dope, go hiking or body surfing.
Here, each of the antecedents refers implicitly to a number
of specific Instances.
2. The child understands that internal states (sensations,
feelings, thoughts) are not visible to others. Conversely
the child is awere that other people have non-visible
feelings. However, these feelings still are described
in rather global, simplistic terms: happy, sad, mad,
glad.
When my brother feels sad, I feel sad too
and give him my bike to ride for a while.
(Question) Do you ever say things to yourself
in your head so that no one else can hear.
(Answer) Yes. I say "I'm glad I did it."
In later concrete operational reasoning, internal states
in oneself and others become more highly differentiated.
"The 1-3/4 subject (late concrete operational) has a
stronger awareness of feelings (Loevinger, al.
,
1970, p.72)," "The 1-3/4 (person) has a deepening
interest in interpersonal relations. Moreover, inter-
actions are described in terms of feelings or traits
rather than in purely behavioral terms as is often the
case with 1-3 (Loevinger, et . al. , 1970, p. 74)," Even
later, the concrete operational person describes
interpersoneil interaction "in terms of differentiated
feelings, motives or traits (Loevinger, al. , 1970,
p. 68)/' One form taken by this more complex, dif-
ferentiated awareness of internal states is a chain of
responses
.
(Question) What happens when you get into a fight?
(Answer) First I get mad, then I get excited, then
I feel guilty.
(Question) Can you tell me how that happens?
(Answer) First I'm just mad. Then I get excited
and fight back. Then I feel guilty about fighting.
Notice however that in this chain of reactions every
other reaction is external. It is not yet a completely
internal chain.
The concrete operational child is aware of the system of
rules governing behavior and re’ itionships.
(a) Early in concrete operations a child judges
his or her behavior in terms of its conformity to the
proper rule or role that is directly experlenced.e.g.
stated by an adult. Kohlberg calls this the "good boy
—
nice girl" orientation. Loevinger, et . al. , state,
"Formulas for what does happen or what ought to happen
tend to be stated in absolute terms without contingencies
or exceptions. Behavior is governed by rules and is
often judged by absolute standards of right-wrong (1970,
pp. 64, 65)."
If my mother gives me advice, I take it because
I know she is always right.
Education is very important for everyone.
The motive for correct behavior is primarily the demon-
strated approval of significant others.
(b) Later in the concrete operational period
goodness—badness is less absolute, and more dependent
on conditions, comparisons and concerns with "the system."
"in place of the I~3 tendency to classify actions in
mutually exclusive categories of right and wrong, the
subject tends to think about appropriateness,
what is right for the time and place and the situation.
There are contingencies, exceptions and comparisons,
though they are global and often banal. More complex
and differentiated contingencies and comparisons
appear at 1-4 (Loevinger, al,
, 1970, p. 71)"
My mother and I share some unfortunate traits,
(emphasis ours)
When I am with a man I feel normal, according
to who the man is and what he means to me,
Kohlberg describes this stage of moral reasoning as the
"authority and social order maintaining orientation,"
Goodness-badness has an added contingency—approval not
just by others for conformity, but by legitimate sanctioned
authorities of the system.
(c) The concrete operational person is aware of
reciprocal or cooperative actions necessary and
appropriate to achieve a desired result or relationship.
The following statement illustrates awareness of
reciprocal sexist roles defined by a larger system;
"A man should always be a jock on the playing field and
a gentleman with the ladies." Kohlberg hints at this
awareness of reciprocity within a system when he
states "moral judgments at this level are based on
role taking, on taking the perspective on the other
person with legitimate expectations in the situation.
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CKohIberg, 1966, pp. 26-27)."
4. Experienced antecedents, responses and consequences are seen
as component parts of a dynamically interrelated set of events.
Self-kncwledge hypotheses infer causality rather than mere
juxtaposition of events. Evidence of these systematic
relationships may be seen in:
(a) Two or more stimuli or sets of antecedents can be
stated as alternative causes of a response.
(b) A set or sets of responses can be stated as caused
by an antecedent or seen as potentially equivalent in terms
of getting a desired outcome.
(c) Responses may be contingent or qualified or
expectations may be stated.
(d) Chains of responses may be listed: A person's
action may cause a response in others that is an antecedent
to another response in the person.
While this complex self-knowledge hypothesis may include many
alternatives, the person does not categorize the alternatives within a
larger framework or state the general rules that describe all variations
in the relationships between antecedents and responses or responses and
consequences. This is a characteristic of formal operational structures.
Formal Operations
In contrast with the concrete operational child's relative imprison-
ment in what is real, present and concrete, the formal operational
adolescent is able to conceive of what is possible, unexperienced and in
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the more distant future. With this capacity comes a deeper valuing
and interest in theoretical problems not related to everyday realities,
ideas about the future of society, the way it should be, how society can
and should be transformed, the adolescent's role in it, ideals about
the way he or she should be, life plans, career and marital choices,
and projects that implement those ideals. Adolescents' concerns focus
on what is remote in time and space and the ocial systems that incor-
porate the present as a point from which some desired future reality will
emerge (Piaget, 1967, pp. 60-70).
Implicit in these new concerns about "the possible" as opposed to
"the real" are three essential characteristics of formal operational
thought. First, it is hypothetico-deductive. An adolescent reasons,
for example, that "It may be necessary and sufficient to get high
grades to get into college, or to be an outstanding athlete, or both.
I have to find out which is really true." The adolescent can hypothesize
a variety of conditions that may have to occur in order to reach a desired
future goal, compare his or her alternative possible courses of action
in terms of the likelihood of leading to the goal and deductively choose
one course of action, all of this prior to action or experience in
achieving the goal. This hypothetico-deductive thought may take the form
of extensive rumination about how to become successful, popular, loved
or powerful (Flavell, H63)
.
Second, formal operational thought is propositional, or propositions
about propositions. Imagine a debate in a group of adolescents over the
rules that will govern their group. As the adolescents identify the
possible consequences of alternative rules in their attempt to choose
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which rules are most appropriate and adequate, they are not only engaged
In hypothetlco-deductive reasoning, they are classifying and evaluating
the rules, establishing criteria or propositions about what kinds of
rules are best. These are propositions about propositions.
Third, formal operational reasoning involves subjecting variables
or rules to combinatorial analysis, the mental actions of considering
all possible combinations of conditions, Tc continue with the example
of the debate over the rules of some ’^nw group, suppose that the
adolescents came down to two basic rules they were considering: (a) In
order to be a member of the clique, members must always tell each other
what they really are thinking when asked; and (b) In order to be a member
of the group, members must always help each other out when asked.
Adolescents could, and perhaps would consider all possible combinations
of these two rules in terms of whether they are necessary to achieve
and maintain membership and a sense of belonging: (i) Perhaps neither
"a" nor "b" are necessary; (li) Perhaps "a" is necessary but "b" is
not; (iii) Perhaps "b" is necessary but "a" is not; (iv) Perhaps both
are necessary; and (v) Perhaps "a" is necessary only when "b" is absent
or "b" is necessary when "a" is absent, etc, (Flavell, 1963), The
essence of combinatorial analysis is to consider outcomes in terms of
all possible combinations of two or more conditions.
Formal operational thinking may be characterized in terms of these
three verbal descriptions, or more precisely and completely in terms of
the logico-mathematical structures and operations Implied by them.
Recall that Piaget defined nine "grouping" structures that are implicit
in such concrete operations as logical classification, seriation, adding.
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substractlng, multiplying and dividing. At formal operations, the
underlying structures, according to Piaget approximate the mathematical
models of a "group" and "lattice." These structures make it possible
for adolescents to engage in reasoning which can be described as
hypothetico-deductive, propositions about propositions and combinatorial
3
analysis. However, certain aspects of these structures must be
noted to make clear the connection between them ano our hypothesized
coding categories for assessing the developmental level of self-knowledge.
The group consists of the complete and systematic relationships
between four different types of transformations of propositions:
Identity (I) nothing changes in the proposition on which this null
transformation is performed, i.e. assertions; Negation (N) everything
changes in the proposition on which this transformation is performed,
e.g. all assertions become negations; Reciprocal (R) this transformation
permutes assertions and negations but leaves conjunctions (i.e. both
X and Y) and disjunctions (i.e. X but not Y) unchanged; Correlative (C)
this transformation permutes conjunctions and disjunctions but leaves
assertions and negations unchanged. (Flavell, 1963, p. 216) "The gist
of Piaget's experimental findings is that older children, in contrast
to younger ones, appear to be able to discriminate the various direct
and opposing operations (i.e. transformations) and also to assess their
effects vis-a-vis one another (Flavell, 1963,p.218) ." I,N,R and C form
a mathematical group in the sense that they can be multiplied or combined.
3. The mathematical notions of "groups" and "lattices" are explained
in Flavell, 1963, pp. 212-222.
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For example, the negation of a negation leaves the original proposition
unchanged (NN=I)
,
or the assertion of a reciprocal is equivalent to
the reciprocal itself (IR=R)
.
This rather abstract and abreviated presentation can be sinnmarized
adequately for our purposes. This summary applies both to the group
and the lattice structure. Lunzer (1965) in his logical and empirical
analysis of the INRC group in relation T' the capacities inherent in
the groupings of concrete operations states that "the essential operations
of concrete reasoning are those of classification and seriatlon and
their effect is to establish precise relations between terms that
are physical objects. . , The results of the present inquiry suggest. . ,
that the familiar verbal analogies (i.e.
,
Lunzer's empirical test)
require formal reasoning in the sense that their solution demands the
apprehension of second order relations, or relations between relations,
and not merely first order relations, which are relations between objects
(Lunzer, 1965, p.41)."
Several examples of seeing relationships between relationships may
help clarify this, and these examples have important manifestations in
formal operational self-knowledge. The formal operational child (1)
understands proportions, the relationships between ratios (e.g. X is to
Y as A is to B)
; (2) can appreciate probability (X occurs a certain
percentage of the time Y occurs) ; and (3) correlation (X varies as a
certain function of Y)
.
All three of these capacities entail relationships
between relations and can be derived mathematically from lattices and
group structures (Flavell, 1963, p. 222).
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To summarize, the formal operational adolescent in contrast to the
concrete operational child is oriented to the possible as opposed
to the real, the future as opposed to what is immediately experienced.
Adolescents' reasoning may be characterized as hypothetico-inductive,
propositions about propositions, and combinatorial. Implicit in these
capabilities are the mathematical structures of the group and the
lattice which involve the capacity to per onr several combinations
of the I, N, R and C transformations on propositions. These combinations
can be summarized as the capacity to appreciate the relations between
relations. Three forms of this capacity are the understanding of
proportions, probability and correlations.
To a large extent the characteristics of formal operational reasoning
are overlapping and Interdependent. They imply or lead to each other
therefore it is difficult to define discrete mutually exclusive
categories of self-knowledge statements to be coded. The following were
first passes at defining relatively discrete categories.
1. Formal operational self-knowledge hypotheses will refer
to possible (as opposed to actually experienced)
antecedents, responses and consequences in relation to
each other.
(a) The formal operational adolescent can postulate
potential antecedents, responses and consequences remote
in time and space.
When I drive my car I realize that I'm lessening
my chances to cross country ski in North America
ten years from now due to thermal pollution.
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Here, the specific relationship is cast in terms of
eternity. It is seeing the relationship as an indication
of the distant future that gives the present its
particular emotional meaning.
(b) The adolescent can postulate a future in terms
of ideal, perhaps unattainable states, situations and
consequences. Conversely, the .jrst possible situation
can be envisioned as well. Both are invested with deep
feelings for the first time during adolescence.
We are struck by the fact that feelings about
Ideals are practically non-existent in the child...
There is no operation available at this level
which would make it possible for the child to
elaborate an ideal which goes beyond the empirically
given. The notions of humanity, social justice,
freedom of conscious, civic or intellectual courage
and so forth... are Ideals which profoundly influence
the adolescents affective life. (Inhelder and Piaget,
1958, pp. 348-349)
(c) One key characteristic is hypothetlco-deductlve
(if-then) statements about future situations, states of
being, and results.
Well, if I decide to go to college I might flunk
out and that would disappoint my parents terribly.
If I were elected president of the club, I guess
I would really feel great. I'd probably have a lot
more friends.
Often reflected in an adolescent's considerations are
two or more routes to achieve the desired end state, e.g.
considerations of a variety of strategies for being admitted
to the college in which he or she wants entrance. Also
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there may be an attempt to make a logical choice about
which strategy Is most likely to be successful, i.e.
a combinatorial analysis of the alternatives.
2. Formal operational self-knowledge hypotheses will
reflect combinatorial analysis, i.e. stating the
possibility of several outcomes ^e^ther responses in
relation to antecedents or consequences in relation to
responses) as a fxmction of the presence or absence of
several conditions.
(a) This may take the form of stating a set
within a set.
When I do something that really pleases teachers
(set), especially those I care about (set within
a set) I feel so full and warm inside and the other
person usually responds warmly to me by letting me
know she appreciates me.
(b) This also may take the form of two or more
conditions that must be present for the result to occur.
When I'm feeling down on myself (condition 1)
and other people criticize me (condition 2)
,
I
feel defensive and sorry for myself.
When I'm in a situation with competent, agressive,
good looking males (conditions 1, 2 and 3) I feel
stupid and weak.
(c) Descriptions may involve a variety of other
possible combinations of necessary conditions; e.g.,
two conditions must be absent; one condition must be present
and another must be absent, etc.
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(d) When a person is trying to arrive at these types
of conclusions (a, b, c above) there may be extensive
rumination about which combination of conditions will
lead to the outcome described.
3. Formal operational self-knowledge hypotheses will contain
two or more alternative viewpoints about the same
experienced or anticipated stimulus, response or consequence,
1 was frightened and really turned off, but
somehow strongly attracted.
When I'm in a group with authority figures
(set within a set), I feel inattentive, confused and
unfocused. I end up just being quiet and not
contributing anything to the group, my ideas
are lost
—
they could save the group a lot o f
mistakes, they could be instrtmiental in changing
policy (viewpoint 1) . Worst of all I lose
my own sense of self worth and pride. I don't
get practice feeling and being competent (viewpoint 2) ,
This may also take the form of a particular antecedent,
response or consequence being seen as good from one
perspective and bad from another.
4. The thoughts, sensations and feelings of formal operational
adolescents is more highly differentiated, complex and rich.
This experience of self has more of a life of its own.
(a) Thoughts, feelings and sensations become antecedents
and responses to each other, leading to chains of
internal reactions. During concrete operations, thoughts,
feelings and sensations are stated as a group of
responses to some external antecedent (s) . At formal
operations, these inner reactions can be stated as
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antecedents and responses to each other.
Sometimes I get angry with my girlfriend because
she doesn't understand what I'm trying to say.
Sometimes I make some nasty comments. Then I
feel guilty and sorry and hope she won't get too
mad. Then after its over I keep wondering why I
do things like that.
Notice that this whole chain of his own resp''nses is
described in response to his slng'e, initial reaction
to his girlfriend. If the rer...tlons were described
as a chain including intervening additional "antecedents"
from his girlfriend, it would be characteristic of late
concrete operational thinking.
(b) Sensations and feelings are described as
psychological states implying more general categories
and a positive or negative value. This is the essential
difference between reports of being "jittery, nervous,
tense" (descriptions of physical sensations) and reports
of being anxious, depressed or elated. Psychological
states are not as visible to others, except through the
manifestations of sensations.
When I'm feeling down on myself and other people
criticize me. I feel defensive and sorry for
myself.
When conflict arises I tend to avoid that person.
I don't tell what's bothing me, and I feel guilty
for feeling annoyed in the first place , like I
have no right to have expectations.
The last example also contains illustration of a chain of
psychological feelings.
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(c) There are reports of vicarious feelings from at
least two types of stimuli.
(1) Individuals report internal responses to
anticipated reactions of others. This is the
meaning of the comment that adolescents are
constantly reacting as if they were playing to an
anticipated audience.
I feel nervous whenever I have to present
something to a group of people I don't know
and to be evaluated by someone who represents
an authority to me.
This is a report of a past pattern of reactions to
an anticipated audience. In many people, there is
stagefright, or in adolescents, extensive preening
and concern about what others will think, feel or
do in some anticipated situation.
(2) The experience of others becomes a more
powerful antecedent to similar feelings in oneself.
Sympathy, and empathy grow by quantum leaps in adolescents.
I know that whenever I'm in a class or
in a group situation and someone in the
group obviously is being put down by
another member of the group or group leader,
I find myself internalizing that put down.
(d) Inner reactions to past and future situations have
a more intense and larger holding power. They Infuse or
cloud one's reactions to an Immediately experienced situation.
While this may occur during concrete operations, the diff-
erence at formal operations is that individuals are aware
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of the carryover. It involves the capacity to
have reactions that are independent of immediately
experienced concrete situations.
After we broke up, it bothered me for months.
(e) The capacity to envision alternative competing
future states and the capacity to view an event or
relationship from several poin* 3 of view leads to more
intense internal psychological conflict. The formal
operational person "feels the full force of inner
conflict. (He or) She tries to cope with it or to find
some means of transcending it or of reconciling herself
to it (Loevinger,
,
1970, p. 99)^"
I want to get to know what different people
are all about, but this is difficult to do
because of the homogeneity of the university
community that I live in and because I am shy
and I don't have a degree.
5. Formal operational self-knowledge hypotheses contain
quasi-mathematical statements about the relationships
between antecedents and responses, between thoughts,
feelings, sensations and actions and between responses and
consequences
.
(a) These statements may reflect awareness of
correlations.
The more I try, the harder it becomes.
I've been trying to lose weight and after going
through several so-called miracle diets I've
discovered, to no one's surprise, that the less
I eat, the more I lose and the better I feel.
(b) These statements may reflect awareness that
relationships between antecedents, responses and conse-
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quences are probabilistic.
In all probability , if I keep using my power this
way people will get turned off and avoid me.
Almost everyday I feel physically well. This
especially happens when I jog, shower, meditate
and eat a good breakfast at Che beginning of the
day. When I start my day c'.f with healthy rituals
I most often feel good physically and psychologically.
(c) These statements may reflect an awareness of
proportional reasoning. Proportions (the equivalence
of two ratios) has a linguistic analogue in verbal
analogies, e.g. wool is to sheep as leather is to steers.
Any use of analogies to describe the relationship between
events, antecedents, responses and consequences is evidence
of proportional reasoning.
It's like taking on a sumo wrestler trying to
master Piaget's theory.
I keep changing my mind, like I had some kind of
mental palsy.
With the advent of formal operational self-knowledge hypotheses,
the adolescent conceives of more distant future states and goals, and
sees actions now as well as potential activity in relation to those
states. Antecedents .responses and consequences are more complexly
conceived as sets within sets or some combination of two or more
antecedents, responses and consequences. Feelings, sensations, thoughts
and actions become antecedents and responses for each other as inner life
seems to have a life of its own independent of whatever situation the
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person may be experiencing here-and-now. Antecedents, responses, and
consequences, s’te now more highly differentiated, complex and have
quasi-mathematical relationships to each other (correlation, probability
and proportionality)
.
Later in formal operations this rich inner life becomes the
object of what the person construes. One can have hypotheses about the
way one hypothesizes, propositions aboi’ one’s propositions, and in
general characterize one's experiences in terms of the characteristic
procedures one uses to make sense of the world, one's relationship
and place in it. Thus far we have seen relatively few spontaneously
occurring examples of this stage. Here are two examples.
I know that I try to synthesize the best parts of
each experience, relationship or concept into subsequent
experiences, relationships and concepts.
I'm an analyzer. I kind of zero in on a problem,
meditate on it, until the essential parts are so clear I can
summarize it in a simple declarative sentence then amplify on
that sentence by describing its component parts and their inter-
connections.
In both of these examples the concern transcends the attempt to describe
specific patterns and focuses on the general procedures used to arrive
at hypotheses. Perhaps it is the equivalent of Kohlberg's last stage
of moral reasoning when there is an "orientation not only to actually
ordained social rules but to principles of choice Involving appeal to
logical universality and consistency (Kohlberg, 1966, p.7),"
Transposing Kohlberg's statement results in the following paraphrase:
"There is an orientation not only to specific hypotheses, but to
principles of hypothesizing involving appeal to comprehensiveness and
consistency."
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A A
The characteristics outlined here were hypothesized before
we began the empirical search for the stage characteristics of self-
knowledge theories. The hypothesized stage characteristics were
considered tentative and preliminary. Their major purpose was to
guide us in the analysis of the ER protocols. These hypothesized
stage characteristics would be revised and corrected after comparing
them to the stage characteristics derived empirically. This procedure
is described in Chapter VII. The next chapter outlines the character-
istics of the stages which were derived empirically by analyzing
the ER protocols.
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CHAPTER V
EMPIRICALLY-DERIVED STAGE CHARACTERISTICS
OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE THEORIES
Four stages of verbal descriptions of experiences were derived
by following the empirical procedures outlined in Chapter III.
In this chapter, the characteristics of these four stages are
presented.
Since these stages were derived in terms of the working definition
of self-knowledge (see Chapter II), the reader should keep this working
definition in mind when reading the stage characteristics presented
here. Before detailing the stage characteristics, we shall summarize
the features of the self-knowledge working definition which seem
especially salient in understanding the stage characteristics.
Background
We have conceived the self-knowledge construct as having three
analytically distinct components as represented in Figure 4-1 (See
Chapter II for details).
FIGURE 4-1: SCHEMATIC MODEL OF THE
SELF-KNOWLEDGE WORKING DEFINITION
EXPERIENCES MENTAL OPERATIONS
THEORIES, 0R VERBALIZED CON-
GEPTDALIZATIOMS.OF EXPERIENCE
One's conscious
thoughts, sensations,
feelings and actions.
Processes of the mind
for transforming
experiences into
theories
Oral or written state-
ments describing the
experience, explaining
the experience, or
assigning value to the
experience.
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Experiences of feelings, thoughts, actions and sensations are private,
in the present time and unstable, in the sense that it is changing from
moment to moment. Mental operations are the procedures or processes
by which a person makes sense of that experience. We have assximed
from the outset a structural-developmental point of view about these
operations, namely that they are limited in number, develop in an
invariant sequence, are hierarchical in nature, are relatively stable
over time, and are to a large degree similar across cultures. At each
stage of development the level of these processes available to a person
determines the nature of the hypotheses and theories they can generate
about their experiences. The focus of this study was to identify changes
in people's descriptions of their own experiences which reflect the
stage or level of a person's mental operations.
The adequacy of any theory depends, in large part, on the
adequacy of the data available to be conceptualized. Thus, the first
part of the Experience Recall test (Question A) asks individuals to
describe fully a significant or unforgetable experience, l.e. to
recall data. It appears that the data reported reflects developmental
changes in the mental operations. Note that we are not saying a
person's original experience changes over time, but only that there
seems to be developmental changes in how much is recalled and the way
it is reported. It is as if the mental operations were slowly changing
filters through which, over long periods of time, more and more facets
of the original experience are "seen recalled and reported. How
personal experience is described , is the first dimension of people's
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theories about experiences. By analyzing responses to Question A
in the ER, we seem to have arrived at some clear ways to define and
characterize this dimension. To date, it is this developmental
dimension we have explored and defined most fully.
A second dimension of self-knowledge theories is the nature of the
value
,
meaning, or significance assigned to one's experiences. The
second part of the ER (Questions B and C) asks respondents to describe
how the experience was significant or important to them. Some subjects
also reported this value assignment in the first part of the ER (in Ques-
tion A). But, having focused only on Question A to date, this second
dimension, namely, how experience is valued, has not received as
complete analysis as the first dimension (how personal experiences are
described)
.
Just as the nature of available data and value assignments appear
to develop, so too does the nature of individuals' hypotheses about
their experiences seem to change. In the second part of the ER (in
Questions D and E)
,
subjects are also asked to make sense of, or
hypothesize about the data they have recalled. We have not analyzed
responses to these questions, hence we are presently not able to fully
characterize this third dimension of self-knowledge theories, how
experience is explained .
In short, the current status of our research is that we have
analyzed responses to the first part of the ER, and this analysis has
yielded characterizations of the first dimension of self-knowledge
theories or verbalized conceptualizations of experiences, namely, how
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experiences are described. The analysis has also given some clues to
the other two dimensions, i.e. how experiences are valued, and how
experiences are explained. However, these other two dimensions cannot
be fully characterized until responses to the second part of the ER are
analyzed. Given this current state, there appear to be four stages in
the development of people's theories about their experiences: Elemental,
Situational, Patterned and Transformatior. il. In the following section,
an overall synopsis of each stage is sketched. In this synopsis, the
three dimensions of how experience is (1) described, (2) valued, and
(3) explained are combined.
Of course, this synopsis of the stages will not be sufficient to
enable one to score responses in the ER protocols, nor will it be
adequate for assigning stages to individuals. The Intension of this
synopsis is to give one a general idea of the four stages. In addition
to the general stage description, sample responses (to Question A) from
two ER protocols in each stage are used for illustration.
Synopsis Of The Stages
The earliest stage we have identified among the protocols we
analyzed is named the Elemental stage. In this stage, only discrete,
"visible," aspects of a single event (i.e. the elements) are described.
These elements may be related to each other by serial ordering or by
juxtaposing them, but no causal connections between the elements are
stated. Hence no explanations or hypotheses about one's experiences
are reported at this stage. The description of the elements seem to
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suffice as an explanation for persons at this stage. The description
of elements also function as the way of assigning value in this stage.
That is, value or significance is attributed to one's experience by
characterizing the elements, usually by adjective or adverb modifiers.
As the name "Elemental" suggests, one's experiences are described,
explained and valued only in terms of the overt of observable elements
of the experience. It is as if one's Ineory or verbalized conceptuali-
zations of experiences at this stage consisted of an album of photographs,
or a motion picture with little, if any, editorial comment.
Responses to Question A Which Exemplify Elemental Stage ;
1. Protocol 0310207—Me and my brother were going
to my friend's house. We were sliding on our sleds.
His house was right in back of ours. We would cut
through the bushes and turn.
2. Protocol 0220406—Well, when we go camping and
we get up in the morning . My father went and told
my grandmother. It was about 4 o'clock in the
morning and we got ready to go camping. It was
this beautiful campground. It took us a while to
get there but we got this beautiful campground.
It had a whole mess of sand all over. It was in
Nova Scotia. It has a platform for the tent to go
on. I was really young then, I slept on a cot.
My mother yelled, "Do you want some lunch?" I said
yes and she said what, I said Peanut butter
sandwiches. She fixed it for me. We waited about
15 more minutes and then we go swimming.
The next stage is labelled Situational. Here, individuals appear
to have a gestalt of a single situation composed of causally connected
elements, including for the first time, non-visible, internal emotional
states. The discrete elements, which were described separately in the
Elemental stage, are now organized into one or more coherent units or
situations. In this stage, explanations of one's experiences are made
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by stating causal connections among elements, or by describing
the causal factors of the whole situation. Value is assigned to
one's feelings, to the whole event or situations, or by explicit
comparison of two specific situations. Situational theories or
verbalized conceptualizations of experiences are thus characterized
by descriptions, explanations and value statements, in which elements
are integrated into a single specific coherent whole.
Responses to Question A Which Exemplify Situational Stage :
1. Protocol 0341024—The experience I remembered happened
about five years ago in the summer of 1969. I had been
driving down a very busy highway with my father, my
brother and two friends. My father who was
driving had pointed out to us many car accidents that
occurred on this highway. We were on vacation in
Cape Cod. In the car ahead of us were my mother
and the parents of my friends. We had to drive
in two cars since there wasn't enough room in one.
But all of a sudden I heard my father yelling
something, and before I knew it we had been
involved in an accident. I remember feeling very
frightened although no one was hurt. It wasn't
my father's fault, it was the other guy's fault who
seemed in a hurry to get off of there. The people
who were in the car in front of us stopped to help
us and I can remember hardly being able to talk to
my mother. I guess everyone was pretty shaken up
especially my father who was responsible for all
the kids in the car. For the rest of my vacation
I had been upset.
2. Protocol 0411203— I was in the explosion in the
village. I was blown out of a building. I
haven't worked since then. Because of my back. I
have real funny dreams. Sometimes I wake up in
the middle of the night and I can't go back to
sleep. No, it wasn't a pleasant experience.
At the next stage, the Patterned stage. Individuals can describe
characteristics of their experiences which generalize across situations
over time. Where the Situational person only organized elements into
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situations, persons at the Patterned stage can conment upon, refer back
to, and make generalizations from the situations they describe.
They name patterns in terms of roles, personality traits, obligations,
and on-going interpersonal relationship characteristics. In explaining
their experience, persons in this stage demonstrate hypothetical thinking,
i.e. hypothetical explanations, or hypotheses in its true sense, are
possible for the first time. At this stage, value or significance can
be assigned to any pattern described, as well as the elements or
specific situations that exemplify those patterns. Theories about
experiences in the Patterned stage thus involve descriptions, explanations
and hypotheses about one's stable, lasting, and distinctive patterns.
Responses to Question A Which Exemplify Patterned Stage :
1. Protocol 0210507—The experience I remembered
was my leaving my house with the intention of getting
a divorce. After 27 years, eight children, many
crises, months of counseling (for me, because
"any problems were mine")
,
several years of trying
to keep the marriage together for the children,
several years of trying to separate for the
sake of the children, and finally success when I
realized that I had to separate for ray^ sake. I had
been working toward a B.A. but took time out to
work for a year to save enough money to make and
move as I would have to be the one to leave with
four children and, also, my father. The day
finally came, and all arrangements had been made with
the lawyer, camp rented for a month (didn't know
where we were going after thaQ father delivered to
aunt's for short time in case any trouble. Two
women friends came and helped with the move and
their support was wonderful. When we reached the
camp and had everything moved, I said, "I did it!"
and we hugged one another. It was a joyous occasion!—
freedom!—liberation!
2. Protocol 0210211—I had a great deal of trouble
focusing, on one experience. I remember some things
that happened at eight years old and some at three
or four. The experience I spent the most time
thinking about happened when I was five or six.
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I doa't exactly remember the cause, but I think
it was a spanking. I found myself in bed, fully
clothed, in my new bedroom that my father had just
added to the house, with my head buried under my
pillow and I was crying and screaming that nobody
loved me. Obviously, I was trying to get my mother
to come in and comfort me but nobody came, I think
I had done this once or twice before and it had
worked then. But this time, nobody came and that
made me scream louder and cry harder and get really
mad and feel alone. Finally one of my parents came
in and told me to stop it or I would got another
spanking. This made me feel '.otaliy helpless and
I soon stopped my tirade ar I left my bedroom and
felt a little ridiculous and thinking, that I
would get back at them if I got the chance, but also
knowing I wouldn't try this kind of thing again.
The final stage we Identified among the analyzed protocols was
named Transformational. Whereas in the previous stage an event is
significant because it defines a stable pattern, at this stage the
experience of change is what is described as stable and continuous.
Specific traits, roles, obligations and relationships are in the
process of transformation and, therefore, are described in terms of
the more general, abstract and stable categories in which these
patterns fall: For example, words such as "abilities," "capacities,"
"personality," "interests," "minds," and "feelings" are often used.
The possibility of actualizing one's unexpressed feelings, undeveloped
capacities. Interests, etc., is far more prominent and reflects the
explicit recognition of internal conflicts. In this context of
continuous development, experiences which stand out as unforgetable are
those which mark turning points having long-term, wide-spread, or
continuing impact on one's life subsequently. At this stage value
is assigned by attempting to explicitly state what is the "meaning,"
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or "Inner significance" of the process of change. Just as situations
integrate elements, and patterns integrate situations, the focus on
transformations enables one to integrate patterns—as points defining
the beginning or end of a phase of change.
Responses to Question A Which Exemplify Transformational Stage:
1. Protocol 0210713—The experience was during a
Gestalt workshop given by a prof, at CSO., Chico,
Calif., in 1971, for teachers, grad students and others.
I was an undergrad at the time. In remembering back
this seems to be the experience where I discovered
my "self" for the first time ever. It was not only
a discovering, because I had always had an inkling
there was one really there, but it was an accepting
process. As I went into the workshop—which was the
first time I had ever experienced Gestalt, I
sensed that it was not only permissible in this
setting to be natural and to follow my own inner
direction, but it was highly desirable if I were
going to receive what the experience had to offer.
Up to that time, 1 had had a poor concept of
myself, although it had been improving slightly
through the previous few years. But that weekend
was vastly important to me. 1 was elated to discover
that I could give myself permission to first: feel
my own feelings, and secondly to act on them.
This had had a tremendous impact on my life. That
was the beginning of a new life for me—a life that
I was now consciously controlling. It was a "high"
experience that lasted for months and months, and
which I still experience to a certain extent.
2. Protocol 0210108—My grandmother's death....
I
was in the eighth grade and I had been invited to
a party at a friend's house and the girls were
Invited to stay overnight and I wasn't allowed to
stay overnight, I don't know why, I wasn't allowed
to stay overnight. My grandmother had been very
sick and I had talked about it with my mother
and had not been familiar with death at all with anyone
this close to me and we had talked about it a
number of times and it was obvious she was going to
die as she was very sick, but somehow I couldn't
accept that, I Just thought she wasn't going to die
and we had gone to Connecticut a number of times to
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see her and each time we would go she would be
very bad. . .the party was on a Friday night and
Saturday I went swimming at the pool and I came home
from the pool and I remember going into the house and
my mother saying—now I don't want any hesterics,
Mimi died today. Then she immediately left the
room and I remembered that I hardly reacted but she
cried. She left me by myself with my own thoughts
and I offered to help her and went downstairs and
hung out the wash. 1 remember just feeling a
stunned thought, like it really wasn't true or that
it just hadn't happened. I couldn't really realize
what it was. She explained to tie later that that's
why she didn't want me to stay at the party,
she was afraid something would happen and that's
why I came home... faith in God...had to be something
other than just here. I remember praying for my
grandmother but there wasn't anything I could do.
When a person dies, life goes on, nothing changes.
I remember riding down the street in the funeral
procession and seeing a girl I had known. She
lived near my other grandmother. She didn't recog-
nize me and she looked at the funeral procession and
kept on playing. Things go on and I had never
been in touch with it before. I had just
never realized people die and people are born
every day and it just doesn't make any difference.
Everything goes on.
The four stages (Elemental, Situational, Patterned and
Transformational) are not numbered because we believe, and have speculated
about, the existence of prior and subsequent stages. The four identified
stages are tentative—they are open to revisions after a method for
scoring the second part (Questions B,C,D and E) of tl)e ER is developed
and after the stage descriptions are cross-validated on other protocols.
However, the current version of stages do provide a basis for extrapolating
possible characteristics of earlier and later stages, and then searching
for their existence. For example, the idea of action differentiated
from the self occurred in all of our test responses. From other
developmental theories, it seems that this differentiation occurs at a
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developmental stage earlier than the youngest age (seven years old)
represented in the analyzed protocols. Similarly, one or more stages
beyond the Transformational stage could be extrapolated from other
developmental theories. However we have not identified any character-
istics of these earlier or later stages in the ER protocols we have
analyzed
.
The four stages and their characterizations above were based on
the symbols in the Preliminary Scoring Manual (Appendix B) . These
symbols were defined for scoring the experience description part
(Question A) of the ER, and thus primarily reflects developmental
changes in the first dimension of self-knowledge theories, i.e. how
experience is described
.
Table A-2 lists the symbols from the Preliminary Scoring Manual
(denoted by their titles and code numbers) by the stages and the
dimensions they seem to reflect. We determined which stage each symbol
should be placed after interpreting the sequence of these symbols on
the Guttman Scaling Technique (See Chapters III and VI for details).
Symbols in the Preliminary Scoring Manual which did not scale are
not included in Table 4-2.
There are noticeably fewer symbols in the dimensions "How Experience
is Explained" and "How Experience is Valued," than in the dimension
"How Experience is Described." This is because the responses analyzed
in constructing the manual did not include responses to the questions
on the ER which directly ask subjects to give explanations of their
experiences and to assign significance or value to their experiences
(Questions B, C, D, and E) . More symbols representing the experience
TABLE
4-2:
SYMBOLS
FROM
THE
PRELIMINARY
SCORING
MANUAL
REPRESENTING
THE
DIMENSIONS
OF
SELF-KNOWLEDGE
THEORIES
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explanation dimension and the value dimension will be defined when
those questions are analyzed. Since symbols for these dimensions are
incomplete at present, we shall only focus on the experience description
dimension as we detail the stage descriptions further in the next
section.^
Symbols Illustrating Stages Of How Experience Is Described
By itself, the synopsis of stages in the previous section is not
sufficient as an operational definition of each stage. Probably a
complete operational definition can only be understood by learning all
the details and nuances of the Preliminary Symbol Scoring Manual
(AppendixB). Short of that, we can give a flavor of the symbols which
represent the observable manifestations of the four identified stages.
In this section, each symbol within the dimension, "How Experience
is Described," is briefly summarized and illustrated with verbatim
responses from subjects. It may be helpful to continue referring to
Table 4-2 in reading this section.
It should be noted that a particular symbol designates only a part
of a sentence. That is, just specific words or phrases within a
sentence are scored by a given symbol. The remainder of the sentence
is scored by other symbols. Thus in the examples that follow, one
should focus primarily on the parts of the example sentences which are
intended to illustrate the symbols. These parts are underlined for
easy identification.
1. Readers wishing further elaboration on the symbols (as currently defined)
in the experience explanation dimension and the value dimension may refer to
the complete descriptions of these symbols in the Preliminary Symbol
Scoring Manual (Appendix B)
,
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Elemental stage
. In the Elementaj stage. Individuals describe
themselves (i.e., "I") by referring to their own physical characteristics,
or vital statistics. This PHYSICAL SELF (S.IA) description Includes
mentioning of specific parts of one's own body, age, race, place of
residence, or states of being in terms of geographic location. Emotional
states are not named as such, but feelings can be described in physio-
logical terms.
"I did wear glasses end did not have dates."
^3S on the baseball team .
"
"I think ^ was eleven at the time."
"I was hurt and sick that my friend couldn't
play with me."
Mention of other persons and descriptions of OTHEES (S.2 and S.2A)
in terms of their physical characteristics and vital ^statistics can be
expected at the elemental stage. Note that the descriptions of others
are parallel to the description of oneself.
"My opponent being white and me being black."
"They gave me a surprize party."
"My husband was sick for nine years."
Similarly, observable aspects of CONCRETE OBJECTS or activities
(S.3 and S.3A) are named and described in Elemental stage responses.
"That was a lovely place ."
"He picked up a stone and threw it at me."
" It was a cold winter afternoon .
"
Also in the Elemental stage, words such as "my," "our," "hers,"
"his," and "theirs" are used to designate PERSONAL POSSESSIVES (S.43).
"She took away m^ icepop and Johnny's mother
didn't take away his ."
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"We* re not his only kids."
"I went to live with cousins."
Elemental stage responses often contain descriptions of overt
COMMUNICATIONS (S.13), References to persons "talking" or "speaking"
are connnon. Also, the content of the communications (i.e, what was said)
may be mentioned.
"M\ 'tiier yelled
,
’Do \ ou want some lunch,’"
"...I vas crying an- screaming that nobody loved me."
.
.my mother came down to tell me my best friend had
died.
.
Simple THOUGHTS (S.6B) are referred to in the Elemental stage.
In this stage, the definition of thought includes the notion of bringing
something to mind or having something in mind.
"I thought this was impossible,"
"I remember one time when we were younger, he called
up on the phone."
"The next thing I^ knew was that I was in a car on the
way to the hospital."
2. Situational stage . In the Situational stage, responses usually
reflect many of the symbols in the Elemental stage. In addition, however,
there are other characteristic ways of describing experiences which are
not evident in Elemental stage responses. One of these is the organization
of the experience recalled into a coherent unit or CORE EVENT (S.18A and
S.18B). Besides describing the observable details of an event, individuals
in the Situational stage comment upon or make several references to the
entire event in their responses. Often these commentaries about the core
event include one’s reactions to or feelings about the event as a whole.
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The core event is illustrated here with a complete response, rather
than with individual sentences.
(1) I was 11 when I was sitting in my cellar
watching TV when my mother came down to tell me
ny best friend had died during the night. (2) I
thought she was kidding until I saw the tears come
down her face. (3) I was the last friend to see
him before ^ died . (4) ^ was like being in a
dream. (5) Just waiting to wake up and seeing
him. (6) But ^ wasn '
t
,
it was reality
. (7) The
funny thing about it he had a brother who was 10.
(8) I was walking down the street with him the
same day his brother died
. (9) He didn't think
anything of it. (10) One of his brother's friends
came up to him to ask where his brother was, and
of course his brother had died
, but he just said
very calmly, 'He's dead.'
In this response, sentence 1 organized the experience into two core
events, (a) "my best friend had died," and (b) "my mother came down to
tell me" about it. Sentences 2 and 3 describe the details of the
situation. Most of the remaining sentences involve commentaries of
either event (a) or event (b)
,
as noted by the underlined phrases.
Descriptions of experiences in this stage often include SITUATION
SPECIFIC EMOTIONAL STATES (S.9A). Unlike the physical or physiological
description of feelings in the Elemental stage, emotional states in the
Situational stage are described as invisible and internal. The emotional
states named may be of oneself or of others.
"For the rest of my vacation, I had been upset ."
"I could sense the agony in him."
"I think I was mad but I know I was frustrated .
"
Individuals at this stage can also refer to SITUATION SPECIFIC
EMOTIONAL ACTIONS OR REACTIONS (S.9B). That is, they can name what
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their emotions are directed toward, or what is the stimulus for an
emotional reaction.
"I always resented him .
"
"We were concerned about our uniforms for some reason."
"I was love with many of the people I worked with."
An UNSPECIFIED SET OF THINGS (S.20) can be referred to by persons
in the Situational stage. These "unspecifieds" are some experience or
events which are mentioned but left undefined or unelaborated in the
person's response.
"We really got to know each other very good by just
talking about anything and everything ."
"I remember some things that happened at eight years
old and some at three or four."
"I was... in far better circumstances than I am today."
Also in this stage, one can describe experiences involving an
UNSPECIFIED EXTERNAL FORCE (S.7). These external forces usually involve
permission from an authority, acts upon the person in the situation, or
available opportunities. The forces may also be the necessity of
getting some physiological need satisfied or physical Injuries healed.
In any case, the source of the force is left unspecified.
"I was blown out of a building."
"The Dr. said it was physical and I must be hospitalized ."
"I had to move from one place to the other."
"My friend couldn '
t
play with me." ("Couldn't"
is interpreted as did not have permission in
this example.)
MUTUAL ACTIONS (S.22A), or behaviors involving two persons acting upon
each other, may also be mentioned in Situational stage responses.
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"We then started ^ kiss ."
. .and we always avoided each other ."
"We laid on the beach and tried ^o^ keep warm In
each other ' s arms .
"
Patterned stage
. Responses at the Patterned stage usually contain
the characteristics of the previous Elemental and Situational stages.
Several additional qualities however, seem to distinguish responses
In the Patterned stage from those In the prior stages. For example,
at the Patterned stage, one can describe PERSONALITY TRAITS (S.39A).
Personality traits are defined as an Individual's distinguishing
characteristics (behavioral, emotional or mental), which describe
that person generally across many situations. Descriptions of oneself
In this stage are no longer situation-bound nor necessarily physically
based.
"Somehow I saved—because of a basically optimistic
nature
. . . .a good dose of self-respect .
"
"I was losing my ambition and sleeping often."
"Like all through junior high school up to eleventh
grade I had always been real shy , quiet . ..."
Similarly, INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIP TRAITS (S.22B and S.22C),
that pervade beyond an Immediate situation can be named In this stage.
"We really got to know each other very good. . . ."
"If It was with a man that I could have the deepest
and most total relationship—there was no
way around the preliminary bullshit."
"I was not getting along with myself though ."
Descriptions of one's OWN AND OTHERS* ROLES (S.IB and S.2B)
characterize many responses In the Patterned stage.
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"We were both art students ."
”
. * . I had a lousy teacher .
”
"I was a housemother In ^ halfway house for del~^rquent
teenagers .**
Also at this stage Individuals can identify Inner-directed
prescriptions or social imperatives; and often express these prescriptions
or imperatives as INTERNAL SHOULDS (S.37),
"l was a fool I should have scid something but I didn*t."
"...a desire not to negatively define my love for certain
women as society would have me do.
"
"My mother’s way of looking at things suggested that if
I wanted a man..._I would have to compete with other
women on the level of physical attractiveness,"
"I should have mentioned that I was married at the time."
Often descriptions of an event at the Patterned stage include
departures from the time frame of the event itself. That is, there is
often mention of CONTINUATION OF ACTIONS OR CONDITIONS (S.42A and S.42B)
prior to or since the event being described.
"I think I had done this once or twice before and
it worked then."
"We went steady for awhile and this day we are
still close friend^"
"In addition it could be useful to say that the
person that I met at the fish store now
my boss.
"
Another characteristic of responses at this stage, is that the
notion of "experiencing" seems to be xmderstood in the phenomenological
sense of personally Involving oneself in, or participating in an action,
event or on-going action or event. The CONTINUING INVOLVEMENT (S.5D)
is one in which the seif is both acting in and affected by the situations
described.
"However, I know I could not endure IIvIdr the life
of the past three weeks for a whole year."
"I became very Involved in the research,"
"It was a 'high' experience that lasted for months
and months, and which I still experience to
a certain extent."
Frequently in ^’attemed stage resjmnses. Individuals substitute
pronouns or key phrases in order to make REFERENCE BACK (S.18C) to
some previously mentioned part of their descriptions.
"...he got married to lots of other women after
that. I never knew this until that day that we
met him and he told us all about it," ("This"and
"it" refer to the prior sentence.)
"I guess I really felt close to the team, but
that's been there for a long time." ("that's
been there" refers to the prior clause.)
"Well, when the coach read the starting line-up
and I was part of it—it had to be one of the
happiest moments of my life." "It" refers to
"starting lineup" in the previous clause.)
SUMMARY (S.35) statements are often Included in responses at the
Patterned stage. These are somewhat general statements whose function
is to conclude, summarize or otherwise bring closure to one's report
of the experience.
"I was ready to start anew knowing that if you
wanted and worked hard enough, nothing is
unattainable.
"
"It was a happy life; course you worry, do you
have enough to live on or not."
"I always wanted to meet my father and then he
was really nothing."
4. Transformational stage . In the Transformational stage, persons a
describe themselves (i.e. "I") and others in terms of generalized
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PERSONALITY CLUSTERS (S.39B), Instead of listing several personality
characteristics or patterns separately, one word such as "traits,"
"capacities," or "interests" can be used to refer to the patterns
collectively.
"I can now see my faults and learn to accept others."
"I hoped and planned to do much work and sexf-realizatlon
of m^ capabilities ."
"I was very curious about her ideas
,
habits
,
expectations
and goals .
"
Also at this stage, one is aware of THOUGHT PROCEDURES (S.6C).
One’s own thinking is often described as involving interrelated
conscious mental acts. Responses usually imply that there are steps
or procedures in one's thinking, or that there is an inter-relationship
among the ideas or thoughts.
"I had planned to go to mental health after diagnosing
myself with hysteric conversion resulting in paralysis."
"I was elated to discover that I could give myself
permission to first: feel my own feelings, and
secondly to act on them."
Emotions or feelings are described as something to be expressed
or used for communication. These EXPRESSABLE EMOTIONS (S.9C) are
depicted as though they can be "let out," acted on, or acted out.
"I was feeling like I had terribly deep feelings and
emotions and had not been able to express them—
let myself out of myself ."
"A burst of anger or fear
.
I don't know which bust
out of me."
"I am lying on the floor of a dormitory room—alone
—
crying with a feeling of hysteria and despair that
want to cry out for help, understanding—
"
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At the Transformational stage, individuals seem to experience several
emotions simultaneously. Often, the actual, specific feelings are not
named; and instead, one word or phrase is used to denote these MULTIPLE
UNSPECIFIED FEELINGS (S.9D).
"Why did it take me as long to admit mjr feelings to
myself and not try and run away from them?"
"I asked in terror as I tried to hold my inner feelings
just to bust out and scream and cry..."
"On one hand I can hardly write at all about these
feelings—even now—almost 7 years later, I am still
trembling inside at the thought of her and my
feelings towards her."
Actions are often characterized in this stage as having an
EMOTIONAL IMPACT (S.5B) on oneself or others. This emotional Impact
can result from actions upon oneself or from actions of other persons.
"Obviously, I was trying to get my mother to come
in and comfort me ...
"
"More a desire not ^ run from what I really felt."
"I was losing my ambition and sleeping often."
ABSTRACT CONSTRUCTS (S.46) or intellectual ideas are often
Incorporated in descriptions of experiences at the Transformational stage.
"In the process, I learned a great deal about the
rights (and lack of rights ) of women .
"
"I can't recall how I developed the ideas ."
Responses at this stage may also depict an experience as a TURNING
POINT (S.36A) in one's lifetime. This turning point is described as a
change in one's personal condition or characterization which begins or
terminates (ends) with the experience described.
"That was the beginning of a lonely and bitter
childhood for me."
I
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"That mark will always be with me until the day I die."
"It was a 'high' experience that lasted for months
and months
,
and which 1 still experience to a certain
extent."
Theoretically, tliere are an unknown and Indefinite number of
symbols that could represent each of the stages. By analyzing
protocols, we have IdentiTied and defined a sample of these symbols.
Tliere are probably othcT symbols (representing each stage) that we
have missed, overlooked or otherwise not identified. Also, the symbols
that we have identified may not be directly representative of the stage
in which they are placed— these symbols may be merely statistical
correlates of other, presently unknown symbols which actually represent
the various stages.
Therefore, the symbols or characteristics that we have identified
should be treated as pieces, samples or hints of a greater, unified whole
that characterizes stages. Extensive evaluation is necessary to
ascertain to what extent these symbols actually represent developmental
stages of self-knowledge theories. Our preliminary evaluation of these
empirically-derived stage characteristics are reported in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE STAGES
OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE THEORIES
The four stages described in the previous chapter were derived from
analyzing 72 responses to the first question (A) on the ER test using the
Preliminary Symbol Scoring Manual (Appendix B) . These stages are incom-
plete; Additional stages and two additional dimensions (l.e. how
experience is explained, and how expe ience is valued) of the present
stages need to be clarified by analyzing the responses to the rest of
the ER test questions. However, it is Important to obtain an interim
assessment of the degree to which the scoring system and the existing
stage characteristics are reliable and valid. More specifically, (1) How
reliable is the scoring methodology? (2) Do the stages form a hierarchial
sequence? and (3) To what extent do Che stages correlate with ego
development and with chronological age. These data will help Inform
subsequent efforts to complete the scoring system and stage descriptions.
Coder Reliability Studies
Three assessments of coder reliability were made: (1) the degree
to which two coders agreed on their decisions to use particular symbols
in scoring each sentence in ten selected protocols; (2) the degree of
coder agreement about the presence or absence of the symbols in the
total response to the first ER question; and (3) the degree of agreement
in assigning stages.
Two coders, Maxine Markson and Roy Tamashiro, were involved in
the evaluation of coder reliability. Both coders contributed substantially
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to the construction of the Prellmtnary Scoring Manual, hence were
familiar with the manual at all points in its evolution. Ten ER
protocols which had not been used previously in the construction of the
Manual were selected, ,The corresponding ego levels for these
individuals ranged from 1-2 to 1-5, but these ego levels were not known
to either coder prior to the coding. The two raters independently
scored the selected protocols according to tne Preliminary Scoring
Manual (Appendix B)
.
In the sentence-by-sentence assessment, particular symbol decisions
made by each coder in each sentence were tabulated. The total number
of symbol decisions that the coders agreed on (l.e. were Identical between
coders) in each sentence also was counted. Table 6-1 presents the
number of decisions made by each coder and the number of agreements
between them,
TABLE 6-1: TOTALS OF SENTENCE-BY-SENTENCE SYMBOL DECISIONS AND
NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CODER A AND CODER B
Protocol
ID No.
Number of
Sentences
Total Symbol
Decisions
By Coder A
Total Symbol
Decisions
By Coder B
Number of Symbol
Agreements Between
Coder A & Coder B
0210606 23 142 143 103
0210509 11 141 158 102
0520104 5 12 16 11
0210613 15 144 148 107
0210618 12 53 59 44
0210518 49 274 284 187
0613105 29 185 192 141
0540119 11 172 151 119
0540105 3 27 29 21
0540104 9 74 72 59
Totals 167 1224 1252 894
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Percent agreement between coders was calculated using the formula,
2 (total number of symbol agreements between coders)
Percent agreement
/total !
V by
symbol decisions
^ coder A
total symbol decisions
^
by coder B J
By this formula, the degree of agreement between coders was 72p^^^cent,
A figure of 72 percent agreement between raters is not sufficiently high
to claim that the scoring method is highly objective. It does suggest,
however, that the coders tend to agree more often than chance on their
sentence-by-sentence symbol decisions. Given the present status of the
manual, the complexity of the scoring system, and the number of symbols
to choose from, the figure of 72 percent is sufficient to indicate that
the definitions and criteria in the Preliminary Scoring Manual are
evolving toward objectivity. However, further effort to improve the ob-
jectivity of scoring is necessary.
Another sentence-by-sentence assessment of symbol decisions and
coder agreements was conducted. In this evaluation, only the symbols
that had scaled by the Guttman technique (described in a following
section of this Chapter) were counted. The rationale for assessing coder
agreement among only the scalable symbols was that only these sjnnbols
were used in identifying stage characteristics— the non-scaling symbols
were discarded. Table 6-2 presents the total decisions Involving the scal-
able symbols made by each coder and the number of agreements between them.
The degree of agreement between Coder A and Coder B on their
decisions involving scalable symbols was 69 percent. Although there
is a three percentage point discrepancy between this figure and percent
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TABLE 6-2: TOTALS OF SENTENCE-BY-SENTENCE SYMBOL DECISIONS OF SCALABLE
SYMBOLS AND NUMBEE OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CODER A AND CODER B.
Protocol
ID No.
Number of
Sentences
Total Decisions
Involving Scalable
Symbols by Coder A
Total Decisions
Involving Scalable
SyCibols by Coder B
Number of Symbol
Agreements Betweer
Coder A & Coder B
0210606 23 58 72 46
0210509 11 80 85 53
0520104 5 5 4 3
0210613 15 58 60 42
0210618 12 20 24 17
0210518 49 136 134 90
0613105 29 87 93 59
0540105 3 13 14 8
0540119 11 76 63 56
0540104 9 25 24 16
Totals 167 558 573 390
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agreement between the coders when all symbols were considered, the
difference is trivial. Thus, we can make the same interpretation about
scorer reliability for scoring with the scalable symbols as we made
about scorer reliability for scoring with all the symbols in the manual.
* * *
Another method for assessing coder reliability involved determining
the degree of coder agreement about the presence or absence of the
symbols in the total responses to Question A on each of the selected
protocols. In this approach, the number of different symbols present
anywhere in the total response to Question A was summed for Coder A's
scoring and for Coder B’s scoring of each protocol. "Agreements" between
coders were counted whenever a symbol was used by both scorers to score
any part of a given protocol. This meant that scorers could disagree
about the use of a particular symbol in scoring a given sentence, but
if both scorers did use that symbol in any sentence in the protocol,
then this would be tabulated as an "agreement" for that symbol.
The rationale for assessing coder reliability with this approach
is based on the method of assigning stages to protocols, described in a
following section in this chapter. The presence or absence of symbols
in the total protocol determines the stage assignment. It is not necessary
to know the frequency of symbols in the protocol, nor is it necessary
to know in which sentence in the protocol a symbol was used.
Table 6-3 summarizes the totals of different symbols used by
each coder for each protocol and the total agreements between the coders.
Using the same formula for computing percent agreement, the overall
percent- agreement between coders on the presence or absence of symbols
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TABLE 6-3: TOTAL NUMBER OF DIFFERENT SYMBOLS USED IN EACH PROTOCOL BY
CODER A AND CODER B AND NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CODERS
(INCLUDES ONLY THOSE SYMBOLS WHICH SCALED BY THE GUTTMAN ANALYSIS)
Protocol
I'D No.
Number of Different
Symbols Used by Coder A
1
Number of Different
Symbols 'i’;;ed bv Coder B
Number of Agree-
ments Between
Coder A & Coder B
0210606 15 16 12
0210509 21 26 21
0520104 3 3 2
0210613
1
18 17 15
0210618 5 6 5
0210518 21 23 18
0613105 26 23 22
0540119 15 13 12
0540105 7 7 5
0540104 10 12 8
Totals 141 146 120
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was 84 percent.. This figure is acceptably high to suggest that the
presence or absence of symbols in a total protocol can be reliably coded.
However, this reliability figure may be misleading. Suppose, for
example there are 100 possible symbols. In a long protocol, coder A
finds all 100 symbols as does coder B. But it is possible that in any
specific sentence, coder A and coder B might disagree 100 percent.
Still their percent agreement for the presence of symbols in the total
protocol would be 100 percent. Given this logical possibility,
greater weight must be given to the first, more precise method of
assessing reliability.
Coder agreement of presence or absence of symbols was also assessed
by stages. That is, we computed the degree of agreement between coders
1
about the presence or absence of symbols in the Elemental stage.
Similarly, coder agreement was computed for symbols in the Situational,
the Patterened and the Transformational stages. Table 6-4 summarizes
the total different symbols present in the coders' scoring of the selected
protocols and the number of agreements between them.
The percent agreement between coders for symbols in the Elemental
Stage was 95 percent. For symbols in the Situational Stage, there was also
95 percent agreement. There was 67 percent agreement for symbols in
the Patterened Stage and 73 percent agreement for symbols in the
Transformational Stage. The degree of agreement between coders for
1. Symbols in each stage were determined by the Guttman Scaling Technique.
See following section in the Chapter.
TABLE
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symbols In the Elemental and Situational Stages are extremely high,
while the degree of their agreement for symbols in the Patterned
and Transformational Stages is below acceptability standards of 80
percent. Given the low percent agreement figure in the previous
sentence-by-sentence assessment, the 95 percent figure in the Elemental
and Situational Stages is probably deceptively high. Although the coders
may both use a given symbol somewhere Ir the total response, they may
not agree that the symbol is used in a particular sentence. The chances
of this occurring is higher among symbols in lower stages (Elemental
and Situational) because coders use more lower stage symbols than higher
stage symbols throughout any protocol. Therefore, the actual percent
agreement figure for symbols in the Elemental and Situational Stages
is probably lower than 95 percent. In addition, two plausible explana-
tions can account for the differences in coder agreement between
lower stages and higher stages: (1) The symbols in lower stages
denote characteristics that are relatively simple to recognize (compared
to characteristics of higher stages): hence they are more sharply defined
in the manual conversely, symbols in the higher stages involve more
complex characteristics and currently this complexity is not fully
defined and clarified In the manual, (2) Another reason involves
the coders' individual abilities to remember all the details, nuances and
other complexities of the manual. The coders are more likely to misunder-
stand or confuse the often complicated criteria or complex definitions of
the symbols in the higher stages than they would for symbols in the
lower stages. Thus, even if the manual defined the symbols perfectly.
U1
either coder's confusion, misunderstanding, or errors on some details
of the manual (which are more likely on the more complex symbols of
the higher stages) can account for the reduced reliability for symbols
in the higher stages. The implications of these explanations are (1) to
clarify the criteria and definitions of symbols that the coders disagree
on most frequently; and (2) to find ways to simplify the scoring procedure
to minimize the human errors of coders (including misunderstanding complex
definitions, forgetting details, etc.) without decreasing sensitivity to
Identifying the stage characteristics. These implications suggest some
of the next steps in the development of the scoring system.
* ife *
One further test of coder reliability was conducted. This involved
the degree of agreement between coders on the stage assigned to their
scored protocols. Each protocol was assigned the highest stage in
which three or more different symbols were present in the protocol. This
rule for assigning stages was derived inductively from the Guttman
scaling analysis (explained in the following section in this chapter)
.
For each protocol. Coder A's stage assignment was compared to Coder B's
stage assignment. It should be noted that the assignment of stages Involves
counting symbols. Any disagreements in stage assignment result from the
individual coders using symbols from different stages in their original
scoring of the responses.
Table 6-5 lists each coder's stage assignments on the protocols,
and the agreements and disagreements between coders. Figure 6-1
illustrates the coders' stage assignments in a scattergram.
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TABLE 6-5: STAGE ASSIGNMENTS FOR TEN PROTOCOLS
PROTOCOL ID NO. STAGE ASSIGNED BY
EATER A's SCORING
STAGE ASSIGNED BY
RATER B's SCORING
AGREEMENT OR
DISAGREEMENT
0210606 Situational Patterned Disagreement
0210509 Transformational Transformational Agreement
0520104 Elemental Elemental Agreement
0210613 Patterned Patterned Agreement
0210618 Elemental Elemental Agreement
0210518 Transformational Transformational Disagreement
0613105 Trans format lonal Irms formational Agreement
0540119 Patterned Situational Disagreement
0540105 Elemental Situational Disagreement
0540104 Patterned Situational Disagreement
Coder A and Coder B's scoring yield identical stage assignments on
five protocols and disagreement on five. In the protocols where the
stage assignment differed between the coders, the deviation was never
more than one stage (see Figure 6-1). Yet the discrepancy of stage
assignment on ?0 percent of the protocols, especially when there are only
four possible stages to assign, seems very unsatisfactory.
FIGURE 6-1: SCATTERGRAM SHOWING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
STAGE ASSIGNMENTS FOR RATER A AND RATER B
Transformational n
Patterned 1 1 1
Situational
1 (1
Elemental II
Elemental Situational Patterned Transformational
STASE ASSIGNMENTS FOR RATER A*S SCORING
I
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This low degree of agreement between coders on stage assignments
is somewhat paradoxical, considering the satisfactory reliability on
the presence or absence of symbols used in the total protocol (84 percent).
Given this satisfactory reliability figure on the presence/absence of
symbols, and given the fact that stage assignments between raters
never varied beyond one >tage, it may be that the source of the error
is in the stage assjgnpnent rule. For exa:iiple, a protocol with only
two symbols in the Patterned Gtage present would not be scored at the
Patterned Stage, but a protocol with three different Patterned Stage
symbols would be assigned to the Patterned Stage. A symbol only
has to be used once in an entire protocol to be counted as present.
Given the unreliability of scoring, it is possible for one coder to
include an extra symbol, resulting in a different stage assignment.
In other words, the stage assignment rule is extremely sensitive to
the presence of symbols that are relatively unreliably coded. Conversely,
the degree of agreement on stage assignments should Increase when the
symbols are more reliably codeable.
In general, the evaluations of coder agreement suggest that the
current scoring methodology—including the Preliminary Symbol Scoring
Manual and the stage assignment rule—is not sufficiently reliable.
Thus, the next steps in developing the scoring methodology are to Identify
the sources that decrease agreement between coders and to make corrections
in these areas.
One obvious solution is to refine and clarify the definitions and
criteria of symbols in the Preliminary Scoring Manual, especially those
symbols on which coders most often disagree. But given the complexity
of the manual thus far, further specification of the symbol definitions
may only increase the complexity of the manual for its users, hence
potentially decrease coder reliability even further.
A second possible solution is to modify the quantitative aspects
of the scoring methodology. For example, the "presence" of a symbol
in a protocol could be redefined as two, three, four or any number
of occurrences of the symbol in the protocol, instead of just one
occurrence. Also, the stage assignment rule could be changed by
altering the number of symbols necessary to assign a protocol to a stage,
or by using a "profile" system (Kohlberg, 1970) or "ogive" system
(Loevinger, 1970) to assign stages. But these quantitative manipulations
will not in themselves increase coder reliability. The coding process
relies primarily on the coders* judgments on the qualitative
characteristics of the protocols. This will not be changed by merely
manipulating the sums, differences and ratios or these characteristics.
Also, increasing the number of symbols required to constitute presence
will confound stage scoring with verbosity or length of response,
because the length of one's response correlates with the tendency to
use a symbol more frequently. Quantitative manipulations may also be
theoretically inconsistent. For example, the existence of mental
operations (comparable to the characteristics denoted by the symbols)
is determined by the fact that one is able to perform those operations,
not by how freq uently one actually performs them. These reasons make
this solution somewhat unacceptable.
Still another solution is to revise the format or procedure for
coding. For example, instead of scoring for the characteristics
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(symbols) first, then assigning stages on the basis of these characteris-
tics; this procedure can be reversed, i.e. first identify the stage,
then justify the assignment by finding a number of appropriate stage
characteristics. The symbols are indicators of the stages that are
broader than the sum of the individual symbols. In contrast to the
"molecular" symbols, the stages are "molar" descriptions. It may
be possible and more reliable for coders to search for these molar
characteristics in protocols, e.g. does the individual generalize
experience across two or more situations (Patterned)? Or, is only this
one event discussed (Situational)? Once a tentative stage assignment
has been made, the coder could justify it by finding several stage
related symbols. Molar coding would have the advantage of simplicity
and speed, making it more accessible for teachers. At present, the
best way to Increase the objectivity of the molecular (symbol)
scoring (a necessary prerequisite for molar coding) seems to be to
have two or more people score every protocol, then resolve differences
in their coding through careful discussion. This is what was done in
determining the symbol and stage scoring among the 72 protocols
analyzed in this study.
Validity Studies
We conducted a preliminary assessment of construct validity by
applying the Guttman Scaling Technique (1950) to the symbols in the
Preliminary Scoring Manual. Also, we compared the assigned stage
scores on the ER protocols to individuals' ego level and chronological
age. These evaluations are reported in this section.
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!• The Guttman Scaling Technique
. In the Preliminary Scoring Manual,
each, symbol represented a hypothesized developmental characteristic.
Having defined the symbols, we needed to ascertain whether or not the
symbols actually formed a developmental sequence. The Guttman
Scaling Technique appeared to be an appropriate method for this purpose:
...the basic notion of the Guttman or cumulative
scale is that an internal relationship exists
among the items forming the scale such that a person
who endorses or agrees with an item of a given
scale position will endorse all items below it
on the scale. If it is known that a person
endorsed three items of a four-item scale, it is
also known which three items he endorsed. Likewise,
all individuals endorsing only three items will
endorse the same three. Thus it is possible to
order Individuals into relative categories or
positions defined by the position of the items
endorsed. (Dotson & Summers, 1970)
We anticipated that this technique would yield (1) a hierarchical
ordering of the symbols used in scoring the protocols; and (2) a
hierarchical ordering of the protocols according to which symbols
occurred in scoring them. If the symbols and protocols scaled in a
hierarchical order, this would be an indication that the symbols
in the Preliminary Scoring Manual were developmental in nature>i.e.,
consistent with the assumption in structural-developmental theory
that stages are hierarchical and integrate acquisitions of the
previous stage. Of course, other criteria would also need to be met
2
before the symbols can be judged as signs of structural development.
2. These criteria include: (a) the symbols form a culturally—Invariant
sequence; (b) that they are relatively stable over time; (c) that
they represent operations which can be organized into structural wholes.
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But the hierarchical sequencing of symbols resulting from a technique
such as the Guttman scale is a preliminary indicator of structural
development.
The first step in scaling the symbols was to chart the presence
or absence of each symbol for each protocol. The presence of a
symbol for a protocol was equated to "endorsement of an item"
and absence of a symbol was equated to "non-endorsement of an item"
on the Guttman technique. Then the rank orders of the symbols and
the protocols were both manipulated with the aim of achieving an
order such that protocols endorsing the progressively more difficult
items (i.e. symbols ordered higher on the scale) also endorsed all
previous items (i.e. symbols ordered lower on the scale). Figure 6-2
summarizes the results of the Guttman scaling procedure.
Twelve symbols in the Preliminary Scoring Manual did not scale
in hierarchical order among all other symbols. We interpreted these
12 non-scaling symbols to be not developmentally relevant, and did
not consider them further in this phase of analysis. The remaining
symbols that did scale were further examined. Some separate symbols
which scaled very closely and which were conceptually similar were
combined into one symbol (e.g. S.24 A-One possibility and S.24 B-Many
possibilities were combined into "Possibilities"). Also the symbols
were analyzed in their rank order for similarities and internal
relationships to each other. From this scrutiny, we derived the
current four stage description outlined in the previous chapter.
From observing the sequence of symbols, we arrived Inductively
FIGURE
6-3:
ORDER
OF
PROTOCOLS
ACCORDING
TO
STAGE
ASSIGMMEMT
RULE
1A9
0
«d
i H
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
4.^. 4. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + ++ +
+ 4. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
1 VO h«. c'4 vo100000
I o CO vn <r cNj
I H O O O O
I ^ iH
I CO CS CS CS CS
» O O O O “
++++++++++++++++
I + + + I + + + + + I I + + + +
++++++++++++++++
++++++++++++++++
10 10 CO 10w s-xw w 'w'
'
covocomior^cn«^i-<r*'0oc'i-«4't**»
1HOOOOO 1HOOOOOOOioror**f-ir>»mr^-4’OevjHCMu^r«»OOHOHOOO«-iHOOOO
ii-l-
f'4CSCM(>JCSC'JCM<S<0<rC'4CvJ^^OOOOOOOOOOOOOO'
aanaaixva TVNOIIVHaOiSBtVaX
ft
+ + +
+++++++++++++++++++ + + +
I I I+ + + + + + + + + + ( ++++++++++++++++++
> CS < <N
I Www
I
10 CO 00000
1
-4-000
cs CO cs
CS CO CS
Iq Q <?
r^fO'tfOvi“lVDCOvO«4'»nOOOr-IOC^IHHOOOH
csr>iCS'<rooo<toocsH0000*HH^00»HHiHCOC*jeS*^-a'sfCMiHiHH .
cocococMfococnc'i'i-«4'*4-'4-OOOOOQQQOO OjO O
cOvOCSOOH*^iO'4’HHOOvOOH*4’H
O OHOOOO<MOOOOHO-^0
C'J OvOCO*>»OCOO»HOeSHHC^OHobdoM obH H oHiHowq»HoggHwq'jtH-|COCN|eS-^*^sfCMiHi HH -H«^HCS*^M^»HHHgcOfH^^
ocNj o oo4>sr*sr ^<t <^«^oooooo 0000000
Ov O lO
tH H O000
000
[
sf •4’
, tT) \0
t iH O
• O H
I H O
I H
I CO CM
I O Q.
TViNawaTa TVNOIXVnilS
150
at a rule for assigning an overall stage score to protocols: Assign
a protocol to the highest stage in which at least three symbols occur.
For example, to apply this rule, if a protocol contains five symbols
in the Elemental Stage, six symbols in Situational, four in Patterned
and one in Transformational, this protocol would be assigned to the
Patterned Stage, because the Patterned Stage is the highest stage in
3
which this protocol has at least three S''!doo1s. This rule was
adopted for the purpose of analyzing the sequence of the four stages.
It does not represent our final stage assignment rule.
In essence, the stage assignment rule reduces the number of items
on the scale to four, i.e. three symbols defining the endorsement
(or presence) of each stage. Figure 6-3 shows the protocols rank-
ordered into four stages by the stage assignment rule. It is possible
to compute the errors on the scale by counting the number of non-endorsed
stage positions below the assigned stage on each of the protocols.
By identifying and tabulating these scaling errors, the degree of
scalability of the stages can be computed. The "degree of scalability"
is one way of estimating the internal consistency among the items on
the scale. Guttman (1950) has proposed the coefficient of reproducibility,
total placement of error
(1- respondents x items ) , as a method of estimating degree of
internal consistency or scalability. He somewhat arbitrarily set a
3. According to this rule, a protocol need not contain three symbols
in lower stages to be assigned a higher stage, although this is rare.
For example, if a protocol had only two symbols at the Elemental Stage,
but five at Situational and three at Patterned, it would be assigned
to the Patterned Stage. But protocols like this are discrepancies,
in the sence that the hierarchical order of the symbols Is violated.
151
minimum of .90 as necessary for assuming scalability. According to
this standard, the amount of error tolerated is not to exceed 10
percent. Applying this formula yields a coefficient of reproducibility
of .97 for the sequence of stages. Thus, the error factor in the
scale ordered by the stage-assignment rule is within Che 10 percent
range tolerable. Menzel (1953) has proposed another method for
estimating the degree of scalability, which he calls "coefficient of
scalability," (1
- Errors^' formula, the coefficient
of scalability for the sequence of stages is .84. This figure is
above the level of acceptability (.60) suggested by Menzel.
Both the coefficient of scalability and the coefficient of re-
producibility imply that given only the stage assignment of a protocol,
one can predict that three or more symbols were present in the assigned
stage and in all previous stages. In general, this suggests that the
symbols in the Preliminary Scoring Manual, rank-ordered into the four
stages, represent a hierarchical sequence. This heirarchical sequence
is one indicator that the symbols in the manual are developmental in
nature.
2. Ego Level . Since the concept of ego development is closely related to
the self-knowledge construct (See Chapter II), we expected ego level
would be moderately highly correlated with stage assignment on the ER.
A high positive correlation is almost guaranteed when using these
72 protocols because the symbols in these protocols were developed in
part to reflect the developmental changes in ego level (See Chapter III)
.
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Therefore, the present comparison of stage scores and ego levels,
whatever the results, must be cross-validated.
To test the hypothesis of positive correlation, the stage scores
were plotted against ego levels. The scattergram (Figure 6-4) suggests
a generally positive relationship between the two vaiables. The
degree of relationship between ego levels and stages assigned can
be determined by computing Pearson's coefficient of correlation.
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By this computation, the correlation is +.73. This figure indicates
that the present scoring methodology is yielding stage scores for the
ER which are developmental in ways parallel to the sentence completion
test for ego levels. However, one's confidence in this "high"
correlation should be tempered by the fact that the ego level scores
of protocols used in constructing the manual were always known
and often considered in deciding on “Anual rules and symbol definitions.
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In th0 othsir diirsctiorij ths correlation is not high enough to suggest
that one's ego level and stage assignment on the ER measure precisely
the same concept, i.e. there appears to be about 50 percent common variance
3. Age. How is chronological age related to assigned stages on the ER
protocols? Compared to ego level, we believed that age would be a
less reliable indicator of stage assignment on the ER test. Theoretically,
one cannot achieve a higher development".! stage without having achieved
all previous stages. Thus, younger subjects are more likely to be at
lower stages, and one would expect few, if any, children at the higher
stages. However, advancement in chronological age does not automatically
mean advancement in developmental stage. Probably, stage advancement
can be retarded or stopped at any age. Hence, one would expect that
an adult may be assigned to any of the four stages. To evaluate
these speculations, we computed the degree of relationship between
assigned stage scores and age on the analyzed protocols. Using
Pearson's coefficient of correlation, a value of +.47 is derived.
This figure denotes a moderate positive correlation between age and
stage assignment on the ER protocols. It is consistent with the theoreti-
cal relationship between developmental stages and chronological age,
namely that younger subjects tend to be at lower stages and older
subjects at higher stages. Hence, this relationship between age and
assigned stages is another partial Indicator that the current scoring
methodology is yielding stage assignments that reflect development.
In contrast with ego level, age was not considered in the creation of
symbols or stages. Thus this correlation was not "built into"
the derivation of the stages and symbols.
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la general, the three evaluations of the validity suggest that
the sequence of stage characteristics (the symbols) and the sequence
of stages are consistent with the theoretical definition of structural
development. The Guttman Analysis indicates that the sequence of
symbols and stages are hierarchical in nature, and the relationship of
assigned stages to age and to ego level suggest consistency with
these two concurrent indicators of deve"* jpmeat. But further
expansion, revision and evaluation of the scoring methodology is
required, and additional construct validity tests must be done before
we can determine more definitively whether the identified characteristics
of people’s self-knowledge theories reflect structural-development.
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CHAPTER VII
REVIEW, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The six previous chapters have described an attempt to identify
characteristics of developmental stages in people's theories about
themselves. To what extent have these stage characteristics been
adequately and accurately defined? What value is there is this work?
And, what next steps should be taken? ""nls chapter addresses these
questions by critically reviewing the present study, drawing some
general conclusions and making recommendations for continued efforts.
In the first section, the derivation of the current version of
self-knowledge stage characteristics is summarized. In the next
section the research to date is evaluated against technical standards
for educational and psychological tests and specific recommendations
emerge. And, in the final section, this study is viewed from a broad
perspective that asks, "Does this work contribute to solving the
original generic problems in psychological education?"
Derivation of the Stages of Self-Knowledge Theories
The assumptions of the structural-developmental perspective
provided the basis for the search for stages of self-knowledge theories
(or verbalized conceptualizations of experience) . For the
structural-developmentalists, notably Piaget, Kohlberg, and Loevinger,
development consists of an invariant sequence of reorganizations of mental
life. These re-organizations or stages are hierarchical Integrations
Ci.e. are more complex, yet more integrated than the previous stages);
they involve distinct, qualitative changes; they are relatively stable
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over time and they form a sequence that is, in principle, culturally
universal.
Initially, stage characteristics of self-knowledge theories were
deduced from Piaget's theory of cognitive development, Kohlherg's
theory of moral reasoning development, Loevlnger et.al.'s theory of ego
development and Van den Deale's theory of ego-ideal development.
From these four theories, we h3rpothesizPa the characteristics of
three broad stages of self-knowledge theories, (1) Pre-operational,
(2) Concrete Qserational, and (3) Formal Operational. From the
outset, there was a dialogue between theory and empirical data.
To test and correct the theoretically-defined stages, we created an
instrument that elicited samples of individuals' self-knowledge
theories (the Experience Recall Test). We ordered the responses to
this test according to the ego level (measured by Loevlnger, et.al. 's
Sentence Completion Test (1970) for ego development) of the person
who produced the response, and searched for a progression of charac-
teristics in these responses to the ER that might reflect structural-
developmental changes. The Preliminary Scoring Manual (Appendix B)
contains the definitions of these characteristics. Using the Guttman
Scaling Technique, we found that 41 of these characteristics appeared
to be hierarchical in nature. After examining this sequence of
characteristics, we Inductively arrived at four clusters or stages of
self-knowledge theories. Statistical examination of these stages
revealed that (1) the reliability of scoring protocols for these
stages and their characteristics is only moderately high; (2) the
four stages form a developmental sequence as judged by the statistical
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measures of scalability and reproducibility on the Guttman Scale; (3) the
stage scores correlate highly with ego level, as they would, given
the derivation method; and (4) the stage scores correlate moderately
highly with age, as was predicted.
Two obvious next steps are called for. These steps include:
(1) cross-validation of these findings using a second matched sample
of 80 protocols, and (2) an integration or mutual re-interpretation
of the theoretically-derived stages and the empirically-derived
stages. The first step is underway at the time of this writing, but
is beyond the limits of this report. Tlie comparison of the theoretically-
derived and empirically-derived stages is discussed here. The
following questions guided this step of the inquiry: First, to what
extent do the theoretical and empirical stage characteristics
agree with each other? Second, to what extent do they contradict
each other? And third, in what ways do the theoretically-derived
version of the stages and the empirically-derived version of the
stages illuminate gaps in the other?
1. Correspondence between the empirical and theoretical versions . In
general, there is a one-to-one correspondence in the early stages
between both versions of the stages. For the later stages, the stage
named "formal operational" in the theoretical version seemed to
encompass part of the Patterned Stage and all of the Transformational
Stage in the empirical version. Table 7-1 shows this overlapping
relationship between the two versions.
Examples of correspnding characteristics between the Pre-operational
and the Elemental Stages and between the Concrete Operational and the
TABLE 7-1; COMPARISON OF THEORETICALLY DERIVED STAGES
TO EMPIRICALLY DERIVED STAGES
Theoretically-derived
Stages
Empirically-derived
Stages
Preoperational Elemental
Concrete Operational
Situational
Formal Operational
Patterned
Transfomat ional
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Situational are placed adjacent to one another in the following outline:
These Pre-Operational Stage
Characteristics ...Correspond to...
Pre-operational thinking is limited
to single, concrete, obvious, im-
mediate Instances or aspects of
reality, (p. 84)
What integration there is occurs
as the juxtaposition of a specific
antecedent, response and consequence
in a specific instance. Although
these three elements are differ-
entiated, they are not causally
related by the child. "And" and
"because" are used to mean "and."
There are no true (self-knowledge)
hypotheses at this stage, (p. 85)
...dreams, names thoughts and
feelings are substantiated as
quasi-tangible entities assumed to
be visible to others, (p. 86)
These Concrete Operational Stage
Characteristics
The child is able to classify (or
cite) two or more concrete in-
stances as members of the same set
of antecedents, responses or
consequences, (p. 90)
The child understands that in-
ternal states (sensations, feelings,
thoughts) are not visible to others.
Conversely the child is aware that
other people have non-visible
feelings, (p. 90)
The concrete operational person is
aware of reciprocal or cooperative
actions necessary and appropriate to
achieve a desired result or relation-
ship. (p. 93)
These Elemental Stage
Characteristics
Only discrete, "visible" aspects
of a single event (i.e. the elements)
are described, (p. 112)
These elements may be related to
each other by serial ordering or by
j’
-.taf osing them, but no causal
connections between them are stated.
Hence no explanations or hypotheses
about one's experiences are reported
at this stage, (p. 112)
Emotional states are not named as
such, but feelings can be described
in psychological terms, (p. 122)
These Situational Stage
Characteristics
Individuals appear to have a gestalt
of a single situation composed of
causally connected elements . .
.
The discrete elements, which were
described separately in the Elemental
stage, are now organized into one or
more coherent units or situations.
(p. 113)
Unlike the physical or physiological
description of feelings in the
Elemental stage, emotional states
in the Situational stage are described
as invisible and Internal. The
emotional states named may be of
oneself or of others, (p. 124)
MUTUAL ACTIONS (S.22A), or behaviors
involving two persons acting upon
each other, may also be mentioned in
Situational stage responses, (p. 125)
...Correspond to..
160
Besides echoing Situational stage characteristics, the Concrete
Operational stage also seemed to parallel several characteristics in the
Patterned stage. For example,
...in later concrete operational reasoning, internal
states in oneself and others become more highly
differentiated.
. .e.g.
,
a deepening interest in
interpersonal relations. Moreover, interactions
are described in terms of feelings or traits rather
than in purely behavioral terms... the concrete oper-
ational person describes Interpersonal Interaction
in terms of differentiated feelings, motives or
traits (Loevinger, e^. al.
, 1970, p. 68) (p. 91)
These same characteristics (namely, personality traits (S.39A);
interpersonal relationship traits (S.22B and S.22C); etc.), though using
slightly different terminology, fell into the Patterned stage in the
empirically-derived version of the stages.
Other characteristics in the Patterned stage match directly with
characteristics that describe Formal Operational thinking. For example,
propositional thinking, i.e. the ability to reason about the "possible"
or "hypothetical" as opposed to the "real" or "actual" is a central
feature of the Formal Operational stage. This is mirrored in the
Patterned stage by characteristics such as "hypothetical if-then state-
ments" (S.25) and descriptions of possibilities (S.24A and S.24B).
Similarly, most characteristics in the theoretically-derived Formal
Operational stage are consistent with characteristics in the empirically-
derived Patterned stage. Another example of this match is that in the
Formal operational stage.
Inner reactions to past and future situations have a
more Intense and larger holding power . They Infuse
or cloud one^s reactions to an immediately experienced
situation. .. It Involves the capacity to have reactions
independent of immediately experienced concrete situations.
(pp. 104-105)
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This corresponds to "descriptions of an event at the Patterned stage
that include departures from the time frame of the event itself. That
is, there is often mention of continuation of actions or conditions
(S.42A and S.42B) prior to or since the event being described." (p. 127)
In short, some characteristics in the Patterned stage match
characteristics in the Concrete Operational stage, whjule other
characteristics in that stage (Patterned) . atch characteristics of the
Formal Operational stage.
The characteristics of the final empirically-derived stage.
Transformational, are consistent with characteristics of the Formal
Operational stage. For example, in the formal operational stage, "one
can have hypotheses about the way one hypothesizes, propositions about
one's propositions, and in general characterize one's experiences in
terms of the characteristic procedures one uses to make sense of the
world, one's relationships and place in it." (p. 107) This description
mirrors descriptions of the Transformational stage such as the following:
At this stage, one is aware of THOUGHT PROCEDUHES (S.6C).
One's own thinking is often described as involving
Interrelated conscious mental acts. Responses usually
imply that there are steps or procedures in one's
thinking, or that there is an inter-relationship
among the ideas or thoughts, (p. 129)
In summary, the empirically-derived stage characteristics closely
paralleled the theoretically-derived stages. This overall consistency
between the two versions of the stages seems to suggest that the
empirically-derived stages (Elemental, Situational, Patterned and
Transformational)
,
some of whose characteristics were conceived
Intuitively, are generally theoretically supportable. Conversely, the
theoretical version of the stages, which was deduced from previous
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investigations, tends to be further confirmed by the set of character-
istics derived inductively by analyzing the ER protocols.
In the parts where the two versions of the stages do not correspond
directly to each other, each version seems to complement each other.
For example, let us consider the Patterned stage, which straddles two
of the theoretically derived stages, l.e. it is partially parallel to
concrete operations and partially parallel to formal operations (See
Figure 7-1). This may be interpreted as a mismatch. But examining
this further, the distinction in the theoretical version of the stages
between concrete operational and formal operational Informs us of
possible differentiations within the Patterned stage. That is, there
may be at least two pub-stages of the Patterned stage, or there may be
two separate stages within what is now defined as the Patterned stage.
Using the concrete-formal distinction to illuminate the definition of
the Patterned stage, one may arrive at the following hypothetical
reformulation:
The next stage beyond Situational becomes
evident when the individual can describe or generalize
from experiences involving several different situations.
Patterns in one's actual or past experiences are named
and described. These patterns include roles, personality
traits (Including behavioral, emotional or thought
patterns), and interpersonal relationship characteristics.
In this stage (or sub-stage)
,
the patterns described are
those actually experienced in the past or present, i.e.
"real." Patterns in the future are usually described
as linear extensions of these actual patterns.
In the next stage (or substage)
,
the advent of
formal thought enables the individual to consider
patterns which are "possible," unexperienced or in
the more distant future. Individuals in this stage
(or sub-stage) are no longer bound to consider only
the patterns that were "real," or experienced in the
past or present. Hypothetico-deductive reasoning;
propositional thinking and combinatorial analysis can now
be observed in individuals’ descriptions and explanations
of possible variations in their patterns.
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Of course, further analysis and clarification is necessary to
complete and verify this potential redefinition of the Patterned stage.
This does, however, illustrate how the misalignment of stages in the
theoretical version and the empirical version could be used to clarify
and differentiate stages. In the other direction, differentiating
the Patterned stage into two separate stages (or sub-stages) may be a
false or unsupportable distinction. This, however, is an empirical
question that can be clarified given more data.
In a similar manner, the distinction between the Patterned and the
Transformational stages suggests a differentiation within the theoreti-
cally-derived Formal Operational stage. It is possible that the
recognition of the dynamics of changing patterns (of thought, emotions
and behaviors) are signs of another stage (or sub-stage) beyond (or
within) the Formal Operational stage. But again, further data is required
to demonstrate the validity of this distinction.
Thus, given the overall consistency and potential areas of distinction
resulting from the comparison of the two versions of the stages, the
following next steps are recommended for research:
1. The characteristics that differentiate Concrete Operational
and Formal Operational self-knoi>ledge should be identified more
specifically, and hypothesized as characteristics differentiating two
stages or sub-stages within the Patterned stage. New data should be
obtained for these characteristics; and these characteristics should
be evaluated to determine whether the differentiation into two stages
or sub-istages should be made.
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2. The distinction betvreen the Patterned and the Transformational
stages should be closely monitered with additional data that may
support the potential distinction of the Formal (^erational stage into
two stages or sub-stages.
3. Similarly, the distinction between the Situational and the
Patterned (first phase) stages, which suggests a differentiation of
the Concrete Operational stage into two sxib-stages (see Table 7-1),
should be further validated with new .ata.
2 . Contradictions between the theoretical and empirical stage descrip-
tions . Another aspect of comparing the theoretically-derived stages
and the empirically-derived stages was to ascertain to what extent the
two versions of the stage characterizations contradict each other.
The stage characteristics of the two versions, as described
above, seem to parallel each other, and in a general sense, are not
contradictory. Hcnjever, the examples given to Illustrate the parallel
characteristics are often non-parallel and seem contradictory.
For example, in the theoretically-derived stage description of
Formal Operations, the following example is used to show descriptions
containing several alternative viewpoints about the same experience.
"1 was frightened and really turned off, but somehow strongly attracted
(p. 102)." The characteristic (alternative viewpoints about the same
experience) is consistent with the ability to the Transformational stage
to describe one's oim thought procedures (S.6C). However, using the
Preliminary Symbol Scoring Manual to score the above example, no
characteristics (symbols) in the Transformational stage are evident.
There are three situation-specific emotional stages ((1) "frightened,"
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(2) "really turned off," and (3) "somehow strongly attracted') scored
S.9A and a logical connection, "but," scored S.16B (Despite/Although).
These characteristics fall within the Situational stage and not the
Transfoirmatlonal stage.
Another illustration: In the Concrete Operational stage the
following two examples are given to show the judgment of oneself in
terms of one's conformity to an authorit}' figure or proper rule:
"If my mother gives me advice, I take it because
she is always right."
"Education is very important for everyone." (p. 92)
When scored by the Manual, characteristics beyond the Concrete
Operational stage (or the parallel Situational stage) are evident in
these examples. Specifically, the first statement contains a hypo-
thetical if-then proposition (S.25), a characteristic of the Patterned
stage. The second statement contains an abstract construct ("Education")
scored S.46 and possibly an indication of its meaning or inner
significance ('Is very important for everyone") scored S.44. Both
characteristics (S.4 4 and S.46) empirically occurred only in the
Transformational stage.
Despite the fact that characteristics between the theoretical
and the empirical version of the stages are parallel, some examples
that illustrate the theoretical version of the stages seem to be
misplaced when the empirically-derived definitions and criteria are
applied to these examples. Thus, these examples are classified in
one stage in the theoretical version and in a different, non-parallel
stage in the empirical version. The misclasslfication of examples
between the two versions of the stages requires further examination
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and analysis, specifically:
1, Search for and identify the sources or causes of the
discrepancies in the example. For Instance, it may be that the
descriptions of the stage characteristics (in either version) are
too broad, such that examples can be interpreted to exemplify the
characteristics of several stages.
2. Revisions or refinements should b~ made for the examples
placed in non-parallel stages. These revisions involve one or both
of the following types of changes:
(a) Replacing or deleting the problematic examples.
(b) Redefining or refining the descriptions and
definitions of the stage characteristics that
involve the problematic examples.
3.
Gaps in the theoretical and empirical stage descriptions
. The
misplacement of some examples Illustrating stage characteristics
seems to be the only inconsistency between the theoretical and empirical
versions of the stages. There are, however, some gaps in the empirical
version of the stage characteristics suggested by the theoretical version.
And, reciprocally, there are some reinterpretations of the theoretical
version suggested by the empirically-derived stage characteristics.
One of the areas characterized in the theoretically-derived version,
but absent in the empirically derived version is how "good and bad"
are described. For example, in the Pre-operational stage, "good and
bad are determined by, and after the response of other people, usually
adults; and the pleasure-pain effects on the person." (p. 86) In the
Concrete Operational stage, conformity to a system of rules governs the
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determination of good and bad. In the Formal Operational stage, good
and bad are not absolute, but often dependent on the perspective or
viewpoint taken in making the judgment. However, this dimension of
how people judge good and bad is not present anywhere in the empirically-
derived stage characteristics, and is relevant to the dimension of how
value is assigned to one's experiences.
The theoretically-derived version also includes another type of
characterization, which is absent in the empirically-derived version.
These are the characterizations described in logico-mathematical terms.
For example, in the Concrete Operational stage, two simultaneous aspects
of adlrectly experienced situation can be related by logical compensations
including: (1) transitive combinativity; (2) associativity; (3) tautological
identity; (4) numerical iteration; and (5) reversibility (p. 89). In
the Formal Operational stage, hypothetical and propositional thinking
enables individuals to describe experiences in terms of (1) correlational
relationships; (2) notions of probability; and (3) proportional reasoning
(pp. 105-106). These logico-mathematical characterizations do not appear
in the empirical version of the stages. This mathematical way of
characterizing the stages seems relevant to how people explain their
experiences.
In short, the theoretical version of the stages contains two kinds
of characterizations which are relevant to two major dimensions of self-
knowledge theories, hut which are absent in the current empirically-derived
version of the stages: (1) descriptions of how people judge good and bad,
relevant to the value assignment dimension of self-knowledge theories; and
(2) descriptions in logico-mathematical terms, relevant to the explanation
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of experience dimension. The absence of these relevant types of
characterization suggests that the next steps in research should be to
search the ER protocols for each of these dimensions, then evaluate,
whether these characteristics fall into a developmental order. Fortunately,
the last half of the ER protocols, which have not been analyzed to date,
contain responses to questions particularly relevant to these two
dimens ions
.
In the other direction, what ga-s in the theoretical version of the
stages are suggested by the empirically’=derived stage characteristics?
In general, the empricially-derived version Identifies characteristics
of people's statements in terms of precise definitions and criteria (in
the Scoring Manual, Appendix B) . The aim in developing these descriptions
was to leave as little as possible to inference or varying interpretations.
In contrast, many of the characteristics in the theoretically-derived
version are stated broadly, hence allowing varying and conflicting
interpretations. For example, let us consider the statement, "I am sad."
Given the theoretical version of the stages, this statement may be
classified in the Pre-operatlonal stage, as an example of a global,
simplistic or dichotlmous description of oneself (p. 86). But, it may
also be placed in the Concrete Operational stage, because it is a
description of an internal state (i.e. a feeling or emotion) that is
non-vlsible to others (p. 90). On the other hand, in terms of the
definitions of characteristics in the empirical version of the stages,
the above statement would definitely be scored as a situation-specific
emotional state (S.9A), a characteristic in the Situational stage. Thus,
compared to the theoretical version, the empirically-derived stage
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characteristics are clearer and less ambiguous in their descriptions
and definitions. .This format of deriving stage characteristics using
precise definitions and criteria is instructive in fleshing out and
amplifying the theoretically-derived stage characteristics.
There is another area in which the empirical version of the stages
illuminates the theoret ics i version. This involves tl.e distinction in
the theoretical version between antecedents, responses, and consequences.
This distinction is not in the empirically-derived stage descriptions.
When this distinction is nutde, it appears to be irrelevant and confusing
in terms of people*s actual experience descriptions. Many people, for
example, do not conceive of their experiences in terms of antecedents,
responses and consequences. For other individuals, antecedents, responses
and consequences are inter-related or interchangeable: one aspect of an
experience is simultaneously a response to something, an antecedent
to something else, and a consequence of still another aspect of the
experience. Given these examples, defining what are the antecedents,
responses and consequences of individuals' experience can easily distort
the meaning of their descriptions. The empirical version of the stages
seems to have sufficiently characterized responses without using the
antecedent-response-consequence distinction. This suggests that such
a distinction may not be necessary, and that these seemingly inappropriate
categories of antecedents, responses and consequences should be deleted
from the theoretical version of the stage characteristics.
In summary, there are two areas in which the empirical version
of the stages suggest revisions in the theoretical version. These
revisions involve: (1) increasing the degree of specificity in defining
170
the stage characteristics and (2) deleting the distinction between
antecedents, responses and consequences in the stage descriptions.
* * *
In this review, we have summarized the derivation of the theoretically-
derived version and the empricially derived version of the stage
characteristics of self-knowledge theories. The two versions of the
stages were compared to each other for sfm-'larities, contradictions and
gaps or revisions that one version suggests for the other. These
revisions and specific recommendations for next steps were also outlined.
Eventually, these revisions and reformulations will lead to a consoli-
dation and synthesis between the two versions of the stages. This
synthesized version of the stages will involve new or revised character-
istics and definitions, and possibly a revived or alternative method
of scoring ER protocols. Of course, new data will be required to
demonstrate the validity of this synthesized version of the stages. In
the next section, the current status of this research is evaluated
against technical standards for educational and psychological tests.
Even though the ER test is not complete and final, it will be helpful
to know how adequate our work is to date and what further needs to be
done
.
Review Of The Study Using Technical Criteria For Tests
Since this study involves the construction of a psychological test,
it is possible to assess its administration, scoring. Interpretation,
reliability and validity, using the American Psychological Association's
Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and Manuals (1966).
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The Experience Recall test was designed to assess the stages of
one*s self-knowledge theories (or one’s verbalized conceptualizations
of experience). The rationale, characteristics and limitations of the
ER are detailed earlier in this report (Chapter III) . Thus far, the
ER is the only measuring device available for determining an individual’s
stage of self-knowledge theories, and the ER was the measuring device
used for collecting data to derive the empirical version of the stages
(Chapter V).
Currently, the ER is primarily for research use, however the aim
is to make it eventually practical for educational diagnosis and
evaluation. Given these intentions, we can judge to what degree we
have sufficiently standardized and validated the ER test and the
stages derived from it. To do this, we examine the administration and
scoring of the test and review the various aspects of its reliability
and validity.
1. Administration of the Experience Recall Test . There are two
formats for administering the ER: one Involves written responses and the
other involves oral responses. The instructions on both forms are almost
exactly the same (see Appendix B). But there are slight variations between
forms in the instructions and Questions to adjust for age differences in
the subjects tested. Also, the oral form can only be administered in
an individual interview (one-to-one) format, whereas the written form
may be administered to groups or individually. The administration of
either form of the ER is not time-consuming—it can be completed within
one hour. Very little training is required to learn to administer the
ER, These factors make the ER quite practical for classroom use and
for research purposes.
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Each form of the ER seems sufficiently standardized separately.
But, there has been no formal evaluation of the equivalency between
the oral form and the written form. A future study should be con-
ducted to evaluate and establish this "equivalent form reliability."
2. Scoring of the ER test . Thus far, there is only one method
for scoring the ER test; this method is described in previous chapters
and in the Preliminary Symbol Scoring Mav.ual (Appendix B) . The scoring
involves a sentence-by-sentence analysis of the responses, a procedure
which is currently complex and elaborate. The same format for scoring
is used for both written and oral response forms of the ER. At the
present time, the scoring procedure probably is too complex and Intricate
to be useable on a widespread basis, and especially impractical for
use by classroom teachers. The scoring method is Incomplete until
responses to the other questions can be scored.
This suggests that future steps need to be taken in developing a
scoring procedure for other questions on the ER test and in simplifying
the scoring procedure without sacrificing objectivity.
3. Reliability . Reliability refers to the accuracy (consistency
and stability) of measurement by a test. There are five major types
of reliability estimates that are relevant to this study. These include
estimates of (a) temporal stability, (b) internal consistency, (c) intra-
individual accuracy, (d) Interrater agreement and (e) comparability
between forms.
(a) Temporal Stability . Temporal stability estimates refer to
how nearly constant the test scores are likely to be if the test is
repeated after time has lapsed. Such an estimate would indicate the
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degree to which test scores reflect actual characteristics of the
individual rather than random fluctuations resulting from the testing
session. For any test of normal developmental changes, an increase in
scores is expected over time. Thus, "stability" is relative. We
would expect stability of scores over periods of weeks or months, but
probably not years. However, to date, no formal study has been
conducted to estimate the temporal stability of the ER test. Measuring
the stability of scores across time r„ the ER test is an essential next
step in research, after the scoring system is complete and final.
(b) Internal Consistency
.
The estimate of internal consistency
deals with the homogeneity of test items. Applied to the ER test, the
internal consistency measure would estimate the degree to which each
question assesses a single trait, namely the stage of one's self-knowledge
theories.
At present, it is not possible to compute an estimate of internal
consistency because a scoring procedure is available for only one of
the items (i.e. Question A) on the ER test. This form of reliability
will be relevant when the scoring methodology is complete for all of
the questions (and dimensions).
(c) Intraindividual accuracy . The accuracy of an individual's
score refers to the degree to which an individual's test score reflects
that individual's true score. This is usually assessed using the
standard error of measurement, that is, the standard deviation of an
individual's score. For example, in terms of the ER test, suppose an
individual scored at the Patterned stage. Without an estimate of the
standard error of measurement, one does not know whether this is Patterned i
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one stage. Patterned 1 two stages, or Patterned i one-half stage. This
estimate would be attained by administering the ER test many times
(parallel forms may be used) to an individual, and then computing the
standard error of the individual's scores on these administrations.
Thus far, estimates of this form of reliability on the ER test
scores have not been assessed. Given the tentati/e and preliminary
status of the scoring methodology and the fact that there are only
four possible stage scores, an estimate of standard error of measure-
ment may not be meaningful at this time. However, as the stage
characteristlts and the scoring approach are developed and become more
well-defined, an assessment of this form of reliability will become
necessary.
(d) Interrater Reliability . Interrater reliability indicates the
degree of agreement between independent scorers of the test responses.
Several as sessments of rater or coder reliability were conducted and
are reported in Chapter VI. There was 72 percent agreement between
two coders on sentence-by-sentence use of symbols in the manual, and 69
percent agreement when only scalable symbols are considered. There was
84 percent agreement on presence or absence of particular symbols over the
entire response to Question A, but only 50 percent agreement on stage
assignments.
Most of the percent agreement figures were below conventional
standards of acceptability (80 percent). Also, these coder reliability
estimates involved only two cocers, and both coders had contributed
substantially to the construction of the Preliminary Scoring Manual.
It is thus not known to what degree other coders, less Involved in the
175
Manual construction process, would be able to achieve agreement on
their scoring.
Further work is thus required in obtaining more rater reliability
estimates, especially with newly=trained raters. Also, the reliability
scores themselves need to be considerably increased. This can be done
(1) by revising and clarifying the definitions and ciiteria in the
present scoring approach, (2) by creating _ standardized, reliable
training program for coders, or (3) developing an alternative approach
to scoring.
(e) Comparability of forms
. This type of reliability is concerned
with the degree to which the scores on two forms of the same test are
consistent. It is applicable to the ER test in two ways. First, there
are two forms of the test, oral and written. The similarities and
differences in the characteristics of the two forms are described in
Chpater III, but no comparisons of test scores between forms has been
conducted. Second, the current version allows individuals to choose
their unforgetable experience. We do not know yet whether current
recollections of a distant and near past experience yield the same
stage scores, or whether stage scores for an individual would remain
the same across several content areas. Thus, future studies that
ascertain the means and variances between forms, and between types of
experiences recalled are desirable.
4. Validity . Two types of validity information are pertinent in
assessing the value of the ER test and the concept of measures: criterion-
related validity and construct validity.
Ca) Criterion-related validity . This form of validity is demon-
strated by comparing test scores with one or more external variables
i
176
considered to provide a direct measure of the characteristic in
question. We have argued that mental processes or operations cannot
be measured directly. Verbal behaviors are the only knoxm external
variable or "output" that is related to these mental structural-
developmental processes. We can thus correlate these verbal "outputs"
(i.e. scores) on the ER test with other types of strrctural-developmental
"outputs," e.g. scores on the ego development test (Loevinger, et. al.,
1970), on the moral development test (Kohlberg, 1958) and on the ego-
ideal development test (Van den Deale, 1968). There should be positive,
moderately high correlations between the ER test scores and the other
developmental test scores; positive because all of these tests are
measures of structural development, but only moderately high because
each test measures a somewhat different aspect of structural development.
Of these "concurrent validity" tests, we have correlated 72 ER
test scores with ego development teat scores. The Pearson coefficient
of correlation was +.72. This unusually high correlation was due in
part to the method of deriving the ER scoring manual, i.e. the ER tests
were ordered on the basis of their ego development score. Cross-
validation of these results on a matched sample of 80 subjects is a
necessary next step (and is underway at the time of this writing) . In
addition, data from several populations that includes scores on other
developmental tests need to be analyzed. In sum, at present we have
completed the analysis of only minimal criterion-related validity data.
(b) Construct validity . This type of validity assesses the
correspondence between theoretically hypothesized relationships and
empirically measured manifestations of. those relationships. For Instance,
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In this research, we assumed (or hypothesized) that the stages would
be CD hierarchical integrations, (2) invariant in sequence, (3) stable
over relatively long periods of time, and (4) relatively culturally
universal. The stages must have these characteristics if we are to
believe they are indices or reflections of structural development.
In addition, we spectulated that at higher levels of self-knowledge
development, the theories people construct about their experiences
should be progressively more adequate, accurate, useful and economical.
These hypotheses need to be assessed empirically.
Most fundamentally, the developmental stages of self-knowledge
theories should be positively correlated with age. A 0-order correlation
would contradict the notion that these stages are related to the natural
development of human beings over time. In fact, in the analyzed
sample of 72, the correlation with age was +.47.
There are several statistical procedures for determining whether
the stages identified by the ER test are hierarchical. The Guttman
Scaling Technique was used in this study. The figures for the
coefficient of reproducibility ( *97) and the coefficient of scalability
(.84) Indicate that the four stages identifiable by the ER test are hier-
archical for the protocols analyzed. But the stage characteristics were
derived from these protocols themselves, thus maximizing these coefficients.
We are now cross-validating these results on a second sample of 80 protocols.
A strategy for assessing the cultural invariance of the stage sequence
is to examine age trends in the stage scores among subjects in various
cultures. Cross-cultural sequentiality would be indicated if there was
a positive correlation between stage and age across the cultural groups
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tested. Thus far, there have been no studies using the ER comparing
various groups within or across cultures. Such studies comparing
age trends across cultures are desirable as another construct validation
approach in future research.
Data from longitudinal studies provide probably the "truest"
indication of construct vnlidity for the invariant sequence of stages
and their relative staljilitv. This appr-'cch consists of measuring
the same individuals at different points over a period of time, e.g.
over a 20 year period. Several critical aspects of development can be
tested since emerging characteristics and changes can be assessed.
The degree of stability of permanence of the stage characteristics can
be ascertained. The invariance as well as the irreversibility of stages
can be evaluated. Also, individual growth Increments and patterns
can be seen using longitudinal studies. Longitudinal studies using
the ER have not been conducted thus far.
There are quicker less costly, but less definitive ways to assess
invariant sequentiality. Specifically, experimental studies can be
used. These studies may be done in several ways including, (1) experi-
mentally Inducing changes Individuals' stage scores (cf. Turlel, 1966),
and (2) assessing preference and comprehension for the type of thinking
that characterizes each stage (cf. Rest, 1973; Rest, et . al
.
, 1969)
.
Both methods presume the following; If the stages form a fixed and
Invariant sequence, then subjects will be influenced more by reasoning
(i.e. stage characteristics) one stage above their own dominant stage
than by reasoning (i.e. stage characteristics) further above. And further-
more, they will tend to view reasoning at lower stages as incomplete or
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Inadequate. Such experimental studies need to be carefully designed
because of numerous potential competing variables and rival hypotheses.
(Cf. Campbell and Stanley, 1966). Nevertheless, these experimental
approaches can provide relevant data on construct validity. In
addition, experiments on inducing stage change have direct relevance
for the educational applicability of the self-knowledge stage
sequence. Thus, future studies involving this experimental approach
to contruct validity are recommended.
Determining construct validity for some aspects of the developmental
nature of the self-knowledge stages require logical and theoretical
analysis. Specifically, structural development Involves qualitative
changes from one stage to the next. To determine whether stage changes
identified by the ER are qualitative, we could analyze the internal
logic and mode of thought characterizing each stage against criteria
such as consistency, logical validity and coherence; and then compare
each stage with the others for their relative adequacy, comprehensiveness,
range of convenience, differentiation and integration of prior stages.
In actuality, the four stages identifiable by the ER test Intuitively
meet these qualitative criteria, but thus far a thorough and explicit
analysis has not been conducted. This must wait until the additional
stage dimensions are defined.
In brief, we have reviewed the ER test and the evaluations of it
in terms of their technical specifications. Table 7-2 summarizes the
status of our work in terms of these technical specifications, alongside
two other developmental theories. In general, the table indicates that
TABLE 7-2: COMPARISON OF STUDIES CONDUCTED
ON THREE DEVELOPMENTAL THEORIES
Theoretical
Derivation
Four structural developmental Western Philosophies
theories (Chapters I-IV) (Kohlberg, 1958)
Historical Philosophical Review Piagetian Theory
(Hopkins, 1974) (Piaget, 1932)
Psychological Theories
(Loevinger 1966; 1969;
Loevinger, et. al. 1970)
Method of
Assessment
Experience Recall Test
2 forms (oral,written)
(Appendix A)
The Moral Judgment Scale
9 Dilemmas ; varied formats
for administration
Sentence Completion Test
Standard Forms for Men,
Women, Girls U Bovs.
Availability
of Scoring
Preliminary S3nnbol Scoring
Manual (Appendix B)
Standard Scoring Manual
(Kohlberg, et.al. 1973)
Scoring Manual for Women and
Girls (Loevinger, et.al. ,1970)
Scoring Manual for Men and
Boys :Pre-publlcation version
(Redmore, et.al.. 1974)
Workshop/ No
Course for
Scoring Available
Yes Yes
RELIABILITY
STUDIES
(l)Temporal
stability
None None Test-retest correlations
(Redmore and Waldman, 1974)
(2)Intemal
Consistency
None None Split-half correlations ;Alpha
coefficients (Re(flnote and Waldman,
1974). Eigan values and coeff-
icient Alpha for principal
component analysis (Loevinger
,
et.al.. 1970)
(3)Intra- None
individual accur-
acy(Standard error
of measurement)
None None
(4) Interrater
Reliability
Sentence-by-Sentence
Presence-Absence >& Stage
assignment percent
agreement (Chapter VI)
Product-movement correlations
(Kohlberg, 1958; Fodor, 1969
;
Fodor,1972;Haan, e^, al
. ,
1968
Keasey, 1971; Ruma and Mosher,
1967; Turiel, 1966)
Interscorer percent agreement
(Haan, et.al. ,1968; Rest,
Turiel and Kohlberg, 1969;
Saltzstein, et.al, 1972)
Percent agreement by items,
Interrate^^ correlation
coefficient. Item inter-
correlations, Percent agree-
ment and correlations for
total protocol ratings
(Loevinger, et.al. ,1970;
Hoppe, 1972; Cox, 1973)
(5) Comparability None
of forms
None None
VALIDITY STUDIES Correlations with ego
(a) Criterion- levels (Chapter VI)
related validity
Political & Social activism Helping behavior compared
compared with stages(Haan, to ego levels (Cox, 1973)
et.al. 1968) Conformity behavior compared
Cheating behavior and helpfulness to ego levels (Hoppe, 1973)
compared with stages Role-taking compared with
(Schwartz. et.al. ,1969) ego levels(Lamb, 1971)
Guilt compared with stages
(Ruma and Mosher, 1967)
Delinquency compared with stages
(Fodor, 1969)
Conformance compared with stages
(Salzstein, 1972)
(b)Construct
Validity (Chapter VI) (Kohlberg, 1967)
Guttioan Scaling Technique Age trends among children in
(Chapter VI) U.S.,Mexico, Taiwan, Turkey
and Yucatan (Kohlberg , 1968)
Quasl-simplex correlation
(Kohlberg, 1958)
ratings (Loevinger, et.al.l970)
Age Distributions on Total
Protocol Ratlngs(Loevinger,et.
,
1970)
Word count correlations with
item ratings and total protocol
Longitudinal(Kohlberg&Kramer,1969) ratings(Loevinger, 1970)
Experimental attempt to induce Correlations with IQ
stage change(Turiel,1966) (Loevinger, et.al. ,1970)
Assessment of Preference and Effects of motivation training
comprehension of stages(Rest, on ego levels(Coor,1970;
,
1969; Rest. 1973) Hidi, 1971)
Fakability of sentence comple-
tion test(Tate, 1970)
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the work on self—knowledge stages is sparse compared to research on moral
resoning development and ego development. However, considering the
relative Infancy of our work (two years compared to 15 years of moral
development research and nine years of ego development research)
,
we seem to be progressing satisfactorily along this checklist of
1
technical criteria. Several characteristics of the ER test and the
self-knowledge stages are already adequate for their eventual Intended
uses in research and education. These characteristics Include the
following:
1. There is a consistent theoretical foundation for the stages
and their characteristics (i.e. the structural-developmental theories).
2. Instructions for each form of the test, oral and written, are
explicit such that the administration of the test is sufficiently
standardized.
3. The administration of the test is not time-consuming, requires
little training, is economical and is relevant to a wide age range;
hence practical.
4. Although the scoring of the test is currently not sufficiently
reliable (between coders), the stage characteristics have been defined
1. In a recent critique of the research on moral reasoning (Kurtines
and Greif, 1974), several problems and omissions in Kohlberg's
approach have been pointed out. These problems include: (1) inconsistencies
in the derivation, administration and scoring of the Moral Judgment
Scale; (2) lack of evidence for the reliability and validity of the test;
and (3) absence of direct evidence for the basic assumptions of the
theory. The work on the ER test seems to have avoided these errors
and inconsistencies th\js far.
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clearly enough to serve as a general guide for identifying the stages.
5. There are preliminary indications of the construct validity of
the stage sequence. Specifically these include correlations with
chronological age and ego level; hierarchical ordering on the Guttman
Scaling Technique; and overall consistency with the theoretically-derived
version of the stages, hypothesized from other developmental theories.
Further work is recommended in the following areas to increase
our confidence in the viability, validity and value of the ER test and
the associated theory of self-knowledge in education.
1. Develop a scoring procedure for Questions B through E on the
ER test.
2. Revise the scoring procedure to increase interrater reliability.
The scoring procedure should also be simplified without sacrificing
objectivity.
3. Conduct reliability estimates for temporal stability of the
instrument, internal consistency, and standard error of measurement.
4. Assess the comparability between the oral form and the written
form of the ER, and between content-specified and open-ended versions
of the ER test.
5. Cross—validate the stage sequence and stage characteristics
using another sample population. Correlations of ER. stage scores with
ego level and with age; and satisfactory scaling on the Guttman tests
are necessary for this cross-validation study.
6. Compare age-stage trends among individuals in various populations
and across' different cultures using the ER test.
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7. Conduct longitudinal studies using the ER test.
8. Use the ER in experimental studies, such as those that involve
inducing changes in an individual's stage scores or assessing comprehen-
sion and preference for thinking that characterizes each stage,
9. Conduct further logical and theoretical analysis for
qualitative differences among stages.
10.
Identify other external variables (behaviors) that seem to
provide a direct measure of self-knowledge stages, and conduct further
criterion-related validity studies using the ER test.
Concluding Discussion
The growing field of psychological education has important implica-
tions for the deliberate development of human beings. Since most of the
present goals of psychological education are not based on a systematic
theoretical and empirical foundation, they are operationally confusing,
difficult to evaluate and questionable in their educational and ethical
value. To solve these problems, we sought, in this study, to lay
theoretical and empirical cornerstones for psychological education goals.
The structural-developmental perspective offers an appropriate
theoretical frame for that grounding. With our confidence staked in
this prospect, we suggested that "self-knowledge" was the common
unifying concern among the courses and goals in psychological education.
Then we created a working definition for the construct, "self-knowledge".
Using this working definition as a guideline, we constructed both the
Experience Recall test and the preliminary scoring methodology.
With the ER test, one can elicit individuals' descriptions of their
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experiences, their value assignments to those experiences and their
explanations of the experiences, i.e* a sample of the theories they
hold about their experiences. The Preliminary Scoring Manual allows
one to identify characteristics of developmental stages in people's
responses on that test in a specific, empirically verifiable and fairly
reliable manner.
Having completed these steps, we may ask, "Are we now any closer to
solving the generic problems of psychological education?" That is, to
what extent does this investigation enable us now to define psychological
education goals that are: (1) operationally clear, (2) more open to
evaluation and assessment, (3) educationally valuable, and (4) ethically
justifiable?
To address these questions, we need to imagine that the self-
knowledge stage characteristics identified in this study were translated
into psychological education goals.
Would the goals be operationally clear? Probably so. The stage
characteristics defined by the Preliminary Scoring Manual have very
specific definitions. These characteristics are observable: Given
virtually any verbal (i.e. oral or written) statement, a person familiar
with the manual can determine whether or not a particular characteristic
described in the scoring manual is evident in that statement. If the
specificity and clarity of these stage characteristics were preserved
\
in translating them into psychological education goals, then one would
expect the goals to also reflect that specificity and clarity.
Compared to present psychological educatinn goals, the goals derived
from our stage characteristics would be less misleading, because there
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would be less confusion about their operational meanings. As a result,
educators would probably be able to derive consistent curriculum
objectives and lesson plans from these operationally clear goals.
Also, assuming that the developmental order of the Identified stage
characteristics is valid, curricular sequencing of psychological
education goals becomes possible for the first time. The sequence of
stages could be used for deciding which goals should precede or follow
which other goals; teachers would have a systematic way to decide
whether a lesson is appropriate for the seven-year old or for the seventeen"
2year old.
Can goals derived from self-knowledge stage characteristics be
assessed? If psychological education goals are derived directly
from the stage characteristics identified in this study, the problem
of assessment or evaluation of the goals would be minimal, because the
Experience Recall test measures the presence of these characteristics.
The administration of the ER is feasible for most classroom purposes
and it is adequately standardized. There is preliminary indication that
the scores on the test are relatively reliable and valid, although more
work is required to Increase its reliability and validity. It appears
that the ER test will eventually enable educators to evaluate their
programs systematically; hence providing them with useful feedback
to improve their effectiveness.
2. An initial attempt to translate the stage characteristics into
curriculum objectives has occurred and is encouraging. The summary report
of this effort is presented in Appendix C.
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Would the goals derived from the stage characteristics be less
questionable than present goals in terms of their educational value? One
way that the educational value of goals can be judged is to ascertain
whether the achievement of the goals is relatively permanent; i.e. Are
the abilities or characteristics retained once they are learned?
By definition, developmental stages and their characteristics are
cumulative and irreversible. Theoretically, once they are acquired,
it is difficult to lose or "forget" these stage-related characteristics
or abilities. Thus, characteristics or abilities that are developmental
in nature would constitute worthy educational goals. In this study, we
have identified several stages and their characteristics, which appear
to be developmental according to preliminary validity indicators. If
psychological education goals were derived from these developmental
characteristics, then it is likely that the goals themselves would
be developmental in nature. And therefore, aiming for these goals
would probably be educationally valuable: Achieving them would probably
consistute relatively permanent and stable learnings. This would be a
major improvement over present psychological education goals which
largely involve characteristics that are transient and not retainable
(See Chapter I)
.
Another way to judge the educational value of goals is to examine
what actual behavioral difference the achievement of the goals make.
Do certain stage characteristics of self-knowledge enable individuals
to engage in more self—enhancing rather than self-destructive behaviors,
to cope with stress situations more adequately or to solve problems
more effectively? If so, these desirable behavioral by-products may
187
substantiate the educational value of goals that were derived from
self-knowledge stage characteristics. At present however, this
criterion-related validity research has not been completed. Thus, it is
not known what actual behaviors people with particular self-knowledge
characteristics would be able to perform.
Would the goals be ethically justifiable? In this study, we have
avoided judgments about the relative worth of the self-knowledge
stage characteristics. There is a tendency to see the higher stages
as "better" than the earlier stages. This is a distortion. Although
the stage sequence was assumed to be an order of increasing complexity,
comprehensiveness and adequacy, this does not imply that it is an
order of increasing worthiness or value. At this point the stage
characteristics and their order are intended to be descriptive only,
and are not meant to contain other prescriptive values. The function of
education in expanding a given stage or fostering stage advancement
must be determined by democratic debate based on more empirical evidence.
Let us return to the general question, "Are we any closer to solving
the generic problems of psychological education?" From our present
perspective, the answer seems to be yes. Thus far, the structural-devel-
opmental perspective has been fruitful in providing a theoretical and
empirical base for psychological education. With further work on this
base, the goals derived from the self-knowledge stages promise to be
operationally clear, assesslble, educationally worthy and ethically
viable. In time, these goals may transform psychological education
into a prime catalyst for developing and nurturing human beings toward
188
clarified ideals that we now describe vaguely as "fully Integrated,
supremely healthy, ultimately capable persons."
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(For 3rd, 4th & 5th graders in school settings)
Go to the classroom personally and pick up the child. Talk with the
child while walking to test site. Talk about self or child; establish common
connection or base: e.g. "I used to be a teacher of 3rd graders." or "I am
a student also." "Nice day for playing outside..." Interviewer should have
an attitude of AUTHENTIC CURIOSITY about the child. Ask and talk about favorite
after-school activities, favorite school subjects, sports, etc.)
INSTRUCTIONS
(SEAT CHILD)
We're working on a project trying to find out hew different people think
about themselves. And so we're asking different age people to help us out
—
like we're talking with some kids and some grown-ups. We picked you because
we're really curious to know how kids like you, think about yourself. I'd
like you to help me by answering some questions I have about some things you
remember. (PAUSE FOR THE CHILD'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT) Just to make it fair, you can
ask me anything you want to after I'm finished, (PAUSE FOR THE CHILD'S
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT)
First, I'll ask you to close your eyes and I'll talk to you to help you
remember., Then I'll ask you to open your eyes to answer some questions. I'm
gonna use a tape recorder, so I can listen to you and not have to write
everything down. Are there any questions before we begin?
For the first part of this Interview, it's best if you get in a comfortabl<
and relaxed position in your seat. You might want to sit or lie on the floor.
Go ahead and get as comfortable and relaxed as you can. Okay? Close your eyes.
Let your whole body relax, from your head to your toes (5). Take a couple of
deep breaths, breathing out any tightness (8). Now breathe normally (5). Notlc<
your thoughts for a minute (6). And now let them go (2).
Now I want you to follow my voice and begin to picture yourself and the
things that happened in your life. I'm going to ask you to think back and
remember your life and your experiences. I'll ask you to remember what you
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did and remember the things that happened to you....We'll start with yesterday
and we'll go back as far as you can recall (2). First, picture yourself yesterday (!'
(allow for child's acknowledgement during each ten second pause) Last Saturday (10).
Last summer (OR NAME A SEASON) (10) When you were in the second grade (10). When
you were in kindergarten (10). And when you were a little boy/girl (10).
I want you to find one thing that happened in your life, something you
won't every forget; some experience that is somehow important to you (10).
There might be several of these times that you can think of, but pick one
that you could think about now (20).
Now, I want you to remember that experience as much as you can. First
picture the place where you were. What did it look like, and who was there? (8)
(ALLOW FOR CHILD'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT DURING EACH PAUSE) Can you picture what
you looked like, like how big you were, and what you were wearing? (8) Now,
see if you can remember exactly what happened. What did you do and say? What
did other people do and say? (10) Can you remember any of your thoughts, or
what you were saying to yourself? (8) What were you feeling then? (8) What
do you imagine the other people were feeling and thinking (8). Can you remember
what led up to this experience? (8) And what happened because of all that? (8)
Go ahead and finish the scene/event in your mind. Take your time (3) and
when you are ready, at your own pace, you may come back to this room and open
your eyes
,
Now, I'll ask you some questions and I'd like you to answer them as
fully as you can. Take as much time as you need to, and I will not ask
another question until you tell me that you are finished. This is the part
I'll tape. (TURN ON THE TAPE RECORDER)
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1. First, could you tell me as much as you can about what you just remembered?
PROBE: IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WANT TO SAY ABOUT WHAT YOU REMEMBERED?
2. When this happened, was it special or Important to you, then? Could you
tell me how?
3. Now that you're thinking about it, how is it special to you now?
4. Now that you've thought about it, does this remind you of some things
you know about yourself ? Could you tell me?
PROBE: ARE THERE SOME THINGS YOU KNOW ABOUT YOURSELF THAT YOU COULD TELL ME?
5. Does knowing this help you out in anyway?
PROBE: DOES IT HELP YOU GET ANYTHING YOU WANT? OR ANYTHING YOU DON'T WANT?
ALTERNATE QUESTION TO #5
Did that time you remembered help you out in anyway?
PROBE: DID IT HELP YOU GET ANYTHING YOU WANT? OR ANYTHING YOU DIDN'T WANT?
UMFORGETABLE £XPERIENCE RECALL
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The following instructions are to be read aloud to an individual or in
a group setting. The numbers in brackets following some of the sentences and phrases
indicate the number of seconds the reader should wait before reading the next
sentence. The written answer sheets should be handed out before the instructions
are given.
INSTRUCTIONS
We are involved in a project which is trying to find out how different
people know about themselves. There are two parts to this exercise. First, I
will have you close your eyes and help you remember an important experience in
your life. Then, I'll ask you to open your eyes and answer some questions.
The questions you have in front of you are the only ones we want you to answer.
Read it over, so you'll know what they are, and so you understand them. Your
answers will be kept in strict confidence and no one except the project staff
will see your responses with your name on it. Are there any questions before
we begin?
For the first part of this exercise it is best if you get in a comfortable
and relaxed position in your seat. You might want to sit or lie on the floor.
Go ahead and get as comfortable and relaxed as you can. Okay? Close your
eyes and let your whole body relax, from your head to your toes (5) . Take a
couple of deep breaths, breathing out any tension (8). Now breathe normally (5).
Notice your thoughts for a minute (6). And now let them go (2).
Now, I want you to follow my voice and begin to picture yourself and the
things that happened in your life. I am going to ask you to think back and remember
your life and your experiences. I'll ask you to remember what you did and remember
the things that happened to you. We'll start with yesterday and we'll go back
as far as you can recall (2). First, can you remember anything important about
yourself yesterday (12), last week (10), last month (10), last year (10),
three years ago (10), when you were in high school (10), when you were in junior
'ligh school (10), when you were in elementary school, when you were a young
child ( 10 ).
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I want you to find an experience or an event in your life that stands
out in your mind, an experience that is somehow important to you. It might
be something you will always remember, something you won't ever forget (10).
There might be several of these experiences that you can think of, but pick one
that you could think about now (20).
Now, I want you to remember that experience as much as you can. First,
picture the place where you were. VIhat did it look like, and who was there (10).
Can you picture what you looked like (5). Now, see if you can remember
exactly what happened. What did you do and say. What did other people do and
say? (10) See if you can remember any of your thoughts, or what you were
saying to yourself (10) . What were you feeling then (10) . What do you Imagine
other people were feeling and thinking (10). Can you remember what led up to
this experience? (10) And what happened as a result of this experience (10)
.
Go ahead and finish the scene /event in your mind. Take your time (3) and
when you are ready, at your own pace, come back to this room and open your eyes.
The next part is the written section. Take as much time as you need to
answer all of the questions. If you need more space you may write on the
backs of the pages.
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Written Response Form
Included here is the current written form of the Experience Recall
test (9/74). It is printed on three pages with a space for the
subject’s name at the top of the second and third pages. Question A
is printed on the first page, Questions B, C, and D are printed on
the second page and Question E and F are printed on the third page.
* * *
Name:
(please print)
Sex:
Age:
Unforgetable Experience Recall
A, Describe as fully as you can, and in as much detail, the experience
you remembered. (Please Include what led up to this experience, what
your thoughts and feelings were and what the results of this experience
were.
)
B. How was the experience important or special to you then ?
C. How is the experience important or special to you now ?
D. From the experience you just remembered, please describe some
things you know about yourself now?
E. How could knowing this about yourself be useful to you? Specifically,
how can it help you get what you want or avoid what you don’t want?
F. Do you have any comments about what it was like answering these
questions?
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THE PRELIMINARY SYMBOL SCORING MANUAL
FOR QUESTION "A" ON
THE EXPERIENCE RECALL TEST
A. INTRODUCTION
This Is a manual for scoring responses to Question A (Form 9-74)
on the Experience Recall Test:
Describe as fully as you can, and in as
much detail, the experience you remembered.
(Please indicate what led up to this experience,
what your thoughts and feelings were and what the
results of this experience were.)
The manual was constructed using the responses to this question
by 72 respondents on both the oral and the written forms of the
Experience Recall Test. Although there are slight variations among
the questions on the various forms, the essential similarity among
them is our case for treating them as the same question. This
preliminary manual has not been cross-validated.
Section A of this manual describes in general how the manual
should be used and Section B outlines the format for diagramming the
responses onto scoring sheets; Section C details the symbols which
are the categories for scoring the responses. In Section C,
definitions and examples are given for each symbol. "Coded" examples
are sentences which exemplify the use of the particular symbol being
discussed. "Not Coded" examples are sentences that show when the
symbol should not be used. Examples which minimally meet the definition
for using the discussed symbol are indicated as "Borderline."
The examples are verbatim excerpts from actual protocols. Mis-
spellings and Incorrect grammar are' faithfully preserved. Since
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these examples are quoted out of context of the total responses,
their Interpreted meanings may not be obvious to the reader who is
not familiar with the protocols from which these examples are taken.
Nevertheless, the examples do Illustrate the criteria for scoring
responses with the symbols.
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B. general rules for scoring and use of the symbol manual
1 . The sentence Is the unit of scoring
Analyze and score a protocol by examining each sentence
Individually. Although an Individual word or phrase may give a strong
Indication that a certain symbol should be used, the usage of that
word or phrase In the context of the whole sentence Is the criterion
for deciding how to score the word or phrase. When the meaning of a
word or phrase Is ambiguous within a sentence, It may be necessary
to examine other sentences In the protocol to arrive at a clearer
definition of what the person means. In most situations, however,
the sentence-unit offers enough Information to score according to
the manual.
The sentence-unit Is defined as In conventional English grammar;
the unit of (written) thought Including a complete subject and
predicate, usually visually distinguishable from each other by
terminating punctuation marks (period, question mark, or exclamation
point). There are, of course, some subjects who respond In non-
standard English or In stream-of-consclousness formats In which
sentences are not distinguishable In the conventional manner. In
these cases the scorers should use their own judgments In Identifying
the sentence-units.
A few symbols (See S.18A, 18B, 18C, S.35) are exceptions to Rule 1.
In these cases several sentence—units are considered In relationship
to each other. See descriptions of these symbols for details.
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2. Score every sentence
Even though some sentences may appear irrelevant to the questions
asked» these sentences should be scored. Some sentences are very
cryptic—in these cases, scorers should use their judgment in inter-
preting the sentence to the degree the statement makes enough sense
to score according to symbols in the manual. The interpretation of
one scorer should be verified by an Independent interpretation by
another scorer. Disagreement between scorers can be resolved by
discussion, or by appeal to a third scorer's interpretation.
Only after all conceivable attempts to make meaning out of
cryptic statements have failed (there were no examples of this among
protocols used in constructing this manual) is the sentence not scored.
3. Stick to the level of the subject's conscious meanings
This means that raters should deal with exactly what the subject
says, or appears to mean to say, in a sentence. Do not postulate
unconscious motivations, drives, needs, etc., in scoring a sentence;
rather Interpret statements only to the degree that the subjects
would (probably) still recognize the interpretations as what they meant.
Score for the relationships between and among self, others, and
environment, which appear to be what the subjects are conscious of.
There is a tendency to identify certain words with certain
symbols. But this can be misleading. The symbols are Intended to
represent what the subject consciously meant, which may not be a
one-to-one association with particular words. For example, in
the statement, "I felt like fully things were happening inside my
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stomach," felt like appears to be a phrase describing emotions,
denoted by symbol S.9B. However, In this statement felt like means
"perceived," or "was aware of," and this Is denoted by symbol S.6B.
Intellectual or technical jargon, and dialect differences In
the language make tasks involved in this rule difficult, since
jargon and special dialect uses tend to veil meanings even for experi-
enced and perceptive coders. Hence, this rule tends to be more a
guideline than an inviolable law.
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C. RULES FOR DIAGRAMMING SENTENCES AND RECORDING RATINGS
D-1 Diagram each sentence on a separate line
Following our ground rule that the sentence is the unit of
scoring, distinguish and numerate each separate sentence in the
protocol response. That is, the first sentence in the response is
#1, the second #2, the third #3, the fourth #4 and so forth. On
the scoring sheet, line should represent the diagram of sentence
#1, line #2 should represent sentence #2, and so forth.
The symbols and configurations representing the various parts
of a given sentence should all be diagrammed on one line. In other
words, the diagram on one line should be complete enough such that
the elements and relationships Involved in the (original) sentence
can be re-created or re-stated (by reading the definitions of the
symbols in that line). Several symbols, specifically S.18A, B, C
and S.35 are exceptions to this guideline, in that they Involve
references to sentences other than Just the one in question. See
the descriptions of these symbols for further clarification. Another
exception is when explicit contrasting, causal, contingent or other
relationship is made from one sentence to the next. In these cases,
the diagrams in the two lines (representing the two sentences) are
linked by the symbol showing the relationship described (by the
subject) between the two sentences.
S.2 Diagram symbols in a left-to-right order
For a given sentence, place symbols on the scoring sheet (line)
in a left-to-rlght order in a sequence corresponding to the order
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in which the parts of the sentence are stated. That is, the first
thing mentioned in the sentence should be the first symbol on the
line (at the left)
,
the second thing mentioned should be the next
symbol to the right, and so forth. In general, do not change the
sequence of the sentence parts into another order in the diagram.
For example, note the following sentence: "Before I went out to
play, I had to do the dishes." In this sentence the temporal (time)
order of events is reversed; l.e. in actuality "I had to do the
dishes" occured first, and "I went out to play" occurred later in
time. In diagramming this sentence, however, the symbols should
reflect the order of the person's expression, not the order of
events. Thus, "before I went out to play" is diagrammed first, and
"I had to do the dishes" is diagrammed to the right of the first
diagram.
The exception to this rule is when a sentence needs to be
interpreted or restated by the scorer to diagram an otherwise cryptic
or fragmentary sentence. Another exception is when the actual sentence
sequence, syntax or grammar obscures the meanings (of relationships
and connections) which the subject seems to be making, (of course, in
both cases, the diagram would reflect the order of the sentence in
its interpreted form rather than its original form. This suggests
that scorers should be conscientious about making interpretations
which remain as faithful as possible to what the subject seems to
mean. (Often Individual scorers Interpret a given sentence in different
ways, and these differences can only be settled by compromise, by
discussion, or by an arbitrary decision.) The necessity of making
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interpretations in order to diagram a sentence occurs to some degree
in practically every sentence, some minimally, others to a greater
degree. Thus, there tends to be less correspondence between the order
of expression (in the original sentence) and the left-to-rlght inter-
pretation is Involved.
D.3 Elemental symbols and relational symbols
Some symbols in the manual are defined in a manner such that
they carry meaning when they are diagrammed alone (e.g. S.l, S.2,
S.3, S.4, etc.). We shall call these elemental symbols . Other symbols
carry meaning only when they are diagrammed in conjunction with other
symbols; they cannot be diagrammed alone, because they denote
relationships (the connnections) between one or more descriptions.
These symbols (e.g. S.7, S.5, S.16, S.25, etc.) are called relational
symbols
.
(In one sense, every symbol denotes a relationship
described by the subject. The distinction is made here only to
clarify the format for diagramming a statement.)
D.3a: When more than one relational symbol is required to represent
the description of one elemental referent, and the elemental
referent is not repeated in the sentence, all of the relational
symbols are diagrammed from the same elemental symbol. For
example, note the following example:
"We sat down at the bar and had a beer."
In this case "we" is the elemental referent and scored S.4. Two
relational descriptions ([1] "sat down at the bar," and [2] "had
a beer.") describe the elemental referent we, by S.5. Hence
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the diagram of this sentence Is: yy
The elemental symbol S.4 is not repeated, i.e. the statement
should not be diagrammed: (Q} ^ (Q) Z\ .
D.3b: When elemental symbols are used to denote more than a simple
reference to the subject, e.g. in denoting physical condition,
vital statistics, etc.), the elemental symbol should be
diagrammed as many times as there are discrete descriptions
in the statement. For example, "I was eight and living in New
York." is scored by two separate elemental symbols S.l
denoting vital statistics as follows: 0,0 . Also when
both an elemental symbol denoting physical condition, vital
statistic or other definition, and a relational symbol are
required to represent a statement, the elemental symbol should
be diagrammed a second time, third time, etc. For example:
"I was sick and knew I probably wouldn't be able to go."
The symbol S.l represents "I was sick," S.6B represents
"knew" and S.7 and S.5 represent "I probably wouldn't be able
to go." The elemental symbol S.l referring to "I" must be
diagrammed three times to accurately represent the statement
as follows: O, . The statement should not
be diagrammed in the following ways
7
D.3c: Often, following rule D.3a may result in confusing or otherwise
ambiguous diagram. In these cases, the scorer may choose to
repeat a diagram of an elemental symbol, even though the
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elemental referent is not repeated in the statement. This may be
done for the sake of visual clarity; i.e. so that a diagram can be
read to accurately represent meaning of the statement.
D.4 Parenthesis
The parenthesis is used to group symbols together. Its function is
to set off symbols which are related to each other in one part of the
sentence from symbols in other parts of the sentence. Parenthesis are
always used in the following instances:
1. When S.8 is used, they set off the results described.
2. When S.13 is used, they set off the content of the
communication
.
3. When S.25 is used, they set off both parts of the relationship.
4. When S.6A, B or C are used, they set off S.l, 2 or 4 from the
content of thought.
The parenthesis create visual clarity and thus resolve ambiguity in
diagramming. For example, if parenthesis are not used the sentence, "I
was in kindergarten at the time, but was not going because I was sick,"
the diagram would appear as: 0
^
0^^ O. in this diagram, one cannot
be sure if the causality arrow is related only to the symbol immediately
preceding it, or if it refers to both sumbols preceding it. When am-
biguity can be clarified by use of the parenthesis, they should be used.
Coded:
0210305 (d) "But I got better earlier than expected and my mother
told the teacher to come by anyway, the day of the picnic
to see if I felt alright to go, providing the doctor
said it was o.k."
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0341021 (A) "The next thing I knew was that I was in a car on
the way to the hospital."
cr^(o.o^)
0341016 (2) "I went across the street to my neighbors house
because their daughter had just graduated from college.
0210305 (A) "We had a picnic planned for about this time of year
and I had known about it for a long while."
0411110 (2) "Both times I had my baby I had some nice people in
with me."
(>^,Co,a)
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D. definitions of symbols and criteria for scoring
s.l The Self Q-9 O-C >-> Q-cr^
This symbol, a circle, is used in conjunction with other relational
symbols to denote any reference to the self. For example, any mention
of "I," "me," "my" or "mine" is scored using S.l.
S.IA The Physical Self CoJ
This symbol is used when self (the "l") is described in terms of a
state of being usually physical or physiological. This can be in terms
1. ¥ital statistics (age, geographical location, race, sex, grade);
except vital statistics describing one's role (see S.l-B and
S.22B, S.22C).
2. Specific parts of the body (my arm, leg); when S.l is used in
these cases, it denotes the personal possessive "my" as well,
as thus, S.43 is not used in conjunction with S.l.
3. Descriptions of states of being in terms of location, l.e.,
environment (laying across the bed, I was on vacation, I
stayed there, I got there).
4. Simple physiological conditions; or conditions of health such
as "I was sick," "l was okay." When description of physlolo-
logical conditions are more differentiated than these general
terms, see S.9 and S.39.
Coded :
0210515 (4/5) " I did wear glasses and I did not have "dates."
Coyco^)
0341012 (3) "I was on a baseball team"
(4/3) "I have one child every year and I lived here and
there. . ."
0410001
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0210210 (3/4) "My opponent being white and me being black ."
‘
03 >&+<0)
0210305 (A) "I got better..."
o
0210303 (3) "I ruined my arm ."
0341024 (4) "We were on vacation in Cape Cod.
0210404 (3/4) "...he meant I was having a nervous breakdown ."
(o)
0410011 (4) "I talked to him one time like when I was pregnant
you know any my mother knew It."
0210404 (3/4) "I was beginning to feel numbness In my hands and
feet ."
Co),
0210404 (3/4) "I thought It was genetic and couldn't be helped."
(Xo)r^
0210404 (3/4) "I was paralyzed from the waist down and couldn't
believe It."
(OjfZD
Borderline;
0210513 (3/4) "I had no Idea what a "negra" was but I was very
hurt and sick that my friend couldn't play with me.
(0tE)>K(D,0>-^Qho))
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0210404 (3/4) "I had always been pleased and worked at being
limber and graceful . . .
"
(a^r^O.O)
Not Coded ;
0210A04 (3/4) "What saved me emotionally was the fact that It
was reversible."
0341019 i'i/Z) "because I was homesick and frightened."
Ejcpla: homesick Is scored S.9.
S.IB Own Role Q
This symbol Is used when the subject defines self using a con-
ventional naming of his/her role where the Implications of that role
are not expllxit such as; mother, student, child, sophomore, housemother,
had a teaching job (When the Individual describes the role use S.22B
or S.22C).
Coded :
0210301 (6) "When I was In high school — a sophmore."
0,0'f'
0210404 (3/4) "We were both art students ."
ot
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Not Coded ;
0410011 (4) "...but that was Important to him "cause I was his
daughter."
Expla: I was his daughter is coded S.43.
(
0210504 (4/5) "I became very Involved in the research."
See. S - 5 t ^CnL^A
0341014 (3/4) "He took me
,
got the other kid and we went to the
office."
0410011 (4) "I guess they'd never believe that we were his
daughters
,
they thought we were his girlfriends ."
CTt( QX(^)
0210504 (4/5) "I was married at the time."
(O)
S.2 Others Q
This symbol is used whenever reference is made to other people
(both in the singular and the plural) . If the other person is men-
tioned Implicitly in a "we," see S.4. When S.22 is used S.2 is always
used as well.
This symbol is used for persons, other than the subject who are
mentioned with proper nouns, third person pronouns, as roles, or as
generalized "everyone."
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Coded '
0210303 (3) "I had been telling everyone all year."
CX
I I
0210515 (4/5) "...somehow the depth of friendship I needed was
not to be found."
0210208 (4) "We met each other on the sidewalk."
Expla: each other is Interpreted as "he and I".
0210201 (4) "I stood up in back and can see the show from start
to finish, Cilia's dancing, June Chris, Joe ail those
slowly falling at the end."
O-X
,
L'X ( D, U , 111)—
^
Not Coded .’
0210504 4/5 "I qijoted Eriksons golden rule in the light of new
insight, Mcluhan (Global Village), Mead and others .
cy~(
)
^
S . 2A ghyeical Pescrlption of Others C Cj)
S.2B Others' Role (t]
The definition of S.2A is identical to that of S.IA, except that
S.2A denotes references to others' physical state, whereas S.IA refers
to onefe own physical state.
Similarly, S.2B is defined like S.IB, except that S.2B refers to
others' roles and S.IB refers to one's own role.
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S.3 Concrete Oblects A
This symbol represents a concrete object (or set of objects) or
activities that is acted upon by a person (the respondent or other
persons). Objects or activities ("party," "table," "cars," etc.) are
frequently named in the responses but only those which are explicitly
acted upon (thought about; or felt about) are scored in conjunction
with S.5; S.6 and S.9. They are not scored when they are parts of prep-
ositional phrases such as "to practice" or "at the bar." Nor are they
scored when the action is directed toward or the object, but not
upon the object (e.g., "to the beach," "come home" are not scored with
S.3). Objects which are named as possessions (See S.43) are also scored
using S.3.
Coded ;
0410804 (2) "They gave me a surprize party ."
0341016 (2) "We sat down at the bar and had another beer ."
0341024 (4) "My father who was driving had pointed out to us many
car accidents that had occured on this highway."
03/3) "I buy my own. ..and have a happy life."
6^ ,©
0410001
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Not Coded :
0241110 (3/4) "I always resented him for this because I never
could understand why people made such a big thing
over skin color ."
0341010 (3/4) "I knew there was something wrong."
Expla: there was something Is scored S.20.
0210211 (4) "I don't exactly remember the cause, but I think It
was a spanking."
Expla: the cause Is coded S.8.
0210502 (4) '1 began to defend my position with argument going on
and on."
Expla: my position Is coded S.39B".
o-c)—? ) cx—
^
0411205 (3/4) "Then in *69 I got pregnant and I came back home..."
0->
0210301 CA) "I recall the confusion in going to practice."
Expla: practice is not scored S.3.
crK<sP^)
S.3A Object Description (4l)
The definition for S.IA also applies to the definition for S.3A,
except that the physical characteristics of an object or activity (rather
than oneself) Is being described.
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Coded
;
0411202 (3) "That was a lovely place."
(A)
S.4 We /Us O
This symbol denotes references where self Is Included with others
(i.e., "we" or "us") in common or parallel action (or thought). The
symbol also refers to people mentioned "together," or "we both". When
self in Included among others but named separately (e.g., "my brother
and I"), S.4 is not used (See S.IO), unless the action (or thought) are
done jointly or commonly, (e.g., "my brother and I thought"). Also,
when the actions involving "we" or "us" involve interactions, i.e.,
actions done upon each other, S.4 is not used, (See S.22A).
Coded i
0410011 (4) "I remember one time when we were younger , he called
up on the phone."
0X©; o~<
0210208 (4) "...and when she saw our heads..."
Expla: our heads is Interpreted as us .
D~->©
0410011 (4) "Last June, right, me and my sister we went to a
concert.
Expla: me and my sister is coded S.4.
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S.4A
0341006 (3) "my twin brother and I than thought why not, let's
enter.
Expla: my twin brother and I are coded S.4B.
—((Q)
0341001 (3) "We managed to have a great time, just because we
were together *"
Hot Coded ;
0411110 (2) "...I had some nice people in with me."
(o, o;
0210404 (3/4) "We each had our own rooms for privacy, personal
tastes and entertainment of friends."
Co. a}ph
‘ S—f))
0210208 (A) "We both happened to have 15 cents with us..."
Expla: Interpreted we each
Co,
0341016 (2) "So two carloads of^ people were in front of us."
0411207 (3) "He brought her home and there I was with the two of
them him with..."
Expla: I with two of them is scored S.IO.
O-tO, (0,0)
Physical Description of "We"
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S . 4B "Our" role ©
The definition of S.4A is identical to that of S.IA, except that
S.4A denotes reference to "our" physical state, whereas S.IA refers to
one's own physical state.
Similarly, S.4B is defined like S.IB, except that S.4B refers to
the role of the first person plural ("our"), and S.IB refers to one's
own role.
S . 5A Action O T’O ^
This symbol (the arrow) denotes a description of an action, deed
or behavior. It represents the predicate phrase or verb phrase in
conventional English grammar. This symbol denotes those verbs which
imply overt, observable behaviors on the part of the subject. Descrip-
tions of acting, doing or behaving are scored S.5-A, some intransitive
verbs are scored S.5-A, when these verbs do not imply physical or
emotional states of being (see S.l A,B,C).
This symbol is superceded by several other symbols which denote
specific types of actions. These symbols are S.6 A,B,C for some mental
actions, S.9A,B,C,D,E for emotional actions, S.13 for communicated
action S.22 A,B,C for mutual action. See definitions for these symbols.
The symbol S.5A should not be used unless these other symbols do not
apply, and the statement fits the description above. Note that
specific other types of actions, deeds or behaviors are scored by
S.5B,C,D and S.5E.
The symbol, S.5A denotes the entire verb phrase, including all of
its prepositional phrases (with exceptions noted below) . This means
T2.
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that prepositional phrases such as "toward..." "upon..." "to the..."
are scored as part of S.5A. Contents of these prepositional phrases
are not diagrammed separately. They are considered as descriptors
of the action described. The exception to this rule is when the
prepositional phrase describes a relationship which can be diagrammed
by any of the other symbols in this manual. Note especially preposi-
tional phrases Involving references to "I"/"me" or other personal
(self or others) as Indirect objects (see S.5E).
Coded;
0210404 (3/4) "I had always been pleased and worked at being
limber and graceful..."
&-4(pP)
0410809 (3) "I avoid them."
0->D
0210502 (4) "I could not keep my mind on my duties, studies, or
work—I began making errors in judgement and
treatments ."
A; A);
0210305 ( ) "We used to get picked up for school by the head
person (man) in his Volkswagen bus .
"
Expla: This statement is interpreted as if it were stated in
the active voice and hence diagrammed as follows:
0210404 (3/4) "I started falling down , experiencing cramping of
whole body, could not run , got panicy at the sight
of staircases, cried alot, felt sorry for myself and
tried to snap myself out of it by babying myself ,
playing games ."
0~y o
,
d+-7. (0,0^;,
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0210211 (4) "I think I had done this once or twice before and It
had worked then."
Cr^C^^)rr,TT, ^
Not Coded ^
0411207 (3) "l just try and go back and put the pieces together.."
Expla: To go back, put the pieces together are coded S.6B,C.
0210515 (4/5) "I resolved that this was not necessarily true and
saved a little comer of myself."
CrK^l &
0410906 0^3) "I kept waiting all day long for someone to come and
noone came."
egc i^)
S.5B Emotional Impact Q Q
S.5B differs from S.5A In that the arrow goes from the external
to the Internal of the elemental symbol rather than from the external
to the external.
S.5B denotes action upon one person (usually the subject) done by
some other explicitly named person, thing, or event which has an In-
ternal or emotional Impact on that person.
Coded
:
0210505(5) "More a desire not to run from what I really felt."
24 -
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0210404 (3/4) 't was losing my ambition and sleeping often."
0210404 (3/4) "What saved me emotionally was the fact that it was
reversible."
0210211 (4) "Obviously, I was trying to get my mother to come in
and comfort me but nobody came."
Not Coded ;
0341006 (3) "This to my brother and I was great!"
S.5C Possession C' ^^
This symbol denotes material ownership or availability. "Have"
and other words Implying ownership are scored S.5C. For example "I
had another beer" would be considered as "I drank another beer "
(See S.5).
Also other meanings of "had" are scored with their respective
symbols (e.g., "I had an ided' = S.6; "I had a toothache" “ S.l; "I had
a funny feeling" = S.9, etc.). Use of personal possessive pronouns are
not scored S.5C (see S.43).
Coded .'
0411202 (3) "I had six rooms."
o^A
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0210101 (A/3) "And I dldn*t have any tissues and I was nervous
about getting the jacket all dirty."
0411202 (3) "I had a young son."
Not Coded ;
0341016 (2) "l had another be-:-r."
Expla: had is interpreted to mean drank .
o-^
0210504 (4/5) "I was married at the time, had a teaching 1ob in a
small lunior college, and in far better circum-
stances than I am today."
Expla: had a teaching job is coded S.IB.
(o;
S.5D Continuing Involvement
This symbol denotes the notion of "experiencing," in the sense of
personally involving oneself in or participating in an action, event or
an on-going (continued) action or event. The personal involvement
suggests that one is both acting in and acted upon (or affected by) in
the situation described. That is, it is indefinite whether one is
subject (active) or object (passive) in the situation described—often
both are implied. A word or phrase is scored S.5D, when it refers to
this kind of personal Involvement. For example, "I experienced
Gestalt...," "I became Involved in the research." "I endured living ."
are scored S.5D.
If there is not implication or direct personal involvement in the
situation, or the involvement is described in a manner suggesting
the person is the actor (agent or subject) or an action, or condition,
S.5D is not used (see S.7; S.5A,B).
Coded ;
0210505 (5) "A desire to 'ommlt myself positively to those I can
0210502 (4) "However, I knew I could not endure living the life of
0210303 (3) "Well, I had a bit, of emotional trauma to go through ."
0210502 (4) "When I talked to my husband on the phone he claimed to
understand and love ind yet, still at certain moments,
that quaking fear of losing it all again—I can't go
through that pain a second time and I am so afraid.
the past three weeks for a whole year.
0210504 (4/5) "I became very involved in the research."
be experiencing the same kinds of discomfort and non-
interest."
0 ) ))
0210713 (6) "It was a "high" experience that lasted for months and
months, and which X still experience to a certain
extent."
27
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Not Coded
;
0210713 (6) "Up to that time, I had had a poor concept of myself,
although it had been improving slightly through the
previous few years.
S . 5E Indirect Action Q
—
(o)
—
This symbol denotes that a verb phrase Includes an Indirect object
(as defined in conventional English grammar). The "Indirect object" is
the grammatical object (in a statement) Indirectly affected by the
action (S.5A) of a verb, for example me in "he gave me some roses."
and us in "friends gave us a drink." A statement must qualify to be
scored with S.5A and a direct object (usually S.3, S.2, S.l or S.4)
before S.5E is considered. The Indirect object of the statement is
diagrammed within the parentheses of this symbol. Note that this
diagramming can be distinguished from S.13, in which content of a
communication is diagrammed in parentheses outside the symbol itself.
This symbol should not be used in most cases when prepositional
phrases describe, qualify, modify or clarify the action denoted by the
verb, see S.5A. A guideline is that indirect objects are usually a
reference to a person (self or others) and not an object or place (i.e.,
location or setting)
.
Coded ;
0341017 (3) "He gave me some red roses."
CH<0»Z\
28 -
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0341002 (3) "...he didn't give me a straw."
D-Ko)-^A
0341014 (3/4) "He picked up a stone and threw it at me."
Ct=(o)^
0341106 (3/4) "Friends came in and gave me a drink or a coke and
rapped for a while then left again."
0=^0)-?A, A,
0210515 (4/5) "I remember my mother saying (by way of comfort)
was that in a year or so they would buy me contact
lens."
Not Coded .
0341024 (4) "My father who was driving had pointed out to us
many car accidents that had occurred on this highway."
0341014 (3/4) "After awhile my father came and took me home."
0410809 (3) "I took him to court."
(>->
0341017 (3) "Finally he brought me home and came in."
0210404 (3/4) "I was extremely upset and expected to be taken to
mental health."
29 -
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S . 6B Thoughts IZT^
This symbol denotes "thinking" in the sense of bringing something
to mind or having something in mind. "Thinking" or thought defined In
the following ways are all scored S.6B:
1, to intend, plan (including to decide, to refuse)
2, to believe (e.g., "it seemed to me, "I guess...") or to regard
as (e.g., "I thought it unfair.")
3. to remember or call to mlrJ; ro recall
4. to expect, look forward to, or anticipate
When the word "think" (or thought) or other words (or phrases) are
used to mean any of the above meanings, score it S.6B. Other concepts
scored S.6B include the following:
1. know, in the sense of apprehending with certainty
2- want or need when it is neither a physiological need (see S.7)
nor a social or personal Imperative ("should's", see. S.37)
3. find out; or "learn," when it means gaining mastery of a skill
or gaining knowledge (apprehension) especially through books
or facts, (see S.6C for other definitions of "learn.")
4. to wonder, ponder, reflect, meditate or dream
5- to try, or put an effort into
6. to perceive, or sense (e.g., "I had an inkling."...."! could'
sense the agony in him)
7. to think, in the sense of, "to say to oneself"
Symbol S.6B should not be used for emotions, feelings or sensations
(e.g., "my mother has never forgiven me.") See S.9 and S.IA.
Coded:
0210305 (ti) "l fiilly expected the doctor to say I could go."
0210305 (/i) "We had a picnic planned for about this time of year
and I had known about it for a while."
(Ch^yp^
0210301 (£i) "I remember wishing I had never known her."
Expla: remember, wishing and known are coded S.6B
(PpCTp})
0341002 (3) "I learned ^ lot about him and he learned ^ lot
about me."
0210211 (4) "Obviously, I was trying to get my mother to come in
and comfort me but nobody came."
0210515 (4/5) "Whatever happens I still like myself," was another
thought later in that tearful night."
0210301 (A) "I thought how phoney that was a coach has to be
interested and ..."
0341006 (3) "My twin brother and I then thought why not, let's
ente£.
"
0411110 (2) "I thought this was impossible."
OP A-)
31 -
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Borderline :
0210306 (3/4) "I remembered dreaming that day of how I hoped It
would answer all my dreams .
"
0341017 (3) "I was beginning to wonder If we were ever going to
leave."
Not Coded :
0210502 (4) "About two weeks after our separation I came to the
conclusion that I was Into a situation I hated and
resented."
Expla: I came to the conclusion Is coded S.6C.
0210505 (5) "A desire to commit myself positively"
Expla: coimni
t
Is coded S.6C.
0210502 (4) "We had promised our parents that we would wait until
I was through my nursing program."
S
. 6C Thought Procedures
This symbol denotes thinking seen as Inter-related conscious mental
activities. It denotes awareness of: (1) the steps or procedures of
thinking or (2) the Inter-relatlonshlp among Ideas or thoughts. The
word "think," when It has the following definitions are scored S.6C:
1. to devise or create by thinking (e.g., "I developed the Ideas')
2. to center one's thoughts on (e.g., "focus on"); to consciously
form a mental picture of
32 -
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3. to subject to power of logical (or procedural) thought (e.g.,
"think things out", "I concluded:"); to reason.
Words or phrases (other than "think") having these definitions
should be scored S.6C. In addition, the concept of "learn" when it
means to acquire by experience (especially when that experience involves
suffering or mental agony) is scored S.6C, (e.g., "X learned what it
meant to be for a person to make a commitment and then break it.").
Note that other types of learning are scored S.6B.
It may be difficult to distinguish words or phrases scored S.6C
from those scored S.6B. One way to decide this is to examine other
parts of the protocol for explicit description of the steps or pro-
cedures of thinking which were involved in the thinking described by
the word or phrase in question. Lacking this, scores should judge
whether the definition of the word or phrase in question is close to
one of those listed above; or closer to those listed in S.6B.
Coded :
0210713 (6) "That was the beginning of a new life for me—a life
that I was now consciously controlling ."
0210713 (6) "I was elated to discover that I could give myself
permission to first: feel my own feelings, and
secondly to act on them.
(^))
0210502 (4) "I learned what it meant to be for a person to make
a commitment and then break it .
"
Cr~Ka^)
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0210404 (3/4) "I had planned to go to mental health after
diagnosing myself with hysteric conversion re-
sulting In paralysis.
0210713 (6) "It was not only a discovering, because I had always
had an Incllng there was one really there, but It was
an accepting process .
Borderline :
0410011 (4) "I can't understand him at all."
cd^D)
0411207 (3) "I just try and go back and put the pieces together ...
(not clear) ....
,er-^)
Not Coded :
0210202 (4) "and quickly passing save tumble weed for my mother,
thoughts of people and things, good feelings, good
sleep then complete off to Yale.
Expla: thoughts of are coded S.6-B.
0210301 (A) "I found out my best friend (name deleted) was on
drugs."
Expla: found out In this Instance Is scored S.6B.
0-^)
0210208 (A) "She was pretty freaked out figuring how our heads
could be cut off...
Expla: figuring Is scored S.6B and Interpreted as knowing.
34 -
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0210306 (3/4) "I sat trying to be calm but inside I was a bundle
of nerves."
Expla: trying is coded S.6B.
0210404 (3/4) "I looked forward to therapy 2 times weekly."
Expla: looked forward is coded S.6B.
0210515 (4/5) "...saved a litcle corner of myself that refused
to jump headlong into the competition’'
S. 7 Unspecified External Force K3
This symbol denotes a description (implicit or explicit) of
an external force acting ^ on the subject, in which the source (origin)
of the action is unclear or unspecified. There are several forms
in which this may be expressed:
1. When the external force involves permission. This
is usually stated as "I was/wasn't allowed to go;" "I
couldn't play," or "I wasn't permitted to..." The
permission usually is implied to be parental, teacher's
or other authority figures; it is not societal
permission.
2. When the external force involves action upon the
subject from the situation described, such as "blown
out of a building," "getting Involved in an accident..."
3. When the force is a need to get physical injuries
(parts of the body, usually) or ailments healed
("had to get stiches").
4. When there is an opportunity available ("we got to go
swimming" )
.
5. When the source of the action is another person, but
the person is not named, or described in the statement,
such as "I get spanked." (See S.5).
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Note that S.7 is not used when the force is an internal prescription
or social imperative ("should's")- For these see S.37. Also, S.7
is not used when the expression "I had to..." is interpreted as "in
order to," i.e. , a means to an end that is specified. See S.34.
Coded :
0210404 (3/4) "The Dr. said it was physical & I must be
hospitalized ."
0411202 (3) "I had to move from one place to the other.
->o-^
0210211 (4) "thinking that I would get back at them if I
got the chance
, hut also knowing I wouldn't try
this kind of thing again."
0210513 (3/4) "my friend couldn't play with me.
Expla: couldn't is interpreted as wasn't allowed.
0411203 (3) "I was blown out of a building."
—>o
Not Coded:
0410906 (A/3) "I got kind of nervous.
Expla: got nervous is coded S.l.
o
0210305 (A)
0
"But then I got sick . .
.
Jt) -
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0341017 (3) "I was a fool I should have said something but
I didn*t."
Expla: should have is coded S.37.
( O )_ ( 0— < )
—
Q-^ )
—
0341024 (4) "We had to drive In 2 cars since there wasn't enough
room in one."
Expla: had to is coded S.8.
This symbol denotes an explanatory relationship between two
parts of a sentence in which one part of a direct result or causal
consequence of the other part. Also when one part of the sentence
is the rationale for or reason for the other part of the sentence,
S.8 is used to link the two parts. The causality must be explicitly
stated in order for S.8 to be used, e.g., with words such as "because,"
"why," "reason for," "result."
The causes are described as if they were the necessary and
slfficient conditions for the described results to occur. No
distinction is made between the necessary versus sufficient reason.
It is as if the causes named invariably determined the results
described.
This symbol is not used when necessary but not sufficient
conditions are described (see S.16B), nor is it used when sufficient,
but not necessary conditions are described (See S.16A). Also
causal statements expressed in hypothetical form is not scored S.8
(See S.25).
(
o
—^ A )
S.8
37 -
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Coded ;
0210504 (4/5) "As a result
,
I prepared a speech."
cPsf )—>)
0411202 (3) "That's why I tried to do the same thing that
she did."
0341024 (4) "We had to drive in 2 cars since there wasn't
enough room in one."
—("A)
0341017 (3) "I thought I might be kind of wierd for not
enjoying kissing."
( )
0341019 (4/3) "When they left I started to cry because I
was homesick and frightened."
(Q^, (D) ^v-^CO—
Not Coded :
0341012 (3) "everytime I got up to bat I would strike out
so one day my coach said to me he said I am
going to teach you how to bat."
Expla: £o is coded S-16.
xd)Co-> a->>
0210513 (3/4) "She told him loud enough for me to hear:
negras
—
you can't play with her anymore."
They ' re
Expla: you can't play and they're Negras—is joined by
implied scored S.16.
(u>^ >->a>-o
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0210404 (3/4) "We each had Our ovm rooms for privacy, personal
tastes and entertainment of friends."
Expla: for is coded S.34.
^
^(<S>. &, 0--Q)
0210201 (4) "Our singer had lost his voice, so we ran it
without words .
"
Expla: ^ is coded S.16.
( ^ W o—>)
S.9A Situation Specific Emotional State
This symbol denotes reference to any general or specific emotional
state or feeling condition. The description of this emotional state
of being may be overall, i.e. a general feeling condition such as
"I was happy," "I had been upset," "I felt alright." Or the emotional
state of being may be more specific, such as "a feeling of inadequacy,"
"I was scared," "I was lonely." Also, the use of "emotional" words
(i.e. words descriptive of emotional conditions) that describe a
time period are scored S.9A, such as "happy moment."
States of being which are not emotional in character are not
scored S.9A. These Include physical states of being (e.g. "I was in
pain."), or states of being described in physiological or physical
terms (e.g. "I was nervous." "I feel numb in my hands.") ( See S.l A)
Physical descriptions (e.g. "He wasn't very cute at all.") are not
scored S.9A (see S.IA )•
Emotional conditions or states of feelings which are not situation
specific are not scored S.9A. That is, if the description of an
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emotional condition suggests that this condition is a distinguishing
characteristic of the person, such as a personality tendency or trait,
this is not scored S.9A (See S.39A, B)
.
Emotional descriptions in which the object of the emotions are
described; or descriptions of emotional reactions to a particular
stimulus (or stimuli) are not scored S.9A (See S.9B). Also, emotions
described as something to be expressed or used for communication (See
S.9C); emotions described in a manner that implies understanding of
multiple emotions described (see S.9D); and emotions "likened" to
other descriptions (See S.9E) are not scored S.9A.
Coded:
0210306 (3/4) "I grew a^ little suspicious and wondered why he
was asking me questions."
W^)
0341010 (3/4) "I could sense the agony in him.
0210210 (3/4) "I saw myself as confident, happy and proud."
0210305 (A) "I think I was mad but I know I was frustrated .
"
0341024 (4)
©
"For the rest of my vacation I had been upset .
- 40 -
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Not Coded :
0411202 (3) "It was a happy life, course you worry (Happy
life is interpreted to mean "I was a happy person.)Q
0210305 (A) "I got better earlier than expected."
0210306 (3/4) "I was so eager to gel started but yet was hoping
the day wouldn't end."
)-frH ^ )
)
9210202 (4) " Sensing freedom we returned travel south tearing
more. ..."
0210303 (3) "I was so cocky ."
©
0210404 "I felt clumsy and awkward ."
0,0
S.9B Situation Specific Emotional Action or Reaction ^ ^
This symbol denotes that emotions are directed toward a
specified object(s), person(s)
,
or thought(s), actlon(s), etc. It
may also denote a description of an emotional reaction (responses)
to a stimulus (stimuli); l.e., a description of a state of
feeling or .emotion resulting from an action, person, thought, etc.
No diagrammatic distinction is made between feelings directed toward
its object, and emotional responses to stimuli.
This symbol is distinguished from S.9A only in that the stimuli
or the direction of the emotion or feelings is specified in S.9B;
and unspecified in S.9A. The other guidelines for scoring S.9A are
also applicable in scoring S.9B (specifically as distinguished from
S.l; S.6; S.9C, D, E; S.39).
Coded :
0210505 (5) "Thoughts like this
—
fill my insides with unending
guilt ."
0210101 (<5/3) "We were concern'^d about our uniforms for some reason."
(
0210515 (4/5) "Whatever happens I still like myself," was
another thought later in that tearful night .
"
0231110 (3/4) "I always resented him ."
0210305 (<5) "...and (I) was mad I couldn't go ."
0210301 (A) "I...went home feeling I was a failure as a friend..."
Mot Coded :
0210208 (A) "...because I knew she was pissed ."
—
( (zr^tn}
0410906 ( /3) "I got kind of mad ."
25A
- -
0210502 (4) "I honestly feel there would have been nothing left
of me leave alone..."
0341024 (4) "I remember feeling very frightened although no
one was hurt."
(n)^ / (
S.9C Expressable ['.motions (^’
This symbol denotes an emotion or feeling described as something
to be expressed or to be used for communication. The emotions are
described as expressible; i.e. the emotions can be acted out (or acted
on) or "let out."
This symbol is different from S.9B in that S.9B Indicates a
description of feelings about or reactions to something and S.9C
involves the actual expression of the feelings or emotions. While
S.9C can be used alone, it can also be used in conjunction with S.5A
or S.13 when the emotions described are actually (or in fact) expressed
in some way as in "A burst of anger or fear, I don't know which burst
out of me."
Code.d :
0210413 (6) "I was elated to discover that I could give
myself permission to first feel my own feelings,
and second act on them .
"
(^ ©))
0210505 (5) "I am lying on the floor of a dormitory room—alone
—
crying with a feeling of hysteria and despair that
want to cry out for help » understanding" -'*
0"> 0^
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0210515 (4/5) "I was feeling like I had terribly deep feelings
and emotions and had not been able to express them ..."
0210515 (4/5) "I was feeling like I had terribly deep feelings
and emotions and had not been able to express
them—let myself out of myself."
0341010 (3/4) "A burst of anger or fear I don't know which
bust out of me."
S.9D Unspecified Multiple Feelings
This symbol denotes that "feelings" or "emotions" are described
in a manner suggesting several feelings experienced. Often the
actual, specific emotions are not named (or specified) in descriptions
scored S.9D. If the emotions are specified, or the reference to
"feeling" is singular rather than plural, the description should
not be scored S.9D (See S.9A, B, C).
Coded :
0210505 (5) "Why did it take me as long to admit my feelings
to myself and not to try and rtm away from them?
0210505
.(5) "What feelings did i have?"
0341010 (3/4) "I asked in terror as tried to hold my inner
feelings just to bust out and scream and cry
if he had broken it the answer was yes."
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0210504 (4/5) "My feelings were heightened.”
0210202 (4) "...and quickly passing save tumble weed for
my mother, thoughts of people and things, good
feelings
,
good sleep then complete off to Yale."
O, O—
>
0210505 (5) "On one hand I can hardly write at all about these
feelings—even now—almost 7 years later, I am
still trembling Inside at the thought of her
and my^ feelings towards her .
"
0210713 (6) "I was elated to discover that I could give myself
permission to first: feel my own feelings
,
and
secondly to act on them."
(^ ©
Not Coded :
0210505 (5) "My first thought (feeling) is that all the
white space in the world."
Expla: feeling is not coded since it is not an emotion.
G-K ^
0341004 (4) "I filled my day with whatever I felt ."
0210306 (3/4) "I remember answering questions concerning what
it felt like."
S
. 9E Likened Emotions -// ( ^
This symbol denotes that an emotion is described, not by naming
it, but by "likening" the emotion to something else. The description
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(or descriptor) of the emotion is seen as similar to, but not exactly
representative of the emotion experienced. Typical phrases scored
S.9E Include "felt as if;" "felt like." Metaphors used to describe
a feeling or emotion are often scored S.9E.
Words or phrases which denote the intensity of the feeling, but
not a likening to another description, such as "I was sort of angry."
"I got kinda upset" should not be scored S.9E,
Coded :
0410011 (4) "For me I just felt like I didn't even know him."
0210401 (4/5) "I felt as if we were the only people in the world.'*
Expla: felt as if is coded S.9E.
0210306 (3/4) "I sat trying to be calm but inside I was a bundle
of nerves .
"
0210306 (3/4) "As far as I am concerned I was on cloud nine , not
really believing it was happeining to me."
Borderline :
0341005 (A/3) "It was like being in a dream just waiting to
wake up and seeing him."
,
0^>(0=^/n)
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0210201 (4) "We had a real family sort of feeling in the cast
and crew."
Expla: family sort of feeling is coded S.9E.
{ (^~a)
Not Coded :
0210515 (4/5) "I was feeling like I had terrible deep feelings
and emotions ..."
Expla: feeling like in this case means perceived .
0210401 (4/5) "I felt warm and beautiful, the two of us."
Expla: warm
, beautiful (asthetlc) are coded S.9A.
0210520 (4/5) "I felt like funny things were happening inside
my stomach."
Expla: felt like is Interpreted as "thought" and scored
S.6B.
iC^)
S.IO Listings
>
This symbol denotes a relationship (s) between one or more parts of
a sentence in which the parts are LISTINGS, l.e., they are related
serially, or conjunctlonally (by and's), listings in time (such as
temporal sequences and simultaneous listings in time). For example,
"and then," "after," "when," "and" are usually scored S.IO.
Rule D.3 precludes the use of S.IO in some cases. Whenever a
sentence requires more than one relational symbol from the same
- 47 -
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elemental symbol, the elemental referent is not repeated; the relational
symbols are diagrammed from the same elemental symbol, without using
S.IO. See D.3 for further explanation.
Coded :
0341019 "The day I went to the hospital I was very frightened."
0
0341021 (A) "We were just fooling around when I decided to ride
his bicycle around the street."
0341016 (2) "...we sat down by the windows and had another beer
and then another."
—>A,A
0210305 (A) "I was in kindergarten at the time, but was not
going because I was sick."
O,
0210210 (3/4) "I remember seeing my opponent making his speak
just before I did."
)->), 0->
0310207 (2) o^'Me and my brother were going to my friend's house."
Not Coded :
0210305 (A) "I had the measles or was just getting over them."
Expla: ^ is scored S.45.
(o) (o)
0231101 (3) "My dad liked her £0 we decided, that's the horse
well buy."
Expla: ^o is coded S.16A.
( Y <0^ ))
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0341024 (4) "I remember feeling very frightened although
no one was hurt."
Expla: although is coded S.16B.
&->(©))
0341002 (3) "I was really nervous and so wasn't he."
Expla: and so is scored S.41.
(0)t4<D)
0310204 (2) "We would cut through the bushes and turn."
Expla: The subject of the sentence, is not repeated
before turn , and thus is scored according to
diagramming rule D.2.
S.13 COBPunication O—
(
O
^ ^
This symbol is used to indicate an overt communication, whether
or not the content of the communication is specified. Besides the
obvious words (said, talked, tell, asked, called, etc.) these are
many other words which imply communication (confronted, promised,
defend my position, argue, consent, gave a sermon, hint, "put it,"
meaning said, rapped, explained. Inquired, quoted, claimed). Other
words could be Indicative of communication but the context is Important
(e.g. answer is coded S.13 when it means "I answered the questions" but
it is not coded S.13 when it means "the result," "it would answer
all my dreams"; scream when used in "screaming that nobody loved me"
is coded S.13. "I was crying and screaming" is not coded S.13 but S.5).
Note: when the person says "my question" the possessive symbol (S.43) is
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not used; possession is indicated by the person the communication comes
from.
Coded :
0410011 (4) "I tried to hint around
.
0210404 "I was very hostile to nurses on my entrance and
in fact would not answer their questions
0210211 (4) "...with my head buried under my pillow and I was
crying and screaming that nobody loved me."
0210502 (4) "We had promised our parents that we would wait
until I was through my nursing program to marry but
when we confronted my parents with the need reason
they consented
,
CH >->)
( CO), CC^>Q))>H
0210502 (4) "I began to defend my position with the argument
going on and on.
©)
Not Coded :
0210306 (3/4) "I hoped it would answer all my dreams."
Cr>(T^s—^(er>))
0411202 (3) "I call it heaven."
Expla: call is scored S.6B
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S.16A And So's
^
This symbol denotes an explanatory relationship between two
parts of a sentence In which the first part Is a variable or condition
that accounts for the second part. It Is stated as If the first part
were sufficient reason for the second part, but that the first part does
not necessarily (always) result In the second part.
The description In the second part may be the result of having
considered the "condition" or "fact" described by the first part. That
Is the second part may be some decision or action taken on the basis
of knowing the facts or conditions described In the first part. There
seems to be an awareness that the second part may not necessarily
result from the fact or condition In the first part.
In cases where the distinction between necessary and sufficient
conditions Is not made, S.16A Is not used (See S.8 ). Also In
cases where the causes are described as necessary, but not sufficient,
S.16A Is not used (see S.16B).
Coded :
0210303 (3) "I was positive that I wouldn't be starting ^
I had to accept the fact that maybe I wasn't as
0210306 (3/4) "I was ready to start anew (knowing that If you
wanted and worked hard enough, nothing Is
unattainable."
Expla: starting anew linked to knowing by S.16.
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0210202 (4) "1969 I had been accepted to Yale painting fellow-
ship ^ decided to go across country for first time
with boyfriend—David before."
(O*)
—
(er'>((o, )->))
0341012 (3) "Everytime I got up to bat I would strike out ^
one day my coach said to me he said I am going to
teach you how to bat."
0231101 (3) "My dad liked her ^ we decided, that's the horse
/Cb we'll buy.
( s—>A 0~'YO-^A))
0341014 (3/4) "I wanted to tease him ^ I said something like
I hope you lose, Glen."
(cP^)—^a )
—
(oA )—> )
a))
Not Coded :
0210306 (3/4) "I was so eager to get started, but yet was hoping
the day wouldn't end because...."
Expla: but yet is scored S.40.
( yShi
0210303 (3) "So I had to accept the fact that maybe I wasn't
as good as I thought."
Expla: ^ is coded S.40.
(or^
0231110 (3/4) I looked down on her and the steps she was
sitting on and said he...."
0341002 (3) "I was really nervous and so wasn't he."
(oHtHo)
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0210303 (3) "I threw so hard during tryouts that I ruined my
arm."
Expla: that are coded S.8.
CO— 5>C )
02204 (/i) I wanted to learn so I could be a champion and
things like that."
cP^
S.16B Despite/Although )—/
—C )
This symbol denotes an explanatory relationship between two
parts of a sentence, in which one part (a description of thought,
feeling, action, condition, etc.) occurs in spite of the fact of
another thought, feeling, action, condition or other description. This
relationship takes the form: "Although "x" is the case, "y" occurred;"
"Despite condition "x", "y" occurred;" "Even though "x" occurred, "y"
followed." The symbol S.16B denotes the relationship between "x"
and "y" in these models.
There seems to be an awareness that in an event there were
necessary conditions present for something to occur, but that these
conditions were insufficient, and therefore the thing expected did not
occur. In other words, S.16B denotes the description of necessary
but not sufficient condition or reason.
In diagramming S.16B, record the qualifying part of the sentence
(l.e. the "x" part; the despite or although clause) first (l.e., to
the left)
. Note that this diagramming rule implies that the order of
the symbols in scoring will be the reverse order of its original
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expression in the statement, when the "despite/although clause"
(x part) is expressed in the second part of the sentence (l.e. after
the y part)
.
This symbol should not be used when the relationship between the
two parts of the sentence is an explicit contrasting relationship; l.e.
when the description specifies contrasting differences between two
parts of the sentence (See S.40).
A serial or sequential listing which does not imply the "despite/
although-type" relationship should not be scored S.16B (See S.IO).
Words like "although," "but," and "even if," are clues that the
sentence may involve S.16B.
Coded :
0341014 (3/4) "He was the one who threw the rock but I still
felt bad."
0341024 (4) "I remember feeling very frightened although no
one was hurt."
0210502 (4) "We had promised our parents that we would wait
until I was through my nursing program to marry
but when we confronted my parents with the
need reason they consented."
0341001 (3) "There was never a dull moment and even if there
was nothing to do or nowhere to go."
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0210404 (3/4) "I told many people about my new feelings but got
much mock advice."
a-< >-«)
0210211 (4) "Obviously, I was trying to get my mother to come
in and comfort me but nobody came."
(
0210404 "I looked forward to therapy 2x weekly, although
it was difficult & I needed someone to help me
dress, get in & out of pool, etc."
Not Coded:
0341005 (D/3) "I thought she was kidding until I say the tears
come down from her face."
0~>(a), 0^(a)
S . 18A & S . 18B Core Event
S.18A Brackets £ J
Brackets are used to distinguish the core event of the protocol.
A core event is a sentence or part of a sentence that represents the
essence of the protocol and must be referred to more than once to
be bracketed. (For non-core event sentences referred to only once
see S.18C.) Further S.18A is always used in conjunction with S.18B.
Brackets are also used when a number of consecutive sentences
from a cohesive unit to which reference is made in a preceeding
or subsequent sentence (See example 23/3—0341005, sentence #7-10).
Indications that S.18A is to be used include "that," "it,"
"things," "these experiences," "what happened," or any other words
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that clearly refer to the event. (See S.35 for instances that do not
require brackets.
S.18B Star
S.18B is introduced when an S.18A bracket is used. From that
point on in the protocol, everytiroe that particular oracketed event is
referred to, the star is used to represent it. If a second bracket is
used in the protocol, it gets two stars and then two stars are used to
represent this event in the rest of the protocol. S.18B is treated as
an elemental symbol; when the star stands alone, this implies a description
or characterization of the referred to event (See sentence //6 protocol
#0341005 for example).
Coded:
*• f
0341005 (i/3)
1.
"I was 11 when I was sitting in my
cellar watching TV when my mother
came down to tell me my best friend
had died during the night."
2.
"I thought she was kidding until I
saw the tears come down her face."
3. "I was the last friend to see him
before he died."
-(ra,aj).
4.
"It was like being in a dream."
5.
"Just waiting to wake up and seeing
him.
'
6. "But it wasn't, it was reality."
."The funny thing about it he had a D
little brother who was 10.
8. "I was walking down the street with
him the same day his brother died."
y )9. "He didn't think anything of it.
56 -
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10 "One of his brother's friends came up
to him to ask where his brother was,
and of course his brother was dead, but
he just said very calmly, "He's dead." ka/’
S.18C Reference Back “7
This symbol denotes a reference to a specific description in a
previous or subsequent sentence (or part of a sentence)
. Generally
a pronoun, such as "it," "that" or "this" is used to express this
reference back. In using this symbol, the arrow is diagrammed to
point to the referent in the previous or subsequent sentence diagram.
This symbol should not be used when the referent is a core event
as defined by S.18A & B.
An example of the use of S.18C is illustrated by sentences #7 and
#9 in protocol 0341105 in the coded example under S.18A & B.
S.20 Unspecified Set of Things
This symbol refers to an unspecified set of events or experiences
,
which are not elaborated (l.e., described) anywhere else in the protocol.
In other words, this symbol is used for a word (or phrase) whose
referent is an unspecified (unnamed) set of actions, events or experiences.
The word(s) denoted by S.20 are usually indefinite pronouns such as
"some things," "anything," or "everything."
If the referent of a pronoun can be found elsewhere in the sentence
or protocol the word (or phrase) in question should not be scored S.20.
It should be scored using the most appropriate symbol that denotes the
referent; e.g., "it" referring to a concrete object is scored S.3;
"this" referring to an action is scored S.5. The symbol, S.18C should
269
be used when the referent of a word 1b located elsewhere in the
sentence or in another sentence (See S.18C).
If the referent of a particular word (or phrase) is a set of
events described by other sentences elsewhere in the protocol, S.20
is not used to denote that word (or phrase) (See S.18B). Also if the
referent is the totality of the event recalled (and described) by the
subject, S.20 is not used. For example, "the day," "that summer,"
"that weekend," "this experience" are not scored S.20 (See S.18B).
Coded :
0341002 (3) "We really got to know each other very good by
just talking about anything and everything ."
0210211 (4) "I remember some things that happened at eight
years old and some at three or four."
0210306 (3/4) "I was so eager to get started but yet was hoping
the day wouldn't end because s£ many things would
change." .
0411207 (3) "I don't think I have had many happy ones .
"
0231106 (3/4) "We stayed there and talked about everything . the world,
people, parents, animals and us."
O, 0,^,0)
0210504 (4/5) "I should have mentioned that I was married at the
time, had a teaching job in a small junior college,
and in far better circumstances than I am today."
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Borderline :
0341010 (3/4) "1 asked my grandfather what happened."
Not Coded :
0210505 (5) "With a great feeling of Inadequacy I will try to
explain on paper this experience .
"
Expla: this experience In
0 )—
>
coded S.18B.
0341001 (3) "I learned different things about different types
of people."
o~^(d)
0411202 (3) "They were happy days...was 27 when she died...
Is 29."
Expla: days Is not coded S.20. They refers to
previously described series of events and
happy days Is a descriptor of those events.
0210301 (A) "It was one of the hardest days of my life...."
S.22A Inter-actlnfi
This symbol denotes mutual and reciprocal actions between two
persons. Descriptions of actions scored S.22A Involve descriptions
that imply or connote observable behaviors involving both parties
acting upon each other. Descriptions of actions Involving both parties
acting together, but not upon each other are not scored S.22A. Actions
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which cannot be done without the other party reciprocating (e.g.,
"met him/her," "kissing each other") are scored S.22A.
Coded :
0341006 (3) "From this first meeting we hit it off great."
Expla: hit it off great is coded S.22B,
but meeting is coded S.22A.
0210201 (4) "I was in love with many of the people I worked with ."
0341017 (3) "We then started to kiss ."
0341014 (3/4) "...and we always avoided each other ."
o=—
O
0210401 (4/5) "we laid on the beach and tried to keep warm in
each other's arms ."
Not Coded :
0341021 (2l) "we were fooling around ."
Expla: fooling around does not connote interaction,
hence not scored S.22A.
0210208 (ii) "The boy across the street...who I wasn't especially
good friends with walked out of his driveway the
same time I walked out of my house."
Expla: (walked out) ... at the same time is scored S.IO.
It is interpreted as simultaneous but not
mutual action.
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S.22B & C Interpersonal Relationship Traits
This symbol incorporates the former definitions of two separate
symbols S.22B reciprocal roles © K1
,
and S.22C reciprocal
relationships ®
This symbol denotes the characterization of an Interpersonal
relationship. it i= when a relationship (usually with another
person) is described, evaluated or qualified. The response must
indicate explicitly or Implicitly tnat the relationship being described
is not particular to just one situation, but rather indicative of a
pattern of interaction.
Coded :
0341001 (3) "I've also learned that there aren't really as many
true friends as people think."
0 - ")
0341002 (3) "We really got to know each other very good..."
.3 ^Z]
0210505 (5) "And why was it too late now to help make her
life meaningful together with mine?
- kV— O—^ ® @ ))
0231106 (3/4) "I was in ecstacy with the great understanding
we had .
"
®—Q
)
0210505 (4/5) "If it was with a man that I could have the
deepest and most total relationship—there was
no way around the preliminary bullshit.
c IS- ©yfHo+x
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0231106 (3/4) "The closeness we both felt mentally and physically
was beautiful, in every sense of the word."®
—
Q
0341006 (3) "Our family are good friends with his and he is
great boss to ^ and really helps and understands."
Borderline :
0210404 (3/4) "I was not getting along with myself though."
(3~ ®
Not Coded :
0210201 (4) "I^ was in love with many of the people I worked
with."
Expla: I was in love with is coded S.9B.
0210505 (5) "Moments ago I made a phone call abroad to find
out that the woman (who I had finally admitted
to myself without shame—that I was very much in
love with)
.
Expla: in love with is coded S.9B.
0-<
0210513 (3/4) "my friend couldn't play with me."
S.23 Negation 0
This symbol denotes that a specific thought, action, feeling or
other description is negated , re.1 ected , retracted or otherwise noted
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absent by a word(s) (such as "not," "none," "don't," "couldn't,"
etc.) that refers to such a negation. Discontinuity of action (e.g.
"no longer") and absolute negations (e.g., "never") are scored S.23
also.
However, actions which connote negation, retraction or rejection
are not scored S.23 (e.g. "breaking a promise," "refused to jump,"
"stop crying." Also partial, tentative or incomplete negations are
not scored S.23 (e.g. "we're not his only kids") ("it was not
only a discovering."). Double negations also are not scored S.23
(e.g. "Nothing was unattainable"). Finally the symbol does not denote
negated value statements that function to express "Intensity," or to
qualify an action, thought, feeling, etc.
Coded :
0210404 (3/4) "I didn't feel energetic or excited.
0210305 (-d) "...knew that I probably wouldn't be able to go."
0210502 (4) "I honestly feel there would have been nothing
left of me leave alone the chance I could have
made some grave mistakes."
Gr->? CO^)
0411207 (3) "Then because we eouldn '
t
speak to my son again,
we just took the plane and flew out there."(O^
0410906 (-d/3) "I kept waiting all day long for someone to come
and ^ ene came .
"
O
—
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Hot Coded :
0210208 (4) "The boy across the street who I wasn't
expecially good friends with...."
Expla: wasn '
t
is not scored S.23 because it is a
partial negation.
(al ( (s~&)
0210301 (A) "Searching for (name deleted) was no easy
task and. ..."
0-^Lj
0341001 (3) "I made so many friends (and kept them) it was
unbelievable .
"
( C2f=-jS)^'79
0411110 (2) "When they brought him into the room, and he
was so tiny, and I thought this was impossible ."
0-/P)— (CJ)
0341002 (3) "I was really nervous and so wasn't he."
Expla: wasn't is not scored S.23 because this is a
colloquial phrase meaning "he was nervous,
too."
(O)^fYa)
S.24A & S.24 B Possibilities -h
S . 24A One Possibility
-f-
This symbol denotes an explicit reference to one possible
contingency. It refers to a description of the potential rather than
actual (l.e. it is hypothetical, rather than real). Often the words
(or phrases) "might," "could," "it was possible that," are scored S.24A.
There is an implicit comparison to another possibility or alter-
native event, condition, action or other description. If no such
- -
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implicit comparison is suggested, S.24 is not used.
"Thoughts" are often hypothetical in themselves, because they are
not descriptive of activity; they describe "possibilities" which one
considers. However, thoughts are not scored S.24, unless they explicitly
state an awareness of the potential, or hypothetical (rather than real)
quality of the thought itself (e.g. "I thought of the possibility of
his coming" is scored S.24A, "wishing I could help," is not scored S.24).
Also "could" when it means "ability" (or capacity to) is not
scored S.24A (See S.5); also when "could" means "permission to" or
possession of a power, right or means (e.g. President can veto the
bill) it is not scored S.24A (See S.37, S.7).
The symbol is not used when the possibilities are Indefinite in
number. (SeeS.24B) Also, it should be noted that S.25 supercedes this
symbol. If a diagram involves a contingency relationship scored
S.25, the parts (or elements) of that relationship should not be
scored S.24A.
Coded :
0210502 (4) "I honestly feel there would have been nothing left
of me leave alone the chance ^ could have made
some grave mistakes dealing with the health care
of others."
(+ 0^))
0410011 (4) "I could have been really happy."
(-+ ® )
Not Coded:
0210301 {£i) "...wishing I could help and yet knowing I never could ."
Cr^Kcy^)
,
O^>(o-o)
0210301 (A) "...feeling I was a failure as a friend
—
I'd never
cut it."
(&^-E]ynD
0210515 (4/5) "Whatever happens I still like myself, was
another thought later in that tearful night."
0210505 (5) "And why was it too late now to help make her
life meaningful together with mine?"
— ® (0 ) )
S.24B Many Possibilities
This symbol denotes the description of an indefinite number
of possibilities. It denotes multiples of that represented in S.24A,
i.e. when numerous alternatives or possibilities are suggested by
the statement. However, the unspecified descriptions (such as "something,
"everything") are not scored S.24B (See S.20). The other criteria
applicable to S.24A, involving thoughts, the use of "could" and
use of symbol S.25 apply for the scoring of S.24B also.
Not Coded :
0210306 (3/4) "I was ready to start anew (knowing that if you
wanted and worked hard enough, nothing is
unattainable.
"
(y~-> (( —( Q— ^ ^ ^
0210101 W/3) ". . . all I could tell her was..."
O—i y
—
p
0341001 (3) "This suimner had to be the greatest summer
have ever had.
"
0341001 (3) "There was never a dull moment and even If there was
nothing to do or no where to go."
Expla: there was nothing
, there was nowhere , are coded S.20.
This symbol denotes an explanatory relationship (between two
parts of a sentence) expressed in the form of a proposition or prediction.
It is a proposition or prediction in the sense that the content of the
statement has yet to occur— it is hypothetical, rather than actual.
It is a statement of potentiality (or possibility)
,
rather than a
statement describing what has already happened (reality or actuality)
.
The statement takes the form, "if x, then y."
The symbol is diagrammed to distinguish the clause of the
sentence (on the left in the diagram)
,
from the then clause of the
sentence (on the right in the diagram)
.
S.25 should not be used if the explanatory relationship is
not hypothetical in nature (See S.8, S.16A, S.16B).
Coded:
0410906 (3) "The doctor told me ^ I wanted help for my ear, I
had to go into the hospital and have my ear taken
care of."
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0210505 (5) "If^ only 1 could have been braver sooner
—
would
she have still been alive?"
0410809 (3) "I think I'd die i^ I did."
(o^)-f-(er>(o)')
0410809 (3) "He said, I ever get a hold of you, I'll
kill you.'"
° 70)—
0410011 (4) "2f. he was then I really could have told him."
()— )—7D)
0210305 (l2i) "My mother told the teacher to come by anyway the
day of the picnic to see if I felt alright to go,
providing the doctor said it was o.k."
-y'>
0210306 Cili) "I was ready to start anew (knowing that ^ you
wanted and worked hard enough
,
nothing is unat-
tainable. "
er^((6Ky-f-CO-^A)) ^ 03^')
0210515 (4/5) "If it was with a man that I could have the
deepest and most total relationship—there was no
way around the preliminary bullshit."
r( a=^
Not Coded :
0341024 (4) "We had to drive in 2 cars since there wasn't enough
room in one."
(3) "I was positive that I wouldn't be starting s£ I
had to accept the fact that maybe I wasn't as good
as I thought."
( cr^(0^>))—
C
0210303
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0341019 C4/3) "When they left I started to cry because I was
homesick and frightened.”
@)—
0231101 (3) "My dad liked her so we decided, that's the horse
we'll buy."
0210303 (3) ”I threw so hard during tryouts that I ruined my
A*....arm.
Expla: that is coded S.8.
0341001 (3) "There was never a dull moment and even if there
was nothing to do or no where to go."
S
. 34 In Order To O I ^
This symbol denotes a relationship in which one part of a
sentence is a means to an end described by another part of the sentence.
This relationship can be expressed by the phrase "in order to."
Although the phrase "in order to" is not usually stated by the subject
in the protocol, the relationship can generally be identified by the use
of a verb-infinitive (e.g., "to help," "to find out," etc.), in which
the word "to" carries the meaning "in order to." The symbol denotes
only the relationship "in order to", and the verb following (the action
or thought) is diagrammed also.
In the English language, the subject of the sentence is usually
not repeated when a verb-infinitive is used; but in diagrams involving
S.34, the subject of the sentence should be re-diagrammed in the
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parentheses following the S.34 arrowhead. For example, the sentence, "I
lined up to go out to the stadium," is diagrammed as follows:
It should not be diagrammed in either of the following ways:
.
^(^).
Symbol S.34 only denotes means-ends relationships which are explicitly
expressed by the phrase "in order to," by the verb-infinitive form, or
in some cases of the word "for" (e.g., "We each had our own rooms for
privacy, personal tastes and entertainment of friends.").
The symbol is not used when the means-ends relationship is stated
less definitely or less explicitly, as in the expression "so that"
(See S.16). Also, S.34 is not used on some colloquial expressions
Involving the words "came" and "went." (e.g., "went to get", "came
to see"). These are scored S.5, as a single action, l.e., S.34 is
not used when the words "come" and "go" (and its tenses) are directly
followed by an infinite (e.g., "came to pick me up").
Coded :
0210306 (3/4) "By then the time grew near and I lined up to
go out to the stadium."
0210303 (3) "I even dragged my roommate to the game with me to
have ^ shoulder to cry on.
0210502 (4) "During the third week I called him again ^ state
that I had resigned."
OK )-^
‘— )-> )
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0341010 (3/4) "I then called some neighbors whom I could
rely on help me get in touch with my parents .
"
Borderline:
0341005 (^/3) "My mother came down to tell me my best friend died.
a)
Not Coded:
0210505 (5) "Moments ago I made a phone call abroad _t£ find
out that the woman (who I had finally admitted
to myself without shame..."
o-< )->
,
e^>(
0341017 (3) "When he came ^ pick me up my mother asked him
what ttae he would bring me home."
0341002 (3) "After the movie we went to get a milkshake and
he didn't get . . . ."
Expla: went to, get is scored S.5.
A, o—
0210502 (4)
o->,
"I returned to nursing ^ ^ sent several hundred
miles away on an affiliation."
0210101 C4/3) "We were concerned about our uniforms for some
reason."
Expla: for some reason is scored S.8.
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S.35 Summary
This symbol denotes that a particular sentence summarizes or
concludes the descriptions prior to that sentence. The summary statement
is (1) one entire sentence, and (2) refers to an aspect of the experience
described in general terms. The summary statement usually occurs near
the end of a paragraph and is often the last sentence in the response.
The summary may be about (1) the specific experience described (see
example #0410011 below) or (2) the Implications drawn from the
experience for future action (See example #0210306)
.
This symbol should not be used if the statement meets criteria
for S.18A, B or C.
Coded :
0411202 (3) "It was a happy life, course you worry, do you
have enough to live on or not."
0210306 (3/4) "I was ready to start anew knowing that if you wanted
and worked hard enough, nothing is unattainable."
0410011 (4) "I always wanted to meet my father and then he
was really nothing." (Summary of particular
experience: This is the last sentence of the
protocol. The core event was a description of
meeting father and her responses
.
)
Not Coded:
0411207 (3) "So these were all tragic experiences
.
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0410809 (3) "Boy that's really an experience for an eleven year
old."
ic—(y
0210504 (4/5) "At the end—my husband asked me, 'liberation from
what?"'
0341014 (3/4) "Afterwards, and even now I felt really guilty
about it."
0210401 (4/5) "It was the most beautiful scene I had ever seen."
0411207 (3) "I haven't got over it yet...."
Q—
S . 36A Turning Point •
This symbol is used when the totality of the (described) experience
is described as a turning point in the subject's lifetime. The turning
point is described as a change in one's personal condition or
characterization which begins or terminates (ends) with the experience
described. The change must refer to the Impact or result of the total
event recalled, not just one element or part of the experience
described (for these changes see S.42A and S.42B).
Coded :
0210713 (6) "It was a 'high' experience that lasted for
months and months
,
and which still experience
to a certain extent."
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0210513 (3/4) "That was the beginning of a lonely and bitter
childhood for me."
^ (2)
5>
0410809 (3) "That mark will always be with me until the
day ^ die ."
^
,
o
Not Coded :
0210502 (4) "It was the hardest thing I' ve ever done."
Expla: I've ever done is scored S.40.
Cr—
0341014 (3/4) "After awhile my father came and took me home."
Expla: after awhile is not coded S.36.
0210401 (4/5) " to this day I never think I've seen the stars
shile so bright as they did that night."
0341014 (3/4) "I never spoke to Glen again."
)~>
^
0210502 (4) "However, I knew I could not endure living the
life of the past three weeks for a whole year."
Expla: for a whole year is coded S.42B.
0341001 (3) "In a way I have learned so much by every small
experience that happened that stunmer .
"
0341001 (3) "I also met a guy that summer that really meant
alot to me."
74 -
286
S.36B Duration | (
This symbol denotes a specified passage or duration of time within
the experience described. The length of time or duration must be
specified according to clock time (number of minutes or hours)
,
calendar
time (days, weeks, months) or specific references to events marking the
passage of time (e.g., "from the beginning to end of the program"'.
This symbol does not denote time used as a benchmark (e.g.,
"that day," "that summer," "the second year") in the experience
described, nor does it denote references to time in describing a
seuqence of events (e.g. "afterwards," "and then," "a few days later,"
"before," and "finally" are not scored S136B, see S.IO).
Coded:
0210201 (4) "I stood up in back and can see the show from
start to finish
.
Cilia's dancing, June, Chris,
Joe all those on stage slowly falling at the end."
LJ
"
'
0210404 (3/4) "The first length of time date I was told was 2 wks
,
next 2 mo
. ,
3 mo
. ,
7 mo
. , 2 years before it would
be over.
0210404 (3/4) "I met an old friend, after a week of these
feelings "
'
I
0210502 (4) "However I knew I could not endure living the
life £f the past three weeks for a whole year."
(3/4) "The next 20 or 30 minutes went by and at the
end I had heard my name .
"
LJ, O—
>
0210306
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Not Coded:
0210502 (4) "I was two years through a 3 yr. nursing program."
(O)
0231106 (3/4) "Friends came in and gave us a drink or a coke and
rapped for awhile then left again."
- PJ^—( )
—
~>AvA
0341017 (3) "We then started to kiss and before long it was
getting late."
0210505 (5) "Why did it take me as long to admit my feelings
to myself and not to try and run away from them?
0210502 (4) "I began to defend my position with the argument
going on and on .
S.37 Internal Shoulds ®
This symbol denotes inner-dlrected prescriptions or social
imperatives, most of which are expressed as "shoulds". "Shoulds"
which originate from specific authority figures (such as one's parents,
the doctor or teacher) are not scored S.37. See S.7 for distinguishing
criteria.
Coded :
0341017 (3) "I was a fool I should have said something but
I didn't."
Co), )->)
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0210713 (6) "I sensed that it was not only permissible In this
setting to be natural and to follow my own Inner
direction, but It was highly desirable if I were
going to receive what the experience had to offer.
Cr^a &
0210515 (4/5) "My mother's way of looking at things suggested
that if I wanted a man—she assumed that—I don't think
I was assuming that at the time—I would have to
compete with other women on the level of physical
attractiveness." ® %
O' )—M ))
0210504 (4/5) "I should have mentioned that I was married at the
time."
0210505 (5) "A desire not to negatively define my love for
certain women as society would have me do."
Not Coded :
0210404 (3/4) "The Dr. said it was physical and I must be
hospitalized.
"
Expla: must be is scored S.7.
->o)
0210513 (3/4) "She told him loud enough for me to hear: They're
negras
—
you can't play with her anymore.
Expla: can'
t
is coded S.7.
0231106 (3/4) "We were happy we didn't ever want to have to leave.
Expla: to have to is coded S.7.
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0210513 (3/4) "...my friend couldn't play with me."
Expla: couldn '
t
is coded S.7.
S.39A Personality Traits Q
This symbol denotes reference to a distinguishing character,
behavioral, tempermental, emotional or mental traits of an individual,
generally referred to collectively as personality traits. When one of
these traits are named individually, (not collectively), S.39A is used.
For example, traits scored S.39A include ambitious, confident, proud,
serious, honest, optimistic, curious.
S.39A is not used when several of these traits are referred to
collectively, for example, by such words as "my personality," "my ego,"
my capabilities (See S.39B).
S.39A is not used when the traits are descriptive primarily of
one's role, vital statistics or physical condition (See S-IA) , e.g.
,
"so I could be a champion," "I was a fool," and "she was more
experienced than I" are scored S.lA—not S.39.
Emotional responses and situation-specific emotions are not
scored S.39A (See S.9); but emotional tendencies or patterns describing
oneself or other persons are scored S.39A. That is, if a description of
an emotion implies that that emotion is a characteristic tendency of
that person, then it is scored S.39A. If not, it is scored S.9.
Note that when the word "my" is used in conjunction with a trait
scored S.39A the symbol S.43 is not used to denote the "my." Similarly,
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S.43 is not used with S.39A when other possessive pronouns, "his,"
"her," "our," "their," are used.
Coded :
0210404 (3/4) "I was losing my amMtion and sleeping often."
©, o->
0210210 (3/4) "It was clear to me that he didn't have the
confidence that 1 was feeling."
er>((t^)-iHG']
0210210 (3/4) "I saw myself as confident , happy and proud ."
0210505 (5) "If only I could have been braver sooner—would
she have still been alive?
0210515 (4/5) "Somehow I saved“because of a basicly
optimistic nature I think—a good dose of
self-respect .
"
( —(
C
Borderline :
0210713 (6) "I sensed that it was not only permissible in this
setting to be natural and to follow my own inner
direction but it was highly desirable if I were
going to receive what the experience had to
0341017 (3) "I thought I might be kind of wierd for not
enjoying kissing."
70 -
291
Not Coded :
0210404 (3/4) "I was curious about her ideas, habits, expectations
02204
— ( ) "...so I could be a champion and things like that."
This symbol denotes references to generalized personality
characteristics, l.e., when several personality characteristics or
traits (individually scored S.39A) are implicitly generalized into one
word or concept, such as "my habits," "my ego," etc. In other words,
the concept named implies that the subject is aware of several
personality traits or characteristics. Typical examples of words
scored S.39B are "personality," "my capacities," "soul," "mind,"
"spirits," "personal tastes," "my 'self'," "Interests." References to
and goals."
Expla: curious is coded S.6B.
0210404 (3/4) "We were both art students, she more experienced
than I."
Expla: experienced is coded S.IA and S.2A.
0341017 (3) "X was ^ fool I should have said something
but I didn't."
"my life" when the contextual Interrelationships S.32 are not specified
are scored S.39B also. (When the word "my" is used in conjunction
with the concept scored S.39B, S.43 is not used.)
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Coded :
0210502 (4) "I began to defend ^ position with the argument
going on and on."
©)
0210404 (3/4) "I was very curious about her Ideas . habits .
expectations and goals .
0210515 (4/5) "I resolved that this was not necessarily true
and saved a little corner of myself .
0411207 (3) "All that happened to them because that was my life ."
—(J)
0341001 (3) "I can now see my faults and learn to accept others.
0210404 "I hoped and planned to do much work and self-
realization of my^ capabilities ."
(5^ ((A))
Not Coded :
0210404 (3/4) "...and mv whole pace slowed down."
0
0210502 (4) "My husband to be (he was a college student) and
I decided that we needed to get married from a
result of our sexual needs."
Expla: our sexual needs Is coded S.9A.
. \
“^a),
0210210 (3/4) "Most of my fantasy took place In the junior
high school auditorium."
Expla: my fantasy Is coded S.6B.
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S.40 Differences /Contrasts ' Ul
This symbol represents statements describing contrasts or
differences between any of the following:
1. Between different, but simultaneous, actions,
thoughts, feelings, or states of being reported
by the subject.
2. Between actions, thoughts, feelings or states held by
the subject and those of another person(s).
^
3. Contrasts over time, betwean a subject's former and
present thoughts, feelings, actions (see S.36 to
differentiate time references).
Contrasts or differences which are not made explicit by words
such as "than," "as opposed to," "versus" or "but" should not be
scored S.40. Negations are not scored S.40. Also, "but" or "despite"
in the sense of although (i.e. the statement of insufficient reason)
is not scored S.40 (see S.16B).
Coded :
0210504 (4/5) "I was married at the time, had a teaching job in
a small junior college, and in far better
circumstances than 1 am today."
(W)-»{0))
Borderline :
0210401 (4/5) "In the sky, the stars never seemed so bright and
to this day I never think I've seen the stars
shine so bright as they did that night."
A, Q^A)^
0210202 (4) "To a snowy continental divide, dinnered on a
grave site of flood victims, no fear but
solidarity."
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0210210 (3/4) "My opponent being white and me being black."
(6H5KO)
Not Coded :
0210713 (6) "Up to that time, I had had a poor concept of
myself, although it had been improving slightly
through the previous few years .
"
((D-fj) / ( Q)^
0210211 (4) "thinking that I would get back at them if I got the
chance, but also knowing I wouldn't try this kind of
thing again."
0410011 (4) "I always wanted to meet my father and then he
^
—
^as really noting."
0210404 (3/4) "I was not getting along with myself though ."
0210404 (3/4) "and now I felt clumsy and awkward."
) ®
0210513 (3/4) "I had no idea what a "negra" was but I was
very hurt and sick that my friend couldn’t play with
( Gr^'u)-^ r a 0)—
S.41 Recognition of Similarities ( ) ( )
This symbol denotes an explicit statement describing the
similarities between two other descriptions. The dimilarities described
are often between the internal, emotional states of oneself and that of
other persons; and between the actions or conditions of oneself and
- 33 -
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another (other) person(s). If the similarities are not explicitly
named by a word or phrase, S.41 should not be used (see S.IO).
Coded ;
0210502 (4) "I know my parents were disappointed, extremely
so
,
and ^ was probably also .
"
0411202 (3) "That's vdiy I tried to do the same thing that
she did." ,
a-^ )
)
0210502 (4) "When I talked to my husband on the phone he claimed
to be experiencing the same kinds of discomfort
and noninterest."
0210505 (5) "Thoughts like this—fill my insides with unending
guilt."
Expla: like this is not coded at all.
(( ^ ^
Not Coded :
0210713 (6) "I sensed that it was not only permissible in
this setting to be natural and to follow my own
inner direction, but it was highly desirable if
I were going to receive what the experience had to
0341001 (3) "There was never a dull moment and even if there was
nothing to do or no where to go."
Expla: even if is scored S.16B.
^
A)—f^A)
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0341001 (3) "I've also learned that there aren't really as many
true friends as people think."
0410011 (4) "Like when we called up the taxi place."
0~< )~^A
S.42A & B Continuation of Actions or Conditions 7^
This symbol Incorporates previous definitions of two symbols,
S.42A condition prior to the event 'TT, and S.42B condition since the
event This symbol denotes any reference to conditions prior
to or since the recalled event. This Includes mentioning of data or
experiences prior but relevant to the situation or event described.
It also includes conditions or actions occurring during the event
recalled (i.e. the situation described) and which continues after
the recalled event. The symbol denotes the continuation of a con-
dition or action that is part of (not the totality of) the recalled
event, or a condition (or action) not related at all to the recalled
event
.
Continuations of actions or conditions attributed to the totality
of the recalled event or situation are not scored S.42A & B (See S.36A).
Also, simple descriptions of physical or emotional conditions are not
scored S.42A & B (See S.IA; 9A)
.
Coded ;
0210306 (3/4) "I sat tracing back the long hours that I
spent applying for scholarships."
C^(cA^)
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0231106 (3/4) "I slept in a waterbed with my boyfrield, after
not being together for two months .
"
93?. (oV
0210211 (4) "I think I had done this once or twice before and
it worked then."
Cr^ (
O
—> y!r)^
^
^
>
0341012 (3) "every time I got up to bat I would strike out."
c o—>
^
o—> )'fr
0210713 (6) ^ that time . I had had a poor concept of
myself, although it had been improving slightly
through the previous few years .
"
( Q y^~^{ ^'hr
0341001 (3) "We went steady for awhile and to this day we
are still close friends."
Expla: to this day Is scored S.42B.
0341006 (3) "In addition it could be useful to say that the
person that I met at the fish store Is now my boss."
0210502 (4) "However I knew I could not endure living the life
of the past three weeks for a whole year ."
0341006 (3) "From this first meeting we hit it off great."
(
(3) "Also we have entered many other shows, won
better prizes but ^ this day these are the
one's I remember most."
0341006
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S.42C The First Time
This symbol denotes that the condition, action, thought,
feeling or other description is described as the first time this
has occurred or was experienced. This definition is the logical
negation of the S.42A definition: something never occurring
prior to the experience/event being described.
Coded ;
0210713 (6) "...which was the first time I had ever experienced
Gestalt."
0341006 (3) "From this first meeting we hit it off great."
CO-€d)^
0210713 (6) "...where 1 discovered my "self" for the first
time ever."
0210303 "Then the big day—our first game."
V
Not Coded :
0341005 (2i/3) "I was the last friend to see him before he died."
n
This symbol denotes the use of a personal possessive. It is used
with S.l when the pronoun is "my" or "mine," other appropriate elemental
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symbols are used with the other possessive pronouns (e.g., "her dress,
S.2), "our car" (S.4). etc. Diagram the arrowhead of S.43 to the
symbol representing the object, feeling, thought, etc. which
the "my" describes
.
S.43 is not used to denote possessions described in a sentence;
such as "I had 5 rooms." See S.5C. Also S.43 is not used when "my"
is mentioned in regard to personality traits (S.39A) or clusters of
traits (See S.39). It is not used when "my" refers to parts of the
body ("my arm," See S.l, S.IA).
Coded :
0210208 "She took away my^ ice pop and Johnny's mother
didn't take his ."
D—
^
0410011 (4) "We're not his only kids."
Expla: his only kids is coded S.43.
(^)
0210210 (3/4) "My closing sentence showed me standing up at the
pottium as the crowd applauded my speech."
(y^CcPH )—
0410001 (/V3) "...I went to live with my cousins ."
0410011 (4) "I guess they'd never believe that we were his
daughters
,
they thought we were his girlfriends .
"
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Not Coded :
0210210 (3/4) "It was clear to me that he didn't have the confidence
that I was feeling."
Expla: have the confidence is coded S.39.
0210515 (4/5) "If it was a man that I could have the deepest and
most total relationship—there was no way around the
preliminary bullshit."
Expla : could have the deepest and most total relationship
is coded S.22C.
( —^—(Cy~Mot Cj))
0210504 (4/5) "In the process I learned a great deal about the
rights (and lack of rights) of women."
Expla: rights of women is coded S.46.
n)
S.44 Meanings /Inner Significance
This symbol denotes that the description which it encloses is
a statement expressing the meaning, in the sense of the "inner
significance" of the experience (or part of the expereince) described.
This "meaning" is usually about "life," about the universe or about the
nature of people.
When the "meaning" is alluded to but not explicitly stated (e.g.
"I learned the meaning of the word friend'.")^ S.44 is not used. See
S.6C. A helpful criterion question to ask when scoring is "what ^
the actual meaning or "inner significance"? If this question can be
answered, then S.44 is probably appropriate.
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The word "you" included in a statement is often a clue to
scoring the statement using S.44. A judgment is made by the scorer
whether the "you" denotes the general philosophical sense of
people in general; or whether "you" denotes a reference to oneself
(i.e. "I"). If it refers to the former, the statement is more
likely to be scored using S.4A.
Coded:
0411207 (3)
U
"You have to bear it."
0210108 (5) "Life goes on, nothing changes."
0411207 (3) "You go along with your children and they
get to be 45 or 50 and you expect they are all
set for life and you can go on living peacefully
and you can't." //
“
15^, Ca, a) a^<LB,
0210502 (4) "It meant breaking a promise."
("(y^ >->")
0341001 (3) "I've also learned that there aren't as many true
friends as people think." ,
o^(
Not Coded :
0210502 (4) "I learned what it meant to be for a person to
make a commitment and then break it.
0341001 (3) "I learned the meaning of the word 'friend.'"
n)
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0210303 (3) "You can be sure there was competition."
03A1001 (3) "I learned different things about different
types of people and I can now see my faults
and learn to accept others."
S.45 Or's
^
This symbol denotes a disjunctlonal (l.e. either-or) relationship
between two (or more) parts of a sentence, in which one part(s) is (are)
an alternative description to the other part(s). This either-or
relationship is usually expressed by the word "or," between the
alternative descriptions. The alternatives may be simple such as
"I was five or six," or more elaborate, such as "she had had a fatal
accident. . .or, in more direct words—had committed suicide."
The following uses of the word "or" are all scored S.45:
(1) alternative thoughts, perceptions, behaviors or other
characterizations; (2) uncertainty or indefiniteness between (or among)
descriptions; (3) synonymous or equivalent descriptions, such as, "I
had acrophophobia or fear of heights."
This symbol denotes only the relationships described above, and not
other related logical relationships such as conjunction ("and," see
S.IO) contingencies ("if-then," see S.25) etc.
Coded :
0210301 Cd)) "I was at softball practice
—
rather just going to it."
O V
91
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0210303 (3) "that I was going to be the starting or^ short stop."
O—> V O
0210505 (5) "had had a 'fatal accident' as the hesitant operator
had put it
—
or
,
in more direct words—had committed
suicide."
C? ( ) ? , , V s
0210305 (4) "I had the measles or was just getting over them."
OyO
0210311 (4) "Finally one of my parents came in and told me to
stop it £r I would get another spanking."
^ \/—>o)
0341012 (3) "It all started when I was about 12 or 11 years
A-
old."
OvO
0341010 (3/4) "A burst of anger or fear I don't know which bust
out of me as I took off with great speed for the
house by the time I returned they ahd contacted
my parents."
o->,
S.46 Abstract Constructs
This symbol is utilized when an individual refers to an abstract
construct which is not part of the self description; the Individual
does not indicate ownership of the construct (for example, the ideas
in the statement, "I developed the ideas" is scored S.46 while "my
ideas" is scored S.39B).
Other examples of abstract constructs are rights, golden rule,
liberation, freedom, justice, issues, questions.
- 92
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Coded :
0210504 (4/5) "In the process I learned a great deal about the
rights (and lack of rights) of women."
E, H
)
0210504 (4/5) "I can't recall how I developed the Ideas."
0210504 (4/5) "I quoted Erlkson's golden rule In ftie light of
new Insight
.
Mcluhan (Global Village)
.
Mead '
* and others.
2L^ T)
0210504 (4/5) "At the end—my husband asked me, "Liberation
from what ?"
—
>o
^
0210504 (4/5) "I can't recall how I developed the Ideas—but
I dealt with many Issues and questions re
masculinity and feminity
, legal rights
,
relationships
.
Exp la: abstract thoughts are coded S.46.
n 2, 2 , 2Z)
0210504 (4/5) "I tied the movement Into a student movement ."
D-> (n)
Not Coded:
0210713 (6) "I sensed that it was not only permissible in this
setting to be natural and to follow my own Inner
direction, but It was highly desirable If I were
going to receive what the experience had to offer .
"
Expla: what the experience had to offer Is coded S.18B.
93 -
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0210713 (6) "It was not only discovering, because I had always
had an inkling there was one really there, but
it was an accepting process .
"
(( Cr^ A ( A~~A{ (^)
0210502 (4) "I began to defend position with the argument
going on and on."
Expla: my position is coded S.39B.
)—>
0210404 (3/4) "I was very curious about her ideas , habits ,
expectations and goals .
"
Expla: ideas
,
habits
,
expectations
,
goals
,
are scored S.39B.
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SELF-KNOWLEDGE EDUCATION WORKSHOP REPORT
For the past two years the Self-knowledge Project has been funded
through the Office of Drug Education in the Office of Education to develop
an understanding of the stages of development of self-knowledge. The
results of these efforts were the focus of a workshop held during the month
of July 1975. The staff of the Self-knowledge Project presented a seven-day
workshop for administrators and teachers within the State of Massachusetts
who have been involved in Humanistic Education programs within their own
school systems. The three main goals of thi workshop were:
1. To present the stages of self-knowledge development as
currently defined.
2. To begin to assess the extent to which teachers can translate
the stages into curricula.
3. To lay the groundwork for a collaborative effort between UMASS
and the school systems in Massachusetts (specifically Foxboro,
Fall River, and Montague, with possibilities in Somerville).
In order to more fully understand these objectives, it is important to get
an understanding of the total effort and the focus of the S-K Project at this
point in time. The following diagram is presented to help put the S-K
Project in perspective. In essence, parts A, B, and C in Diagram I represent
the focus of the Self-knowledge Education Project for the last two years.
More recently we have focused on part D and the work resulting from that
effort was presented to the workshop participants during the first two days
of the workshop. During the second week of the workshop there was an effort
fo translate D into F and G. Due to the fact that part D needs to be more
completely defined and validated, the work on parts F and G were tentative and
DIAGRAM I
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partial at the end of the workshop. However, connections were made with
school systems where a collaborative etTorr will be ma i n ( a liu'.l throvinlimil
the coming year. Concomitantly the coming year will also be a time for
further validation studies. But before discussing the work ahead, it
Is necessary to describe in more detail the content and process of the
workshop
.
The first two days:
As noted earlier the workshop was focused on presenting our stages
of self-knowledge development in as clear a way as possible so that
the teachers and administrators from school systems within Massachusetts
could begin to use the stages of development in their own curriculum work.
Thus in the first two days of the workshop we attempted to present the par-
ticipants with some understanding of the process we utilized in deriving
the stages. We tried to provide them with a cognitive and experlenclal
understanding of the stages so that they might better assess the extent
to which they would be willing to work with us for the following week. At
that time the task would envolve a translation of those stages into
curriculum objectives and lesson plans. In essence, after the first two
days participants were asked to make a choice as to whether or not to
continue working with us during the following week. It should be noted that
while the workshop was specifically designed for individuals currently
working in school systems in Massachusetts there were many people from outside
the State of Massachusetts who were invited explicitly for the first two
days in order to become more acquainted with the current status of our work.
While most of these individuals were not concerned with the immediate
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implications of our work for curriculum development, some of them continued
through the second week of the workshop.
The workshop began by having people meet other people who are attending
the workshop and getting an idea of what others were doing in the field of
humanistic education. During one small group activity the participants were
asked to discuss the changes they had seen in the field of Humanistic
Education during the last few years. The essence of each group's discussion
was shared publicly and then our perspective was presented in which we
described how we arrived at the need for a developmental understanding of
the growth of self-knowledge. This was followed by a brief statement by
Ruth Levinson of how interests and concerns from some key people in
Washington were very close to our concerns and how the project was funded
to explore the ideas further.
A major portion of the afternoon session was devoted to having the
participants take the Experience Recall Test and then talking about their
reactions to the instrument. It became clear from the responses that
the participants appreciated the chance to focus on an experience in the
depth. Many of them reported having learned something about themselves
as a result of completing the instrument. During the latter part of the
afternoon we presented some protocols which were illustrative of responses
from the lower stages of self-knowledge and had the participants brainstorm
about the ways in which their responses differed from those of the sample
protocols. This differentiation seemed obvious to them and gave them a
better sense of some of the characteristics of stage differences. The last
item on the schedule for the first day was a brief presentation of the
symbol coding system which had been used to derive the stages. The
311
demonstration illustrated the extent to which the structure or process
of a person's thinking could be differentiated from the content of their
experience.
On the morning of the second day we presented the participants with
a description of the stages of self-knowledge (see Chapter V). This
was presented in terms of a verbal description of the characteristics
of the stages. Following this presentation the participants, in small
groups, discussed what they understood about the theory and the character-
istics of the stages. To give the participants an experiential feel for
the stages they were asked to imagine a building and they had to describe
themselves as that building would at each of the four stages. A sample
description generated is as follows:
I . Elemental
I'm stone and have lots of candles and painted windows.
Usually I am dark and no one is there. Sometimes music plays
and people' sing.
II. Situational
We had a wedding today and lots of people came. Some cried,
some seemed happy, lots of cars were on the road outside and the
horns were noisey. I like weddings because I enjoy smelling the
flowers and looking at the people.
III. Patterned
I have lots of different moods, weddings are o.k. but
funerals seem to make people so sad. The music is different
and this often makes me look and feel differently. I wonder
about the people and what they are like when they leave or if
they act differently when they are some place else.
IV. Transformational
Sometimes I hear remarks about what people think of me.
To some I am almost an enemy, a destructive force to society,
to others I seem important and a very real part of their
lives. What seems most important to my being is not my
physical appearance or even the rituals that are performed
within me but the purpose 1 serve to some people.
To further clarify the stages we asked the participants to think of
a typical humanistic education exercise in which individuals are asked
"Are you more like a hammer or a nail." Then participants were asked the
reasons people would give for their choices at the different stages.
Participants also generated a list of process questions that could be
used to elicit responses at each of the four stages.
These two experienclal tasks helped people understand more clearly
the nature of the stages and the types of thinking processes which are
characteristics of a given stage. Thus, during the two days participants
had been exposed to some of our thinking in terms of how the problem was
defined, how the instrument was developed, how we were currently going
about the process of coding the protocols and had both a theoretical and
experiential understanding of the stages as they had been defined. The
final task of the second day was to discuss what the participants wanted
to happen during the following week. It was clear from the responses
from the group that most of the participants would return and that they
were excited about the prospect of generating curriculum. We asked them
to tell us what kind of a focus they wanted for the second week. On the
basis of this data the second week was designed.
The Second Week:
On Monday we presented an agenda for the week to the group and asked
for their response. In essence we suggested that the common goal for the
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group was to write a developmental curriculum for self-knowledge within
their area of interest. From the data collected the previous week the
following Interest groups were defined.
Hxjman development curriculum for high school
Teacher training curriculum
Confluent applications of humanistic education
(math, social studies, etc.)
A revision of the Montague curriculum
One-to-one counseling
Stage related issues (Erlkson, Maslow, Loevlnger)
Alternative methods of diagnosis
The essential task for Monday was to create a set of curriculum objectives
for the stages—regardless of special interest area—and these could
be used for the remainder of the week by the interest groups. By the
end of the day curriculum objectives for the general stage and for
each of the symbols in each stage had been defined. These were
duplicated Monday night and ready for the interest groups to work with on
Tuesday, To help people with their work on Monday an
expanded version of Working Paper #8 was created with a more detailed
description of the symbols utilized to illustrate each stage^
On Tuesday morning people began work on their groups and continued
to work throughout most of Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. In working
within the interest groups, participants were asked to create a minimum
of six lesson plans.
Three lesson plans which represented alternative ways of
trying to meet one objective; and
Three lesson plans which would illustrate an attempt
to meet an objective at an adjacent level of development.
3M
In order to do this they had to:
1. Choose an objective to work with at a given stage.
2. Design a lesson plan which included the following
considerations
:
a. A description of who the exercise is for.
b. A description of the materials necessary to implement
the lesson.
c. A description of the activity and how it would be
conducted.
d. A list of the processing questions that would be
utilized.
e. A consideration of the possible follow-up that could
be used and cautions to be considered when using
the exercise.
3. Consider how you would change the lesson plans if the group
the exercise was used with was mixed in terms of self-knowledge
stages represented.
With this framework participants could choose:
1. The stage they wanted to work within.
2. The specific objective which would be the focus within
the stage.
3. The content of the exercise.
4. The actual activity which would be employed.
5. The total number of exercises they would produce by the
end of the week.
On Wednesday afternoon we presented an exercise
io illustrate some of the processing questions which could be asked at
3 given stage. In actual fact, the exercise turned out to be a task which
could be worked on through an entire semester's course. By Thursday
afternoon most of the groups felt that they had done as much as they
could on the task and so we spent part of the day discussing how a
315
collaborative relationship could be established between the University
and the various school systems represented.
The groups requested that some of the following things could happen
during the coming year:
That a directory of the participants be created so that
people from the workshop could write directly to one
another.
That the staff produce a processing guide which would
consist of a listing of possible processing questions
that could be used at each stage.
That the curriculum materials which had been completed
be edited and duplicated for all personnel who attended
the workshop (see Attachment ; .
That we sent new curriculum ideas to people in the field
as it was generated and that they would respond to how
it worked, making suggestions for revision.
That there be a specific person to whom correspondence,
etc., could be addressed who would be responsible for
coordinating the efforts between the various systems.
That the participants meet once or twice during the
year to share their experiences in trying to use the
material, generating additional material, etc.
In general, people were excited about the things they learned during
the workshop. They seemed to have a good understanding of our definition
of the stages, but it was clear that we had to better define the stages
before further work could be done. Thus our staff met on Friday to
consider our next steps and to discuss the work for the coming year.
Referring back to Diagram I it is possible to get a sense of the next
steps. Essentially we will be working on Parts E, F, and G at the same
time that we are continuing to do work on validating the Instrument.
SELF-KNOWLEDGE EDUCATION WORKSHOP
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STAGE I: Elemental Self-Knowledge
Main Goal: The person will be able to, spontaneously or when asked, describe
separate distinct independent "useable" parts of a personal experience (occurring
at a single point in time and space)
.
Enabling Objectives:
1) The person will be able to describe others vital statistics, locations
and physical condition in regard to the personal experience. A person will be
able to use third person pronouns and proper nouns relating to other people.
Example
Who else was there?
2) The person will be able to describe concrete objects — vital statistics
(color, shape, etc. location).
Example
How big was the ball?
What did it look like?
3) The person will be able to indicate a communication which occurred
in regard to the personal experience. The person will be able to repeat or
report what they or someone else said.
Example
Who said that?
What did he/she say?
4) The person will be able to report at least one thought in his/her personal
experience.
Example
What did you say to yourself when that happened?
2317
Physical Self
(a) When asked, or spontaneously, a peison will be able to deseiibe
tal statistics such as age, physical characteristics, geographical
1, race, sex and grade.
(b) When asked, or spontaneously, a person will be able to describe
;
parts of his/her body as required.
(c) When asked, or spontaneously, a person will ba able to describe
if being in terms of location, i.e., environment and time —present,
;e, past, removed past.
(d) When asked, or spontaneously, a person will be able to describe
ir general physiological conditions or conditions of health.
impies
ire were you when it happened?
I old were you?
Personal Possessions: A person will be able to use appropriate
.ve pronouns (This objective is not significant).
unple
>se was it?
[: Situational Self
:: A person will a) be able to recognize a number of Internal and
. elements of a situation, b) be able to organize these elements into
mt unit and c) be able to make elementary evaluations of the event.
;
Objectives for Goal One:
Mutual Actions (This objective is not significant)
lerson can describe an action involving hlm/herself and another person(s)
ipon each other...
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by experiencing working with others
playing with others
learning vocabulary which expresses mutuality of action
listening to others feelings of same experience
2) Situation specific emotional state
A person will be able to express emotions/feelings about a specific
situation in emotional rather than physiological states by increasing feeling
vocabulary
.
3) Emotions as causes or caused: A person will be able to describe his/her
own feelings about something such as an act^on, a thought, a person or object
and also name the object of his/her feelings.
4) Core Event: A person will be able to describe a situation by specifying
the details (who, what, etc.) of the situation, and then comment about the
situation by describing (a) what led up to it, (b) what its consequences were,
or (c) what his/her feelings about it were.
STAGE III: Patterned Stage
Goal One: The person can name patterns of his/her and others' personalities and
generalize across situations over time and assign values to these patterns.
Enabling Objectives for Goal One:
1) In the description the person will name personality traits, identify
his/her own and others' roles and recognize reciprocol role.
2) There will also be an expression of awareness of continuity of actions
or conditions and of continuing involvement. S/he will describe Internal
"shoulds" (This objective is low priority for this stage).
^al Two: A person will be able to describe personality traits in terms of the
characteristics of an experience in a specific situation and will be able
to recognize their own role and the interplay with others' roles and assign
value to some of these patterns.
Enabling Objectives for Goal Two:
1) A person will be able to describe a number of personality traits
In self or others.
2) A person will be able to show awareness of his/her own role and the
roles of others, and to be aware of how these relationships interact.
3) A person will be able to describe personal involvement in an experience
and to recognize its effect.
4) A person will be able to demonstrate his/her ability to explore
alternative actions.
STAGE IV: Transformational Self
1) The student will be able to describe and categorize one's own:
(1) processes of transformation
(2) continuous development
(3) assignment of value in terms of meanings and inner significances
of these processes
2) The student will describe an awareness of:
(1) the steps or procedures of thinking, namely understanding, impact
application, analysis, synthesis and evaluation
(2) the interrelationships among ideas or thoughts
3) The student will refer to an abstract idea such as truth, justice,
without claiming ownership of the idea.
4) The student will describe the impact or result of one's experience in
its totality, the student will refer to this total experience as the point of
change in one's life condition.
5) The student will be able to indicate that several (multiple) feelings
were experienced simultaneously, by using one word or phrase to denote those
feelings or emotions.
6) Expressable Emotions: One will be able to describe the conflict of
Expressing or not expressing a single emotion or feeling.
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7) Personality Cluster
(a) The person will be able to express one word or concept to
denote a generalization of several of his/her personality traits or
characteristics
.
(b) Given several words that denote several personality traits, the
person will be able to use one word that categorizes all of them (in personal
terms)
.
(c) Given a word that denotes a "generalized personality cluster,"
(such as "my interest," "my capacities," "my personal tastes"), the person can
name several examples of that cluster. (For example, "personal tastes include:
my preference for browns and violets in clothing, an inclination for Greek *
and Mexican foods, preference for discussion in social sciences rather than
biological sciences.)
8) The person will be able to describe "learning" in terms of personal,
emotional or experiential impact on oneself.
9) The student will be able to describe through the use of a single
word multiple simultaneous feelings stimulated by a particular experience.
10)
The person will be able to describe the total experience — as turning
point or time of change in his/her personal existence. The total experience
described will begin or end this change.
SAMPLE lesson PLANS
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T each er-Tralnlns — Stage III (Patterned)
Topic — Awareness of one's sex-role and the sex-roles of others
Objective; — A person will be able to show awareness of their own roles and
the roles of others, and to be aware of how these relationships interact.
I. Teachers are given the following sentence stubs to answer individually.
1. When I see two males fighting I usual 1;' experience
Fed.ings of
I tell myself
What I do is
2. Whan I see two fonales fighting 1 usually experimee
Feelings of
I tell myself
What I do is
3. When I see a male crying I ecperioice
Feelings of
I tell myself
What I do is
4. Whan I see a fanale crying I usually experiaice
F eelings of
I tell myself
What I do is
5. Whan I am sworn at by a male I usually experiaice
F eelings of
I t ell mys elf
What I do is
6. Whan I am sworn at by a fanale I usually expariaice
F eelings of
I tell myself
What I do is
?. Whan I am praised by a male I usually experience
Feelings of
I t ell mys elf
What I do is
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8. Whm I am praised by a f anal e I usually ocperlence
F eelings of
I t ell mys elf
What I do is
9. When I am the only male/fanale In a group I usually experience
F eelings of
I tell myself
What I do is
10. When I am working for a male 1 usually ex peri me e
Feelings of
I t ell mys elf
What I do is
11. Whai I am working for a fanale I usually experience
Feelings of
_
I t ell mys elf
What I do is
12. When I have dinner with a male I usually ex peri me e
F eelings of
I tell myself
What I do is
13. Whm I have dinner with a fanale I usually experimee
F eelings of
I tell myself
What I do is
14.
Whm a male o pms a door for me I usually exparimee
Feelings of
I tell myself
What I do is
IS Whm a fanale o pms a door for me I usually ocperiaice
Feelings of
_
I t ell mys elf
What I do is
1) Of the fift em choose as many pairs as time permits.
2) Shar e r Gs pons es to the questions in triads.
3) Answer the following process questions individually
a. Did you notice any similarities across these patterns to
your responses?
- 8 -
323
b. Under what circumstances do you notice this pattern?
c. How docs this pattern affect your relationships with
your pea-s, studaits, parmts, administrators?
Follow-Up — Continue the original exacise by following the steps of the
Trum pet.
My pattern helps me ...
Some of the prices of my pattern are ...
Alternatives to my pattern are...
Cautions — Use with voluntea group
Use with grou p who have prior knowledge of cont®t of th« workshop
Teacha-Training Stage IV (Transformational)
Obj ative A. - The pason is able to describe one's level of thinking, namely
undastanding impact, application, analysis, syntheses and evaluation.
Objective B. The pason is able to describe "learning" in terms of pasonal,
onotlonal and oc palatial impact on oneself.
At the last session, the teachas looked at their patterns in terms of
function and consequence and chose an alternative to "try-on" a new behavior
in the Intervailng tlmebaween maings.
At the beginning of this session teachas share in their small supprt
groups the expalmce of try-on new b diavior, and accepting that bdiavlor as
dlffaait from a previous pattern or patterns of bdiavior.
Did you make any decisions aft a the "try-on" to accept or r ^ ect the
naj behavior?
Check those patterns (from the questionnaire) that are relatively recait
for you. For «ch one checked, see if you can recall a turning point apalaice.
What wae the similar charactalstics of these turning points? Do the charactaistics
of the turning points at aid to otha patterns you have changed?
SAMPLE lesson PLANS: HUMANISTIC EDUCATION
STAGE TWO
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Mutual Actions : (this objective has relatively low priority) A person can
describe an action involving himself and another person acting upon each other.
...learning vocabulary which expresses mutuality of action.
Cautions : These exercises are based on the assvunption that the children have
already been exposed to the affective techniques and activities that would
enable them to have a high trust level and an adequate feelings vocabulary.
DAY I
A. Activity - Forced Choice
Teacher explains to children four choices
:
1) likes monster movies
2) likes dogs
3) is afraid of dark
4) likes to collect things as a hobby
B. Give children time to make their decisions
C. Designate four comers of the room to represent your four topics. Ask
children to meet in the group (comer) of their choice.
D. Materials — give each group a crayon and a large sheet of newsprint
E. Instruct children to draw something pertaining to their choice
F. Encourage conversation while drawing
Process Questions
Think of as many things as you can that you shared in your group.
1. What kinds of things did you do to one another, (we talked to each
other, we laughed at each other, we disagreed with each other, etc.)
2. When you laughed at each other how did you each feel? Did you have
the same feelings for each other?
3. There are many questions that would naturally follow the answers
to the previous questions.
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This is an excellent activity for stage III but inappropriate for stage II.
1. Activity - "The Howdy Game"
2. Materials - mimeographed sheet that looks like a Bingo Game - pencil,
square markers for game.
3. Instructions - on top of work sheet (Bingo)
4. Instruct children to walk around (mice) the classroom and talk about
shared feelings. Fill-in blanks (with name of other child) who shares the same
feeling about each block.
5. Play the Bingo Game
6. Ask process questions.
Sample of Game Sheet
Name
Everyone walk around the room. Talk to each other about each block. When
you find someone who has the same feeling as you do about a certain block go
on, but with that persons name in that block. Try to fill as many blocks as
you can. Don't be concerned if all blocks are not filled in.
favorite favorite favorite hates likes
ice cream
Susan
pet dogs dogs school
hates favorite likes likes hates
school t.v. show music dentist dentist
likes
drawing
hates
drawing
is afraid
of dark
is not af- same
raid of dark hobby
a shared
friend
favorite
drink
favorite
game
likes hot
dogs better
than hamburgs
likes
write
to
stories
likes to
help Mom
likes to
help Dad
likes to
cook
likes to be
alone
likes to be
with people
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a. How did you feel when you found someone who shared your feelings?
b. How did you feel about encountering feelings different from yours?
c. Who surprised you?
d. Did you find someone you'd like to know better?
e. What did you do together while doing this activity?
SAMPLE LESSON PLAN: HUMANISTIC EDUCATION
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STAGE III
iiame Tag Exercise — (other options — Bumpety Bump Bump, Elephant and Giraffe,
Sign Game)
Objective: After this exercise the person hopefully will be able to name one
personality trait as process questions in their personal journals.
Materials : large cards
,
blackboard
,
pens and magic markers
,
Cape
\ 2.) "ing" 3) A place where
words
1) NAME
you've been
(What you would like
to be known by)
4) Name three 5) Name one thing
things you do you would like
help to improve
1) Name
2) List three words that describe you and end in ING.
3) A place where you've been that you enjoyed and would like to return to again
4) Name three things you do well
5) Name one thing you would like help to improve.
Is there anything else about this exercise that you would like to write in
your journals? *(Open up the group for public sharing of processing questions)
During the milling:
How did you feel about this exercise? Is this a feeling you often feel when
you meet new people? Try to remember where you stood in the middle, on the side,
did you move around—is this typical of you? Were you a picker , a plckee? Did
you meet many or few people? Is this a pattern of yours? Did you follow the
rules? Did you want to follow them? Was this a concious decision? Is this
typical of you?
*Open up processing here
Following Exercises: A coffee break, an energy exercise
Cautions
!
328
Sharing to be voluntary /high structured exercise
Milling—Non-Verbal observing other people's name tags and making mental notes
about individuals you would like to meet with later (two minutes)
.
Now find one or two people who you would like to share your name tags with,
as you review your name tag patterns take out your personal journals:
(assure them that content of answers do not have to be shared). Considering
patterns you noted within yourself during the milling exercise were there any
of these you are willing to or wish to alter. What do these patterns get you
or do you loose through them? VThat will you gain through them? What will you
gain or loose by changing them?
Name one behavior you would like to try on during this workshop in order
to change your perception of yourself.
Process Questions
1. Do you do these things often? (In reference to your "Ing" words. How
often are these words used to describe you? Are these positive or negative
describing words?
2. Which of the three words do you do most often and under what situations?
3. What about the place that makes you comfortable has made you comfortable
in the past. Are there other places with these characteristics?
4. Are there certain times or needs that bring this place to mind and want to go
back?
5. How did you feel about answering this question? Do you often feel this way
when you have to name something "good" about yourself?
6. How did you feel about answering question five. Was it easy for you to admit
to yourself that you need help? When asked where and how you need help, is your
response to question five a pattern?
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WRITING LESSONS
Lesson I Stage II (Situational)
A writing class
Objective : Mutual Actions (this objective has low priority for this stage)
A person will recognize and express actions Involving himself and another person.
A person will write a recalled experience Involving another person
Materials: paper, pencils and pens
Procedure :
1. The teacher begins by relating an experience demonstrating the Stage II
objective—the teacher would start with a sentence such as :"I am going to tell
you about something that my friend and I did to each other."
Conclusion: "You must all have had experiences with other people where you did
the same thing to each other.
2. Asslgnmant—write about an experience you had during the past week
with a sister, brother or friend.
3. Processing—What did you feel? What did the other person feel? Were
your feelings the same or different?
Objective: The person can name patterns of his/her and others' personality and
generalize across situations over time and assign values to these patterns.
Materials .
Stage III — the same writing class
Assignment
-i- Same as for stage II
Processing for Stage III (Patterned)
Use questions for Stage II plus the following:
Tell about another situation where you felt the same way.
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Do you usually react this way?
Name the similarities and differences between the two situations
.
Did you do something then that you might have done differently?
Fill in the blank
I am usually the kind of person who
.
Lesson II Stage III —
. Same writing class
Objective : A person will describe an action involving hlm/herself and another
person acting upon each other. (This objective has a very low priority for
this stage).
Writing Objective ; A person will write a recalled experience involving another
person.
Materials needed : corrected papers (corrected for writing skill content)
display board
Procedure :
1. The teacher will hand back papers and Instruct the students to make
a final copy for the bulletin board. There will be no names on work. Teacher
will assign numbers to work.
2. When finished the teacher will collect and post on the board
3. Teacher will ask students to read several papers to themselves and
indicate what experience they most relate to by listing on a piece of paper the
numbers of the stories they chose.
4. Students will hand in lists
* Teacher will indicate to students they will be doing something the next day
related to the list they made.
Lesson III Stage II — writing class
Enabling Objectives: a person can describe an action Involving him/herself and
another person's action upon each other.
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Writing Objective : A person will participate In an experience with another
person by illustrating a story they both relate to.
Materials : drawing paper, crayons or other drawing materials
Procedure :
1. Teacher will pair off students based on number selection.
2. Teacher tells students they will be working in pairs to Illustrate
stories they picked the day before.
3. Students are given time to work.
4. After most have completed work, students will be given paper
to answer process questions.
Process Questions :
1. What story did you illustrate?
2. How did you help each other to decide what parts each would draw?
3. What problems did you cause each other while working together.
4. How did you feel as you were working with someone else?
5. How do you thlnlp your partner felt?
When finished have volunteers share responses with class. Teacher might
Informally Inventory the rest of the class to find similarities.
Lesson III Stage II Science Education
Assumed pre-requisite : * Student should be able to observe and record data.
Objective : Two students will perform a forced choice experiment. The remaining
students will observe the demonstration and redord data and express their feelings
of how it would feel to be the can or the egg and who had the same feelings
or reaction.
Materials : Lab equipment for experiment—can, bunsen burner, hard boiled egg.
glass milk bottle, paper.
Process questions :
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1. Can you ever recall a time when you felt like the can or the egg?
2. Did anyone ever have the same feelings that you had?
3. What did it feel like to be the egg/or can?
4. When did you discover that someone else had shared the same
feelings that you had.
Caution : (1) Exercise should be a voluntary response.
(2) Possibly by grouping students who shared same experience.
Revision for Stage I Process Questions
1. How old were you when you had the experience?
2. Who if anyone was with you?
3. Where in your body did you feel the same as the egg or can.
Stage III Process Questions
:
±. How many times did you feel that same way?
2. Did you ever feel that other people had the same feelings as you?
3. How has having the feelings or experience changed you (If you feel
it has changed you?)
Evaluation by students: Students and teacher gather together in a circle
and discuss their reactions to the lesson. Sort of a feedback situation.
Lesson II Stage III (Patterned)
Oblectlve : After observing a demonstration involving clear liquids in containers
the students will be able to name patterns of their personality and of others;
and generalize across situations over time and assign values to their patterns.
Demonstration: Three identical clear containers each containing a different
solution. Container marked ill will contain mineral oil; container marked ill will
contain alcohol, container marked #3 will contain water. (Fill containers with
solutions before students enter room)
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1. Piace a plastic cube in container #1 (this cube will float).
2. Place an ice cube in container marked #2 (cube wiil sink to bottom).
3. Place ice cube in container marked #3 (cube will float).
Student may try to draw conclusions from data received. Student should only be
reporting observation.
Materials : Three clear containers; alcohol, mineral oil, water, plastic cube, ice
cubes, container for ice cubes, coke-pepsi, plain cups containing the soft drink.
Mimeograph continuum.
Process questions !
1. Have you ever come to a conclusion prior to this demonstration without
gathering enough information about the topic or subject?
2. On the mimeograph continuum place a check mark to show where you are
on coming to a conclusion wlthoug enough information.
3. What were the results of or consequences of your reaction?
Process Questions :
Stage I
1. How old were you when you first felt the same ways as the other person?
2. What do you usually do when you experience this?
3. What do you tell yourself?
Lesson III Stage IV (Transformational)
Objectives: After the student has completed the continuum; identifying patterns
of behavior; the student will be able to describe and categorize one's own process
of transformation.
Materials : mimeograph sheet
Process questions ;
1. If you could describe your behavior in terms of an animal what would
that animal be?
2. How do you feel about the value of your behavior?
3. If you're not comfortable with that behavior what could you do
about it?
4. What kind s of changes (alternative) could you try?
a. What happened when you tried the alternative?
b. What were your feelings while you were changing?
c. Would you continue with that alternative change?
5. Can you think of a time wheii your reaction to the same situation
changed your behavior?
a. How did it change it?
b. What was your reaction?


